Georgia-Pacific, LLC v. Fields

Citations: 293 Ga. 499; 748 S.E.2d 407Docket: S12G1393; S12G1417

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia; September 9, 2013; Georgia; State Supreme Court

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A writ of certiorari was granted concerning the case Union Carbide Corp. v. Fields, 315 Ga. App. 554 (726 SE2d 521, 2012), focusing on the assignment of tort liability to non-parties under OCGA 51-12-33 (c). The Court found that the Court of Appeals erred by ruling that admissions regarding non-parties in the pleadings did not qualify as evidence for summary judgment and misapplied the “right for any reason” rule. The case involves Rhonda Fields, who developed peritoneal mesothelioma allegedly from childhood asbestos exposure. The Fields claimed that Georgia-Pacific, LLC and Union Carbide Corporation, among others, were responsible for asbestos products that caused Mrs. Fields's injuries. After settling with some non-party entities, the Fields later excluded allegations against several companies from their complaint.

The Fields sought partial summary judgment to prevent Defendants from attributing fault to these non-party entities, which the trial court granted and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals concluded that the Defendants' evidence, based on allegations in the Fields’ complaint and Mrs. Fields’ sworn information form, was insufficient to counter the summary judgment motion. It held that unverified allegations in a complaint do not constitute evidence for summary judgment, as personal knowledge is necessary for such verification. The Court also noted that Mrs. Fields’ form, like the complaint, was based on her "best knowledge and belief," which does not meet the evidentiary requirements.

The opinions cited by the Court of Appeals do not apply to the current case, as they involved plaintiffs arguing that their own allegations countered a summary judgment motion. The relevant law is found in OCGA 24-3-30, which allows either party to use allegations or admissions from the opposing party's pleadings without presenting them as evidence. These allegations are treated as conclusive facts unless withdrawn. The Defendants' reliance on admissions regarding Mrs. Fields' exposure to asbestos-containing products is valid, as these are factual admissions rather than mere opinions. The Fields argue that Mrs. Fields lacked personal knowledge of the facts in her sworn statement, but this does not negate the effect of her pleadings. Admissions are admissible as evidence, regardless of hearsay claims. 

While amendments to pleadings can withdraw original admissions, the initial statements remain on record and can be used as evidence. A party cannot disprove an admission without first withdrawing it. Even if an admission is stricken, it can still serve as evidence of fact, allowing the admitting party to explain but not conclusively refute it. Thus, the Fields cannot legally establish the truth of their admissions but can only raise factual disputes for a jury's consideration. An opposing party retains the right to present the original admission as evidence, even after it has been withdrawn.

The Defendants were improperly denied the opportunity to reference admissions in the Fieldses’ pleadings when contesting a motion for summary judgment. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals made errors in their rulings. The Court of Appeals incorrectly concluded that the Defendants’ reliance on these admissions was insufficient to counter the summary judgment regarding their non-party defense, as they failed to provide evidence linking Mrs. Fields’s alleged exposure to nonparty products to her mesothelioma. The Fieldses’ motion aimed to challenge the inclusion of nonparty defendants in damage apportionment but did not address causation, focusing solely on the lack of evidence for exposure to the nonparty products. The legal precedent establishes that the Defendants, as non-movants, were not obligated to present counter-evidence until the Fieldses fulfilled their burden as movants. While appellate courts can affirm a summary judgment on any valid basis, the Court of Appeals' reasoning regarding causation was inappropriate since it was not a matter raised in the Fieldses’ motion. Therefore, the judgment was reversed, with the concurrence of several justices, while noting that Phelps Dodge was not a named defendant in the original or amended complaints.

Mrs. Fields identified Phelps Dodge Cable and Wire (BICC CABLES CORP.) as a manufacturer of asbestos products in her sworn information form under OCGA 51-14-7. The original and amended complaints named GENERAL CABLE INDUSTRIES, INC., both individually and as a successor to BICC CABLES CORP., as a defendant. The opinion assumes that "Phelps Dodge" refers to both BICC CABLES CORP. and GENERAL CABLE INDUSTRIES, INC. According to OCGA 24-8-821, effective January 1, 2013, parties may utilize allegations or admissions from the pleadings of the opposing party without needing to present them as evidence. The Fields referenced cases indicating that a party's failure to withdraw an admission leads to a conclusive presumption, but these cases do not apply to the Fields’ situation, as they relate to a party’s own admissions rather than those of the opposing party. Additionally, the case McReynolds v. Krebs does not provide relevant insights regarding the former OCGA 24-3-30. In their motion, the Fields mentioned “asbestos-containing products associated with any non-party whom Defendants wish to have listed on the jury form.”