Atlantic Building Systems, Inc. v. Atlantic States Construction Co.

Citations: 172 Ga. App. 148; 322 S.E.2d 311; 1984 Ga. App. LEXIS 2431Docket: 68444

Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia; September 6, 1984; Georgia; State Appellate Court

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Atlantic Building Systems, Inc. filed a lawsuit against Atlantic States Construction Co. Inc. (ASC) seeking $66,476 for building materials allegedly supplied. ASC counterclaimed for $49,163.71 due to undelivered or non-conforming materials and for tortious interference with its business dealings. The jury ruled in favor of ASC, dismissing Atlantic Building Systems' claim and awarding ASC $275 for the tortious interference counterclaim. The trial court initially granted a judgment n.o.v. for Atlantic Building Systems regarding a $17,312.29 difference but later reinstated the jury’s verdict after ASC’s rehearing motion. 

Atlantic Building Systems argues that the trial court erred in reinstating the jury verdict for the $17,312.29, asserting that evidence showed it was not liable for that sum. Specifically, testimony from Edward Lawrence indicated that Atlantic Building Systems was owed this amount as contract retainage. However, the court found that the jury was justified in awarding the full $66,476 based on the quantum valebant theory. Atlantic Building Systems also contended that the only evidence of value was a bid exceeding its own estimate, but the court noted that its own witness's estimate included a 40% profit markup.

The court explained that quantum meruit and quantum valebant reflect an implied promise to pay for services or goods, and recovery is based on their reasonable value. The absence of an express contract negated claims for lost profits. The jury was permitted to discount Atlantic Building Systems' evidence by considering the value of undelivered materials and the nonrecoverable profit markup, which surpassed the disputed $17,312.29 amount. 

Regarding the tortious interference counterclaim, Atlantic Building Systems argued that the evidence presented was hearsay and insufficient to prove purposeful interference. Nonetheless, the court upheld the jury's finding, indicating that enough evidence supported the verdict.

Lawrence testified that Kidd, during a phone call, indicated that Atlanta Metal Products would not sell roofing materials to the appellee due to a threat from the appellant regarding a $50,000 debt on an unrelated contract. This testimony was admitted under OCGA § 24-3-2 as an exception to hearsay, illustrating why the appellee procured materials through an intermediary, resulting in project delays. The trial court admitted this testimony with jury instructions, consistent with Allen v. Brookshire. During cross-examination, appellant's counsel sought further details from Lawrence and later brought in two officers from Atlanta Metal Products, Kidd and Galon, who denied the statements made by Kidd. However, William Mott, the appellee’s president, testified in surrebuttal that he was present during the conversation and heard Kidd’s threat, which was admissible to challenge the officers' denials as per Prescott v. Carithers.

The appellant contended that a memo from Sellars, written ten days before the expiration of an exclusive purchasing contract with Atlanta Metal Products, lacked sufficient evidence of intentional and malicious interference with the appellee’s business relations. The memo expressed a desire to prevent Atlanta Metal Products from supplying replacement panels for the appellee's project. Intentional interference by a third party with existing contracts can give rise to a tort claim, requiring proof of malicious actions without lawful justification. The term "malicious" does not necessitate personal animosity. While the memo did not guarantee a judgment for the appellee, it provided some evidence from which reasonable interference could be inferred. In reviewing an appeal regarding the denial of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the focus is on whether the evidence demanded a different judgment, similar to principles applied in motions for directed verdict.

The determination centers on whether the evidence necessitates a verdict for the movant and if there is any supporting evidence for the jury's verdict. If such evidence exists, the denial of the motion is proper; granting it would be erroneous. The court evaluates the evidence in favor of the party who won the jury verdict, a standard applicable to both trial and appellate courts. The memo from the appellant’s manager, alongside other testimony, constituted sufficient evidence to uphold the jury's verdict. Since the evidence did not exclusively favor the defendant/appellant, the trial court correctly denied the motion for judgment n.o.v. and the motion for a new trial. The judgment was affirmed, with concurrence from the Chief Judge and Presiding Judge.