Republican Party of North Carolina Bruce Briggs William R. Sigmon Marvin K. Gray R. Howard Riddle Lloyd Fowler Joe R. Wilson R. Walter White Edgar A. Readling, Jr. Frederic M. Gallagher Ralph A. Walker v. James G. Martin, Governor of North Carolina North Carolina State Board of Elections Robert N. Hunter, Jr., Chairman of North Carolina State Board of Elections Thomas A. Farr William A. Marsh, Jr. Ruth Turner Semashko June K. Youngblood the North Carolina Association of Black Lawyers, and Durham County Board of Elections Forsyth County Board of Elections Guilford County Board of Elections

Citation: 980 F.2d 943Docket: 91-1741

Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit; January 4, 1993; Federal Appellate Court

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The Republican Party of North Carolina (RPNC) appeals a district court's dismissal of its lawsuit against the North Carolina State Board of Elections (NCSBE), asserting that the method for electing superior court judges constitutes a political gerrymander that violates the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The appellate court agrees that a justiciable issue exists and that the complaint presents a valid claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, which, if proven, could warrant relief. However, the court finds that RPNC has not sufficiently stated a claim under the First Amendment. The appellate court thus reverses the dismissal in part, affirms it in part, and remands the case for further proceedings. The history of judicial selection in North Carolina indicates that prior to 1868, judges were appointed by the General Assembly, but since then, the state constitution has allowed for either statewide or districtwide popular elections. The current scheme, established in 1877, mandates statewide elections, with local districtwide primaries implemented by the NCSBE, despite no specific constitutional requirement for such primaries.

Voters nominate candidates for superior court judgeships in local party primaries within each district, with successful candidates then competing in a statewide general election. Superior court judges must reside in their elected district but hold statewide jurisdiction and may rotate between districts. Currently, North Carolina has four judicial divisions. RPNC's complaint asserts that superior court judges rarely serve outside their divisions and maintain unique statutory powers, such as appointing local public defenders and filling clerk vacancies. 

In the mid-1980s, a lawsuit was filed against Governor Martin by the North Carolina Association of Black Lawyers, alleging that the election system for superior court judges impaired nonwhite voting strength, violating the Voting Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment. This led to a consent decree and the enactment of Chapter 509 in 1987, which eliminated staggered terms and mandated redistricting, increasing judicial districts from 34 to approximately 70. The new district lines often split counties and sometimes included parts of multiple counties, with RPNC claiming that 16 districts lack essential judicial infrastructure.

Chapter 509 requires candidates to reside in their district at the time of filing for candidacy, with RPNC alleging that attempts to change the election method to district-level primaries and general elections have been rejected multiple times since 1961. RPNC also highlights that only one Republican has been elected to a superior court judgeship since 1900, and that a majority of Republican candidates would have fared better in districtwide elections rather than statewide contests.

RPNC asserts that in the 1984 statewide general election, Republican candidates for superior court judgeships garnered approximately 46% of the total vote, while Democratic candidates received about 54%. Notably, in the 24th Judicial District, Republican candidates obtained 54% of votes, contrasting with the statewide trend. This pattern of Republican majority voting occurred in several other judicial districts as well, yet no Republican Superior Court judges were elected due to the alleged dilution of their votes through existing voting customs, practices, and procedures.

Additionally, RPNC highlights a similar pattern in the 1986 election across ten judicial districts. RPNC challenges the statewide popular election process for selecting superior court judges, claiming it violates the Fourteenth Amendment by diluting Republican votes and the First Amendment by infringing on Republican voters' rights to free speech and political association. The organization contests the requirement for candidates to reside within their electoral district at the time of nomination, arguing this provision undermines Republican voter influence, also violating the Fourteenth Amendment.

RPNC seeks a declaration that North Carolina's election system for superior court judges is unconstitutional, an injunction against NCSBE from conducting elections under the current process, and a directive for districtwide elections. NCSBE's motion to dismiss the complaint was granted by the district court, which deemed RPNC's claims a nonjusticiable political question. RPNC is appealing this decision. The document references the Supreme Court's framework for analyzing political questions as established in Baker v. Carr, which outlines factors that may render an issue nonjusticiable.

Discovery of any factor that is inextricably linked to a controversy indicates the presence of a political question, rendering it nonjusticiable. The Supreme Court's ruling in Davis v. Bandemer established that claims of political gerrymandering are justiciable, as the Court found no distinction in justiciability between vote dilution claims concerning political groups and those concerning racial groups. In assessing whether a state electoral scheme violates the Equal Protection Clause by diluting votes, the case aligns with the principles set forth in Bandemer, which emphasizes the consistency of state actions with federal constitutional standards.

The NCSBE contends that this case is nonjusticiable due to the absence of judicially manageable standards for resolving equal protection violations regarding the election of judges, as opposed to legislators. However, the Court previously identified manageable standards for similar claims in Bandemer, indicating that issues of fair representation are relevant regardless of the type of elected official involved. RPNC's allegations of vote dilution under the Fourteenth Amendment parallel those in Bandemer, leading to the conclusion that established judicial standards under the Equal Protection Clause are applicable to both legislative and judicial election schemes.

Both claims necessitate judicial review to determine if a state has unconstitutionally diluted voting strength through a flawed electoral system. The court's analysis parallels prior cases, suggesting that the standards for addressing vote dilution are applicable regardless of whether the election involves legislators or judges. The North Carolina State Board of Elections (NCSBE) contends that adjudicating the claims would require nonjudicial policy decisions, but the court finds no valid distinction between the roles of legislators and judges that necessitates such a determination. The characteristics of the affected groups are deemed relevant to the merits of the case rather than its justiciability. 

The claims brought by the Republican Party of North Carolina (RPNC) are thus found to be justiciable. The court acknowledges its authority to affirm a judgment for any valid reason on record and proceeds to evaluate whether RPNC's complaint sufficiently states a claim for relief as per Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). This rule focuses on the adequacy of the complaint rather than factual disputes or defenses. The allegations must present a clear basis for relief, and the court must view them favorably for the plaintiff unless it is evident that no set of facts could support the claim. Additionally, to establish a case of vote dilution due to political gerrymandering, a heightened standard demonstrating actual discriminatory effects is required, as outlined by the Supreme Court.

The Equal Protection Clause mandates impartial governance by states, allowing for classifications as long as similar individuals are treated equally. Overall, the court's analysis emphasizes the importance of judicial standards in evaluating claims of voting rights violations without overstepping into policy determinations beyond its purview.

Classifications under the Equal Protection Clause must align with legitimate governmental purposes and cannot be based on impermissible criteria. In Nordlinger v. Hahn, different treatment of homeowners based on property tax assessment did not warrant heightened scrutiny as it was rationally related to a legitimate state interest. The Clause guarantees equal participation in the political process, prohibiting barriers to voting and ensuring equal vote weight. The North Carolina State Board of Elections (NCSBE) argues that equal protection does not extend to claims regarding the election of judges, as judges are not seen as representative officials who respond to constituents. This interpretation misreads the Clause's fundamental protections against improper classifications. A prima facie equal protection violation can arise from unequal governmental treatment of similarly situated individuals. In cases of political gerrymandering, a state must justify its classification goals. The NCSBE's justifications for electing superior court judges are not under consideration for establishing a claim. However, even if the position of elected officials affects equal protection, the election of judges implicates the goals of fair representation. The Supreme Court in Chisom v. Roemer emphasized that elected judges are not insulated from public opinion, as they campaign for support like other elected officials. Consequently, if other elected executive officers are viewed as representatives, the same logic applies to elected judges.

Judicial offices face a conflict between the ideal of impartiality and the reality of electoral politics, as judges must be elected while remaining somewhat detached from popular will. Although judges may not represent constituents' specific interests, voters do consider candidates' philosophical views. The NCSBE argues that the case Wells v. Edwards contradicts claims of voter representation, asserting that judges serve rather than represent the populace. However, it is clarified that claims of vote dilution differ from one-person, one-vote claims, allowing for the possibility of pursuing the former despite the Wells precedent.

The document then addresses whether RPNC's complaint establishes a prima facie case of vote dilution due to political gerrymandering, requiring allegations of intentional discrimination against a political group and demonstrable adverse effects. The complaint must show a history of disproportionate electoral outcomes and indicate that the electoral system undermines voter influence. The intent standard is deemed to be met, as RPNC provides sufficient allegations of discriminatory intent to avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). Specific claims include legislative resistance to changing election methods from statewide to districtwide, suggesting an intent to discriminate against Republican voters. RPNC also highlights the rarity of Republican candidates winning superior court positions, indicating an exclusionary trend. The assertion is made that voters in various parts of the state often lack knowledge about candidates beyond party affiliation, which supports the inference of intentional discrimination in the election of superior court judges.

NCSBE's argument that the Bandemer case is irrelevant is rejected, as political considerations remain significant in the legislative design of election schemes, even for a separate branch of government. The court emphasizes that intent must be assessed similarly for both legislative and judicial election designs, as political interests can influence the entire governmental sphere. 

The RPNC must demonstrate an actual discriminatory effect under the Equal Protection Clause, requiring evidence of disproportionate electoral outcomes alongside a lack of political power and fair representation. RPNC alleges that it is nearly impossible for Republican candidates to win superior court judge elections, citing that only one Republican has been elected in about 220 elections since 1968, despite Republicans comprising approximately 27% of the voting population. 

While the mere difficulty for a particular political group to win does not render the election scheme unconstitutional, RPNC asserts that the election system consistently diminishes Republican voters' influence. The complaint provides data indicating not only disproportionate results but also that the candidate nomination process is adversely affected, with few Republican candidates contesting available judgeships. For example, in the 1984 and 1986 elections, only four of 40 judgeships were contested by Republicans, and only ten Republican candidates ran in the last 220 elections since 1968.

RPNC argues that limited Republican candidates are willing to run for superior court judge positions due to perceived low chances of success, which diminishes campaign contributions. The complaint asserts that this situation reflects an impact beyond just disproportionate election outcomes. RPNC cites Republican electoral successes in other statewide and district offices as evidence of their political strength in North Carolina, noting that Republicans have won significant races, including the governor's office and U.S. Senate seats. However, the nature of superior court judge elections—statewide contests for local offices—creates challenges, as candidates often lack recognition outside their districts, leading to straight-party voting and reduced voter engagement with individual candidates.

While RPNC has not claimed that Republicans are excluded from party participation or candidate nomination processes, the document argues that such exclusion is not a prerequisite for alleging negative effects on the political process. The court indicates that requiring such allegations would undermine the ability of political groups to challenge partisan gerrymandering. The Supreme Court's examination of whether a political group is effectively shut out of the political process includes assessing the responsiveness of elected officials to minority interests.

RPNC acknowledges the absence of complaints regarding superior court judges' performance and recognizes that, unlike elected officials in the legislative and executive branches, judges do not represent constituents in the same manner. However, RPNC asserts that political groups should retain protected rights in electing judges, especially when a state's electoral system allegedly violates the Fourteenth Amendment. The court finds that RPNC has presented sufficient allegations of discriminatory effects due to political gerrymandering, allowing their claim of vote dilution to survive a motion to dismiss. This conclusion is narrowly based on serious claims of systemic discrimination, particularly the long-standing lack of political diversity among North Carolina's superior court judges.

The court emphasizes that RPNC's chances for success would be weaker if it had shown any electoral success or access to the political process. The court is cautious about judicial involvement in gerrymandering issues, echoing concerns from past justices regarding the implications of requiring proportional representation for political groups. Despite these concerns, the court feels compelled to adhere to precedent established in prior rulings.

Additionally, RPNC claims that the current electoral method infringes on its First Amendment rights, arguing that it restricts Republican participation in the political process and imposes an unspoken requirement to affiliate with the Democratic Party. The court finds RPNC's arguments unpersuasive and concludes that they do not adequately support a claim under the First Amendment, noting the importance of protecting free discussion regarding governmental affairs, including candidate discussions.

The First Amendment protects both political association and expression, ensuring citizens can cast effective votes and associate to advance political beliefs. The RPNC claims that North Carolina's election system infringes on these rights by hindering Republicans in electing preferred candidates for superior court judgeships. However, the RPNC conflates protections under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal weighting of votes, while the First Amendment prohibits restrictions on ballot access that impede political expression or association.

In North Carolina, Republicans can run for office, vote, and associate with others to support candidates, suggesting that the election system does not impose direct restrictions prohibited by the First Amendment. The First Amendment allows participation in the political process but does not guarantee political success. The RPNC also argues that the election system chills Republican engagement in debate and candidacy. A chilling effect is typically associated with overly broad laws that deter constitutionally protected expression. However, the North Carolina laws do not impose penalties for political expression, and thus do not create a chilling effect. Election practices lacking punitive threats to protected speech, even if they influence candidacy decisions, do not constitute overbreadth.

RPNC's claim of overbreadth does not constitute a constitutional violation. The argument that the government cannot force individuals to choose between public employment and their political affiliation is acknowledged, citing Elrod v. Burns. However, the distinction is made that North Carolina superior court judges are elected officials, not government employees, thus the electorate, rather than the government, has the authority to make selections. RPNC's claim that the legislature has overstepped by dictating election methods is rejected; the electorate retains the power to choose judges. Consequently, RPNC's assertions of First Amendment violations regarding free speech and association are dismissed. In contrast, RPNC's allegations of political gerrymandering related to the election of superior court judges are deemed justiciable, allowing for a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court’s decision includes a partial reversal and affirmation, remanding the case for further proceedings. Appellants include various Republican-affiliated individuals and groups, while Appellees consist of officials from the North Carolina State Board of Elections and an intervening organization. The district court had previously dismissed the complaint due to a lack of justiciable questions.

Defendants successfully moved to dismiss the case early in litigation and also obtained a change of venue to the Eastern District of North Carolina. North Carolina’s judicial system includes Superior Court judges who are elected through a statewide general election, a practice unique to the state. The General Assembly is mandated to organize the state into judicial districts, a process established by the North Carolina Constitution. Amendments in 1868 instituted a rotation requirement for judges. Following the passage of Chapter 509, Governor Martin filed a lawsuit against the State Board of Elections and several superior court judges, claiming the statute infringed on voters' rights to elect judges and candidates' rights to seek judicial office, while also asserting that it usurped his executive authority to appoint judges. The Supreme Court of North Carolina upheld Chapter 509 as constitutional, noting its alignment with the Voting Rights Act and its intent to enhance justice administration. The Republican Party of North Carolina (RPNC) argued that Chapter 509 increased the number of judicial districts to 70, while the North Carolina State Board of Elections (NCSBE) claimed an increase to 73, though this discrepancy did not affect the court's holdings. RPNC alleged no Republicans had been elected to superior court judgeships since 1900, although one was elected after the complaint was filed. In the 1986 general election, RPNC reported that approximately 43% of voters chose Republican candidates for superior court judges, with a majority in the Twenty-Sixth Judicial District and nine other districts voting for Republicans.

RPNC argues that Republican candidates would have won in specific districts had there been Republican contenders and if the elections had been district-wide. Voter registration in 1986 remained similar to 1984, with 27% Republicans, 69% Democrats, and 4% unaffiliated. NCSBE claimed legislative immunity as a defense, which the district court did not address, leaving its applicability unexamined on appeal. The district court dismissed the complaint primarily due to a lack of a justiciable question, referencing Federal Rules 12(b)(6), 12(b)(1), and 12(h). The appellate review of the dismissal is conducted de novo. The passage acknowledges ongoing debates about the Supreme Court's Bandemer decision concerning partisan gerrymandering, noting that while criticisms exist, the court's ruling is binding. The court recognizes that equal protection claims can be raised by political groups concerning gerrymandering. Additionally, the excerpt references the Chisom ruling, which interprets "representatives" under the Voting Rights Act to include state supreme court judges for vote dilution claims.

Preclearance requirements under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act apply to judicial elections, prohibiting voting qualifications based on race or color that deny or abridge voting rights. The Supreme Court's interpretation in Chisom emphasized the role of elected judges in electoral politics, which extends to claims under the Equal Protection Clause. Additionally, judicial decisions may be influenced by party affiliation, suggesting a connection between judges' political alignment and their rulings. Various studies indicate that judges may be subject to majoritarian pressures, particularly in partisan elections, which could affect their decision-making processes. Numerous cases, such as Wells and others, have established that judicial offices are not representative in the context of voting rights, and the one-person, one-vote principle does not apply to state judiciary elections. The Supreme Court's summary affirmance in Wells is binding but limited to the specific issues addressed. The Court may still revisit questions previously resolved by summary actions.

Questions surrounding whether superior court judges act as governmental representatives and the impact of distinctions among elected officials on establishing a prima facie case of discrimination pertain to the justification presented by the NCSBE, rather than to the sufficiency of the RPNC's discrimination claim. The Supreme Court's treatment of Wells in Chisom does not necessitate a different conclusion. The state argued that without the one-person, one-vote principle, a manageable standard for adjudicating vote dilution in judicial elections could not be established, a claim the Court rejected, indicating that such claims are not precluded in judicial elections. In Bandemer, although the majority acknowledged that claims of political gerrymandering are justiciable, there was no consensus on the necessary allegations and proofs for a vote dilution claim. The plurality opinion in Bandemer is applied here as it provides the "narrowest grounds" for decision. 

The NCSBE's assertion that RPNC does not meet the intent element due to the inclusion of Democratic plaintiffs is addressed, with the plurality opinion offering no clear guidelines on acceptable political groups for such claims. However, the inclusion is deemed acceptable as the complaint indicates that these Democratic plaintiffs have historically supported Republican candidates, demonstrating sufficient cohesiveness to withstand dismissal. Identifiable voting groups are typically based on political affiliation and voting behavior, and under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, voting patterns among group members can establish political cohesiveness necessary for a vote dilution claim. Furthermore, the Republican Party of North Carolina is deemed a sufficient identifiable group on its own.

The legal analysis centers on a political gerrymandering claim brought by the Republican Party of North Carolina (RPNC) regarding the electoral scheme for superior court judges. The examination focuses on the alleged unconstitutional impacts of this scheme on the electoral process, referencing the Bandemer case, which emphasizes the importance of evaluating the political process as a whole. The court finds that RPNC's allegations meet the liberal pleading standards under Rule 12(b)(6), indicating that they provide sufficient detail to avoid being merely conclusory or repetitive.

The North Carolina State Board of Elections (NCSBE) argues that RPNC's claims lack necessary supporting details, similar to the claims in Badham v. March Fong Eu, which were deemed insufficient. However, the court determines that RPNC's allegations are sufficiently varied and detailed to avoid those pitfalls. The court also notes that while summary affirmance in Badham could have binding implications, the specific First Amendment issue was not decided by the Supreme Court, allowing for independent evaluation of RPNC's claims.

Additionally, the court reiterates its precedent that a viable First Amendment claim in voting rights cases is contingent upon a Fourteenth Amendment claim. Since RPNC has established such a claim, the First Amendment issues must also be considered. Although there is scholarly support for extending First Amendment protections to cases of political vote dilution, the court finds these arguments unpersuasive and chooses not to apply them in this instance. The court acknowledges that political party affiliation may be relevant in certain contexts but maintains that the core issues at hand do not warrant such considerations.