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Calhoun County Hospital Authority v. Walker
Citations: 205 Ga. App. 259; 421 S.E.2d 777; 92 Fulton County D. Rep. 1636; 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 1122Docket: A92A0739
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia; July 16, 1992; Georgia; State Appellate Court
Rosalyn Walker filed a lawsuit in Dougherty County against the Hospital Authority of Calhoun County and Willie Murray for damages resulting from a car accident involving an ambulance driven by Murray. The trial court denied the defendants' motion to transfer the case to Calhoun County, where both defendants reside, prompting an interlocutory review. The defendants argued that the trial court incorrectly determined that the hospital authority was a motor common carrier under OCGA 46-7-17 (b), which allows lawsuits in the county where the cause of action arose. The court agreed, stating that the hospital authority operated as a motor common carrier by providing ambulance services, as supported by prior case law. However, an exception exists in OCGA 46-1-1 (7) (C) (viii), which excludes vehicles owned and operated exclusively by the government or its subdivisions from this classification. The hospital authority, being an instrumentality of Calhoun County (a political subdivision of the state), falls under this exemption. The ruling is consistent with established legal principles regarding the status of counties as arms of the state and aims to harmonize conflicting statutory provisions. OCGA 46-1-1 serves as a definitional statute for Title 46, which encompasses public utilities and transportation. The statute broadly defines ‘person’ and necessitates the enactment of OCGA 46-1-1 (7) (C) to specifically exclude certain entities, including counties, from the provisions of Chapter 7 concerning motor carriers. Counties are recognized as political subdivisions of the state, and their exclusion aligns with historical legal interpretations that acknowledge counties as state subdivisions. The absence of the terms 'county' and 'public authority' in OCGA 46-1-1 (7) (C) (viii) is deemed insignificant. Previous case law supports that local authorities, such as hospital authorities, operate as instrumentalities of the state. The legislative intent behind the Hospital Authorities Law is to enable counties and municipalities to fulfill state obligations to indigent citizens. It is therefore unreasonable to subject vehicles owned by hospital authorities—performing state functions—to the motor carrier act while similar state-owned vehicles are exempt. Consequently, since venue is improper for the appellant hospital authority in Dougherty County, it is similarly improper for appellant Murray. Despite Georgia law allowing joint tort-feasors from different counties to be tried in either county, both the hospital authority and Murray are considered to reside in Calhoun County, making the trial court's denial of the motion to transfer an error. The judgment was reversed, with a dissent from two justices. Reconsideration was denied shortly thereafter.