Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Thomas

Citations: 172 Ga. App. 816; 324 S.E.2d 735; 1984 Ga. App. LEXIS 2676Docket: 69041; 69045

Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia; November 13, 1984; Georgia; State Appellate Court

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Appellant Travelers Indemnity Co., as the holding company of Phoenix Insurance Co., initiated case no. 69041 for a declaratory judgment regarding benefits owed to Mrs. Pearl Thomas, widow of the insured who died in an automobile accident. Concurrently, Mrs. Thomas filed case no. 69045 against Phoenix for maximum Personal Injury Protection (PIP) benefits, citing a precedent from Jones v. State Farm. The trial court consolidated the cases for consideration. 

The Thomases had maintained a $5,000 PIP policy with Phoenix since before Georgia’s No-Fault Insurance law was enacted. In December 1974, they executed a form to reject higher coverage options, although there is uncertainty regarding the identity of the signatory. On March 5, 1982, just before a renewal, Travelers/Phoenix sent out a mailing offering policyholders a chance to update their coverage, which Mrs. Thomas claims she never received. The record includes a form dated March 15, 1982, purportedly signed by Rev. Thomas, indicating rejection of optional coverages. 

On April 14, 1982, Mrs. Thomas' attorney notified Phoenix of Rev. Thomas' intent to elect maximum PIP coverage and tendered the necessary premiums, which Phoenix refused. Both parties sought summary judgment, initially denied by the trial court, but upon reconsideration, the court granted summary judgment for Mrs. Thomas and dismissed Travelers/Phoenix’s motion.

Appellants challenge the trial court's decision on several grounds: (1) The court ruled that the March 15, 1982, rejection of coverage applied only prospectively and did not affect a policy expiring on that date, and deemed the signature on that form unauthorized and ineffective; (2) The court found as a factual matter that Rev. Mr. Thomas was unconscious from March 12 to March 18, 1982; (3) Alleged abuse of discretion in permitting the appellee to renew her motion for summary judgment based on the same record and legal grounds; and (4) The court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the appellee while dismissing appellants' motion for a declaratory judgment.

Key evidence presented indicated that the original application form from 1969 had been destroyed when Phoenix/Travelers relocated, and that the information was transcribed into a permanent "History Journal." Mrs. Thomas argued that neither she nor Rev. Thomas ever executed a written application before the original policy was issued, and that the forms dated December 30, 1974, and March 15, 1982, were signed by someone else. Testimony suggested that Mrs. Thomas presented the March 15 form to the agent after that date, and a handwriting expert noted discrepancies between the signatures on the form and Rev. Thomas’ known handwriting, suggesting it resembled Mrs. Thomas’ handwriting instead. Appellants asserted that the 1982 form was valid and had both retrospective and prospective effects.

However, the court found that the key issues pertained to the December 30, 1974, supplemental application rather than the March 15, 1982, form. Even if the latter were valid, it could not retroactively apply to an injury that occurred before both the expiration of the existing policy and the date the form was executed. Thus, the validity of the 1982 form was deemed irrelevant, rendering appellants' first four claims meritless.

Additionally, the trial court is authorized to consider renewed motions for summary judgment without needing to expand the record, making appellants’ fifth contention without merit. Lastly, according to OCGA 9-11-56 (c), summary judgment is permissible only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, placing the burden on the movant to provide uncontradicted evidence for each necessary element while interpreting evidence in favor of the opposing party.

Examination of case records indicates that the December 30, 1974 communication complied with OCGA 33-34-5, as interpreted in Wiard v. Phoenix Ins. Co. The supplemental form must contain written information on optional no-fault PIP coverage and vehicle damage coverage, along with a means for the insured to accept or reject these options, without requiring signatures—simple checkboxes suffice. Coverage options include $50,000 or $45,000 in addition to the basic $5,000 PIP coverage, with other amounts also permissible. The December 1974 letter indicated that failure to respond would be deemed acceptance of maximum PIP coverage.

In Wiard, it was uncontested that the insureds did not respond, rendering the non-response moot as it automatically conferred maximum coverage. Conversely, the current case involves a written response allegedly executed by the Thomases to the same December 1974 letter. Mrs. Thomas claims that the letter was neither received nor responded to, creating a factual dispute regarding the validity of the Thomases’ purported election. If valid, the Thomases would only have basic PIP coverage; if not, they would have maximum coverage, unaffected by a subsequent 1982 document.

The conflicting evidence on this issue prevents summary judgment, leading to the conclusion that the trial court's grant of summary judgment was erroneous. The cases must be remanded for trial, and the judgment is reversed.