Ellis v. Caldwell

Citations: 290 Ga. 336; 720 S.E.2d 628; 2012 Fulton County D. Rep. 68; 2012 Ga. LEXIS 31Docket: S11A1748

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia; January 9, 2012; Georgia; State Supreme Court

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Burrell Ellis, DeKalb County CEO, and Eddie O’Brien, Fire Rescue Chief, appeal a writ of mandamus that mandated the reinstatement of Sell Caldwell III as a fire captain in the DeKalb County Fire Rescue Department, along with back pay and litigation costs. Caldwell's termination on February 2, 2010, was based on allegations of failing to locate a fire dispatch address and not taking command at a fire scene. As a Merit System employee, Caldwell appealed his termination within the required timeframe. Following a hearing, the hearing officer found that the fire department had incorrectly applied the facts, leading to a reversal of Caldwell’s termination, which was upheld by the Merit System Council. Despite this, Caldwell was not reinstated, prompting him to file a mandamus action for reinstatement and compensation. The trial court ruled in Caldwell's favor, asserting he had a clear legal right to reinstatement and awarding him the difference between retirement benefits and the compensation of a fire captain, along with attorney fees, due to the County's stubborn refusal to comply with the Council's decision. The County contested the issuance of the mandamus, claiming Caldwell lacked a clear legal right. However, the court found that Caldwell had pursued his administrative remedies and that the hearing officer's decision was consistent with the DeKalb County Code, which allows for reversal of disciplinary actions based on factual errors.

The remedy for Caldwell’s termination was to 'reverse' the decision made by the chief, effectively reinstating him as if he had never been terminated. The County's argument against reinstatement is deemed disingenuous, as reversal inherently implies reinstatement. Relevant case law, including McAfee v. Bd. of Firemasters of Atlanta, supports the notion that mandamus can compel reinstatement when termination violates established regulations. The County's assertion that the Council's authority only extends to affirming or reversing does not negate Caldwell’s right to reinstatement upon the Council's affirmance of the hearing officer's decision. The Council's ruling is binding on county officials, who cannot disregard the merit system proceedings and their appeal outcomes.

Caldwell’s clear legal right to reinstatement was violated by the County's refusal to comply with the hearing officer's order. The trial court's monetary award for Caldwell reflects the full salary lost since his wrongful termination, supported by precedent including Bradford v. Bolton and McCallum v. Bryan. Additionally, the County contended that Caldwell forfeited his reinstatement rights by opting for retirement benefits. However, evidence showed that he could relinquish these benefits for reinstatement, which Caldwell is willing to do.

The trial court imposed attorney fees and litigation costs on the County under OCGA § 9-15-14 for its unnecessary litigious behavior in not reinstating Caldwell, despite findings of error in his termination. Although the court's order did not specify the subsection of the statute under which fees were awarded, the circumstances align with subsection (b), as established in Century Center at Braselton. The County's refusal to comply with the Council's mandate lacked substantial justification, leading to the conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding reasonable attorney fees and litigation expenses to Caldwell. The decision was made on January 9, 2012.

Before awarding attorney fees under OCGA § 9-15-14 (b), a party is entitled to an evidentiary hearing with proper notice to contest the claimed value and necessity of legal services. However, a party can waive this right to a hearing. In a specific case, the court indicated its inclination to grant a petition but decided to keep the record open for ten days for post-hearing briefs regarding attorney fees. Counsel for the County expressed a desire to respond to the attorney fees argument through briefs, which the court accepted, confirming a timeline for submission. The County did not object, and both parties submitted their briefs accordingly, resulting in the County waiving its right to an evidentiary hearing on attorney fees. The judgment was affirmed with all Justices concurring.

The termination notice referenced a violation of specific departmental rules and was reviewed under DeKalb County Code provisions, allowing a permanent employee to appeal a termination to a hearing officer. The hearing officer can only reverse a disciplinary action based on factual errors or non-job-related motives. The County cited a federal case regarding due process rights, but the court found it unpersuasive and noted that issues regarding Caldwell's retirement revocation fall under the jurisdiction of the DeKalb County Pension Board, not the current court. OCGA § 9-15-14 (b) allows for the assessment of reasonable attorney fees if a party's action lacks substantial justification, is for delay or harassment, or involves improper conduct, with 'lacked substantial justification' defined as substantially frivolous, groundless, or vexatious.