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United States v. Miguel Martin Tapia
Citations: 981 F.2d 1194; 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 933; 1993 WL 1705Docket: 92-6171
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit; January 22, 1993; Federal Appellate Court
On July 2, 1991, Miguel Martin Tapia pleaded guilty to escaping from federal custody, violating 18 U.S.C. § 751(a). The district court, on February 26, 1992, sentenced him to 24 months of imprisonment under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, to run consecutively with his prior federal sentence, followed by three years of supervised release. Tapia appealed the sentence on four grounds, all of which were found to lack merit, leading to an affirmation of the district court's decision. A key argument in Tapia's appeal asserted that his escape occurred before the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines were established in November 1987, thereby contending that sentencing him under these guidelines violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution. The court clarified that for a law to be considered ex post facto, it must be both retrospective and disadvantageous. While Tapia's sentencing did impose a harsher penalty compared to pre-Guidelines practices, the court found that his actions constituted a continuing offense. His escape, alongside his failure to return to custody, extended beyond the implementation date of the Guidelines, justifying the application of those guidelines in his sentencing. Thus, the court concluded that there was no constitutional violation in sentencing Tapia under the Guidelines. The court affirms the constitutionality of applying sentencing Guidelines in an escape case, aligning with the Third Circuit's ruling in United States v. Audinot. The appellant claims the Ex Post Facto Clause prevents the application of new laws without prior warning, arguing his lack of English proficiency denied him adequate notice of changes regarding escape under the Guidelines. The court clarifies that Miller v. Florida does not impose a duty on the government to warn individuals of new laws, emphasizing that ignorance of the law is not a valid defense. The court acknowledges that due process may protect individuals unaware of laws in rare circumstances, but this does not apply to the appellant's case. Regarding the appellant's request for a four-level offense reduction under U.S.S.G. 2P1.1(b)(3), the court notes that while the appellant escaped from non-secure custody during a work detail, the government contends that to qualify for the reduction, the escape must originate from specific types of facilities (e.g., community corrections centers) not met in this case, as the appellant was at a federal prison camp. The interpretation of U.S.S.G. § 2P1.1(b)(3) establishes that to qualify for a four-point sentence reduction, a defendant must show they were in "non-secure custody" and specifically escaped from a community corrections center, community treatment center, halfway house, or a similar facility. This requirement is distinct from § 2P1.1(b)(2), which broadly applies to non-secure custody without specifying the type of facility. Chief Judge Thompson's analysis emphasizes that prison camps and community corrections centers are not "similar" for the purposes of this guideline, as community corrections centers involve community-based programs while prison camps are institutional confinement. The court agrees with the Ninth and Tenth Circuits that an escape from a federal prison camp does not allow for a reduction under § 2P1.1(b)(3). Additionally, the appellant's claims regarding the imposition of a consecutive sentence and the denial of a downward departure due to poor medical condition lack merit. Consequently, the district court's judgment is affirmed.