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People v. Smalls
Citations: 80 A.D.2d 446; 438 N.Y.S.2d 1015; 1981 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10112
Court: Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York; May 19, 1981; New York; State Appellate Court
The appeal centers on whether the defendant's trial should have been separated from that of his codefendant, Anthony DeShawn McGee. The defendant claims his oral confession does not interlock with McGee's written confession, suggesting a severance was warranted. The court finds this argument unconvincing. On December 7, 1976, McGee, Philip Green, and the defendant planned to rob Pedro Pratt’s apartment, orchestrated by Mary Jenkins. Jenkins, who did not participate in the robbery due to recognition risk, recruited Green. On the night of the crime, Green, accompanied by McGee and another associate, met the defendant before proceeding to Jenkins' apartment to finalize the robbery plan. Jenkins believed the robbery was canceled after Green expressed concern about the defendant being 'high.' However, upon encountering Pratt and his friend Edward Tyler as they returned to the apartment, the plan was executed. The three men brandished guns, with the defendant threatening Tyler, while McGee forced entry into Pratt's apartment, asserting it was a robbery. McGee demanded the location of money while in an apartment, and a confrontation ensued with Pratt, resulting in McGee's pistol discharging due to its 'hair trigger' when Pratt struck McGee's arm. Following the shot, McGee and Smalls allegedly fled the scene, but several Pratt family members testified that they completed the robbery. Jenkins, present in her own apartment during the incident, heard the shot and went to Green’s apartment, a pre-arranged meeting point for the robbery participants. At Green’s, McGee admitted to Jenkins that he shot Pratt 'right in the face' and later bragged about being a 'marksman' who shot Pratt 'directly between the eyes.' Five weeks post-shooting, the defendant was arrested and gave an oral statement to authorities, which was written down but not signed by him. He claimed he was unaware of any robbery plans and had only intended to buy wine when he met McGee and Green. The defendant described accompanying them to Jenkins' apartment without discussing a robbery. After Jenkins spoke to two men in the hallway, McGee drew a gun and forced entry into the Pratt apartment, demanding money. The defendant witnessed McGee shoot Pratt and claimed to have attempted to help the victims before leaving and going home for the night. The key legal issue is whether the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was violated when the trial court admitted the confession of Smalls, McGee's codefendant, who did not testify. The dissent argued that the confessions were not interlocking, but the majority found them substantially similar, thus not violating the Bruton rule (Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123). In a joint trial, the admission of a codefendant's extrajudicial confession, which cannot be cross-examined, typically constitutes an error under the Bruton v. United States precedent. However, this rule is not absolute; courts can consider the actual impact of the confession on the defendant and whether any error is harmless in light of other evidence. In People v. Baker, the court emphasized evaluating the confession's effect on the defendant rather than applying Bruton rigidly. In this case, confessions from defendants Smalls and McGee are notably similar, detailing their actions on the night of the incident, including meeting at a specific location and participating in a robbery. Both confessions indicate that they were together at Jenkins’ apartment, where a robbery was announced, and that they fled after a shot was fired. The defendant attempts to argue that his role was merely that of an innocent bystander out to buy wine or to assist a friend. However, the court finds these claims unconvincing, as both confessions substantiate his active participation in the crime. The court concludes that even if the confessions were not entirely interlocking, the overwhelming evidence against the defendant justifies upholding the conviction. Citing Harrington v. California, the court states that a Bruton error can be deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if the evidence against the accused is compelling, further reinforcing the basis for affirming the defendant's conviction. Defendant Smalls is implicated in a shooting incident, with evidence against him deemed overwhelming. Eyewitnesses, including Edward Tyler and members of the Pratt family, testified to Smalls' involvement. Tyler specifically identified Smalls as one of the gunmen, stating he held a pistol to his head. Smalls admitted to being in the victim Jenkins' apartment during the crime and followed another individual, McGee, into Pratt's apartment, where McGee demanded money and shot Pratt. Additionally, testimony indicated that Smalls searched the victim’s pockets after the shooting. The dissent acknowledges the substantial evidence against Smalls, and any potential violation of the Bruton rule regarding confessions is deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The form of the confessions did not materially affect the jury's decision. The judgment of the Supreme Court of New York County, convicting Smalls of second-degree murder and sentencing him to 17 years to life, is affirmed.