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Barber v. Barber
Citations: 8 Cal. App. 3d 956; 88 Cal. Rptr. 434; 1970 Cal. App. LEXIS 2109Docket: Civ. No. 35180
Court: California Court of Appeal; June 18, 1970; California; State Appellate Court
The court has reversed an order that reduced the wife's alimony and denied her attorney fees in a divorce case. The couple, married in 1952 and separated in 1966, had a son and entered into a Marital Property Settlement Agreement (MPSA) stipulating custody, child support of $150 monthly, and alimony of $200 monthly, which could only be modified in writing by both parties. The agreement was to be submitted to the court for approval but remained effective regardless of court action. In 1968, the wife filed for divorce, seeking to have the MPSA approved, which the court granted, confirming custody and support aligned with the MPSA. In 1969, the husband requested a reduction in alimony, citing the wife's full-time employment status compared to her part-time employment at the time of the MPSA. The wife sought attorney fees to contest this request. The court found that the parties' incomes had changed over time, with the husband's income increasing. It concluded that the MPSA implied the wife waived her right to attorney fees in general legal proceedings but not concerning child support. Ultimately, the court ordered a modification of the divorce judgment, reducing the alimony to $120 per month, decreasing to $100 after a specified date, with payments structured to last until the wife dies, remarries, or until August 1, 1972, whichever comes first. Plaintiff’s request for attorney fees and court costs is denied, and that order is reversed. The husband argues that the wife's income at the time of the agreement in 1966 was only $96 per month as a part-time student nurse and that her subsequent full-time employment as a licensed vocational nurse in 1968 was not disclosed to the divorce court. He contends that any modification of alimony should be assessed from the date of the 1966 agreement rather than the interlocutory decree. The court notes the wife's income increased by $357 since 1966 but decreased by $62 since 1968, while the husband's income rose by $154 from 1966 and $119 from 1968. The court cites precedent indicating that modifications to alimony must be based on legal grounds concerning the parties' circumstances. It concludes that the wife did not conceal her employment status, as the husband was aware of her full-time work prior to the divorce hearing. He had not questioned the agreement's appropriateness during the six months of payments following the decree. The interlocutory decree assumed the orders were correct at the time, and the husband cannot later challenge the order based on potential outcomes had he contested the case. The court determines that absent extrinsic fraud, the decree stands as conclusive. The denial of attorney fees by the trial court is based on a specific provision in the agreement releasing both parties from future claims against each other, except as outlined in the agreement or subsequent wills. Parties mutually release each other from all claims, suits, and obligations, except for divorce actions, as of the agreement's execution date. The provision does not prohibit court-ordered attorney fees in this case. Claims are categorized into two groups: one concerning specific economic rights and the other pertaining to claims up to the agreement date. A waiver clause for specified claims does not prevent the wife from seeking attorney fees necessary to defend her rights under the agreement and an interlocutory decree. The trial court's ruling barring her from requesting fees prevented consideration of her financial situation, which could have justified an award. The statute allows requests for fees for past services, and she can also seek fees related to this appeal and future hearings. The order is reversed and remanded for further proceedings. The husband misrepresented knowledge of the wife’s part-time employment in his declaration. He did not provide evidence of his expenses, so the trial court relied on other grounds for its ruling. The wife demonstrated a slight financial need exceeding her income, exacerbated by the loss of free childcare from her older son, now in military service. However, she did not request increased support, indicating no significant change in her overall need. The husband's evidence did not support claims of fraud.