Thanks for visiting! Welcome to a new way to research case law. You are viewing a free summary from Descrybe.ai. For citation and good law / bad law checking, legal issue analysis, and other advanced tools, explore our Legal Research Toolkit — not free, but close.
Tate v. Burns
Citations: 172 Ga. App. 688; 324 S.E.2d 485; 1984 Ga. App. LEXIS 2633Docket: 68359
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia; October 24, 1984; Georgia; State Appellate Court
On October 17, 1983, the Superior Court of Gwinnett County issued a judgment in favor of Burns against Tate. Two days later, Burns initiated garnishment proceedings in the State Court of Fulton County. Tate subsequently filed a motion for a new trial, followed by a traverse to the garnishment on October 31, 1983, arguing that enforcement of the judgment should not occur until ten days post-judgment as mandated by OCGA 9-11-62 (a). The Fulton County court denied Tate's traverse on November 9, 1983, but ruled that Burns could not condemn any property until the judgment became final or Tate posted a supersedeas bond. After the Gwinnett Superior Court denied Tate's new trial motion on November 28, 1983, a garnishee paid $15,371 into the Fulton court on December 5. Without filing an appeal within the 30-day period following the denial, Tate contested the order releasing these funds to Burns, leading to this appeal. The court highlighted the clear mandate of OCGA 9-11-62 (a), emphasizing that no enforcement actions should occur until ten days after the judgment, ensuring the party has time to decide on further actions. The garnishment court's failure to adhere to this statute constituted an error, as it lacked discretion in the matter, thus infringing on Tate's rights. The court found that the error in denying the appellant’s traverse was not harmless, as it infringed upon his statutory right to determine his post-judgment actions for a ten-day period. The court emphasized that violations of a party's rights create a presumption of injury unless proven otherwise. It ruled that merely ordering funds to be paid into court and suspending their disbursal was inadequate, as the proper course of action would have been to dismiss the premature garnishment. The finality of the judgment hinged on the appellant's ability to file a timely post-judgment motion or notice of appeal within thirty days. During the initial ten days, he should not have faced enforcement actions against the judgment, and the garnishment court had the authority only to dismiss the proceedings at his request. Consequently, the court reversed the order of disbursal and mandated that the traverse should have been granted. The judgment was reversed with a dissent from two justices.