United States v. Roberto Puente, Jr.

Citations: 982 F.2d 156; 38 Cont. Cas. Fed. 76,533; 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 895; 1993 WL 9510Docket: 92-8084

Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; January 21, 1993; Federal Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Roberto Puente, Jr. was convicted of making a false statement to a government agency under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 after a bench trial. Puente, along with his father, submitted a bid for a HUD-administered housing project, signing a certification form that falsely stated they had never been convicted of a felony, despite both having prior felony convictions. Although HUD's John Melton initially supported their bid, upon learning of the felony convictions, he reported the misrepresentation to HUD legal counsel. Despite recognizing potential misunderstandings due to the form's readability, HUD officials ultimately rejected Puente's bid after he signed a clearer version of the certification. Puente raised two arguments on appeal: that the government failed to prove the elements of a § 1001 violation and that his conduct fell under the 'exculpatory no' exception. The Fifth Circuit found no error in the district court’s judgment, affirming the conviction. The case hinged on the sufficiency of evidence regarding the materiality of the false statement and Puente's intent, both essential elements of the offense.

The Court employs a substantial evidence standard to evaluate the sufficiency of evidence in bench trials, determining if the evidence justifies a conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt when viewed favorably to the government. A statement is deemed material if it has the potential to influence a government function, regardless of actual influence or reliance by the agency. Puente contends that his felony conviction was immaterial since a bidder could still secure a contract; however, case law indicates that materiality hinges on whether a misrepresentation could influence agency decisions. The Previous Participation Certification Puente signed aimed to inform HUD of a bidder's qualifications and included multiple assertions regarding his criminal history and financial standing. Although Puente might have still received the contract even with truthful answers, his misrepresentation limited HUD's ability to assess bidder qualifications comprehensively. Consequently, the district court correctly found that Puente's misrepresentation was capable of influencing agency decisions.

For a conviction under § 1001, the prosecution must demonstrate that the defendant intentionally made a false statement, either deliberately or with reckless disregard for the truth. Puente's claim of not reading the HUD form was countered by the district court's finding that his failure to read it constituted reckless disregard for the truth and an intention to avoid discovering it.

The Court upheld the district court's judgment, confirming that 'reckless indifference' satisfies the scienter requirement under 18 U.S.C. § 1001, meaning a defendant cannot evade criminal liability by deliberately avoiding the truth, including not reading a signed form. Puente's argument that his false statement qualified for the 'exculpatory no' exception—exempting mere negative responses from § 1001 liability—was rejected. This doctrine, which arises partly from concerns over Fifth Amendment implications, was deemed inapplicable since Puente did not present this theory in the district court. The Court applies a 'plain error' standard for new arguments raised on appeal, which Puente's claim did not meet. Consequently, the Court affirmed Puente's conviction for violating § 1001, finding no plain error in the district court's failure to acquit him under the 'exculpatory no' doctrine. The judgment of the district court is therefore upheld.