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People v. McPherson
Citations: 89 A.D.3d 752; 932 N.Y.2d 85
Court: Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York; November 1, 2011; New York; State Appellate Court
On October 18-19, 2007, around midnight, the defendant visited the Island Rock nightclub in Hempstead with his girlfriend, her friend Delroy McCalla, and Roman Taylor. After consuming alcohol, the defendant and Taylor went to a nearby parking lot, where McCalla noted that the defendant did not appear intoxicated but became upset, expressing, "I lost my shit," likely referring to drugs. He searched his car trunk and argued with his girlfriend. At approximately 3:15 a.m., witnesses reported hearing gunshots, but none saw the defendant firing a weapon. The defendant then ordered McCalla to leave with his girlfriend, and they drove away. Shortly after, at about 3:20 a.m., police arrived and found several 9-millimeter shell casings in the parking lot, but the defendant had already left. At around 3:30 a.m., the defendant was observed driving his vehicle the wrong way on the Southern State Parkway at speeds of 70-75 mph, posing a danger to oncoming traffic. Witnesses described his reckless driving, including one who had to pull over to avoid a collision. Police Sergeant Edward Schulze, also driving correctly, narrowly avoided a crash with the defendant’s vehicle, which continued to speed without any attempt to change course. Near exit 13, the defendant's vehicle collided head-on with another car, resulting in the victim's instant death and the vehicle being incinerated. When emergency responders arrived, the defendant was agitated and exhibited a strong smell of alcohol. A blood sample taken at 4:49 a.m. showed a BAC of 0.19. During a subsequent search of the defendant's car, which transitioned from an inventory to an investigatory search, police found a 9-millimeter semiautomatic pistol, cocaine, and multiple 9-millimeter bullets. The gun matched the shell casings found earlier. The defendant’s argument that the evidence was insufficient for his conviction of second-degree murder and criminal possession of a weapon was deemed unpreserved for appellate review. Viewing the evidence favorably for the prosecution, it is determined that there is sufficient legal basis to establish the defendant's guilt for depraved indifference murder beyond a reasonable doubt. A person can be convicted of this crime if they recklessly engage in conduct showing a depraved indifference to human life, creating a grave risk of death, which results in another's death. The dissent's assertion that there was no evidence of the defendant's deliberate recklessness in driving the wrong way is rejected. Witness testimonies indicating that the defendant was speeding towards them and forcing them to swerve demonstrate a mental state of depraved indifference. The defendant claims his blood alcohol concentration (BAC) impaired his ability to form this mental state; however, evidence indicates he appeared coherent and capable. Witnesses confirmed he did not appear intoxicated when leaving the nightclub. The case law referenced supports the position that statutory intoxication does not eliminate the possibility of forming the necessary mental state for depraved indifference. The trial court's finding that the defendant experienced an atypical reaction to substances further suggests he maintained coherence prior to the incident. Comparisons are drawn to a similar case where the defendant's intoxication did not prevent the formation of requisite mens rea, reinforcing the conclusion that intoxication alone is not determinative of guilt. Evidence presented at trial distinguishes this case from precedents cited by the defendant, specifically People v Prindle and People v Valencia. In Prindle, the defendant's reckless driving during a police chase resulted in a fatal collision, but the Court of Appeals found the evidence insufficient for depraved indifference murder, as the chase indicated an intent to evade. In contrast, the current case does not suggest the defendant was fleeing from police and shows he had opportunities to avoid oncoming traffic. In Valencia, the defendant's intoxication was found to render him oblivious to his driving, negating the required mental state for depraved indifference assault, a finding upheld by the court. Unlike Valencia, where no evidence showed the defendant's reckless behavior prior to the accident, the current case includes eyewitness testimony indicating a complete disregard for human life, supporting the conviction of depraved indifference murder. The court does not agree that intoxication alone absolves a defendant from culpability in cases involving fatal accidents in oncoming traffic. Instead, the nature of the evidence is crucial, and while a proper factual predicate could lead to an acquittal, the facts here justify the defendant's conviction for second-degree murder. Thus, the cited cases underscore the importance of factual distinctions in determining culpability. The legal framework regarding aggravated vehicular homicide, established by the 2007 Legislature as a class B felony, remains underdeveloped. The new crime targets intoxicated drivers whose actions do not exhibit depraved indifference to human life, highlighting that it was not in effect during the incident in question. While the dissenting opinion suggests that a conviction for depraved indifference murder would require evidence of suicidal intent, this is incorrect; such intent is not necessary for establishing guilt under the standard of depraved indifference, which is characterized by a reckless disregard for life. The defendant’s conduct of driving against oncoming traffic for several miles constituted reckless behavior indicative of a depraved mindset. Evidence refutes the claim of extreme intoxication affecting the defendant's culpability, as he displayed coherent behavior before the incident. The court found sufficient evidence to uphold the conviction for murder in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, and deemed the verdict consistent with the evidence weight. The court also ruled that the search of the defendant’s vehicle was lawful under established exceptions to the warrant requirement. The defense counsel's performance was deemed adequate, and the sentence was not excessive. In dissent, Judge Belen argues for modifying the murder conviction to manslaughter and calls for resentencing.