McLeod v. Barrett

Citations: 271 Ga. 569; 522 S.E.2d 219; 99 Fulton County D. Rep. 3800; 1999 Ga. LEXIS 782Docket: S99A1143

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia; October 18, 1999; Georgia; State Supreme Court

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Riley Hampton McLeod, also known as Edward Patterson, appeals the denial of his habeas corpus petition in an extradition case, arguing that Georgia cannot extradite him to Mississippi due to Mississippi’s non-compliance with OCGA § 17-13-23 regarding his alleged escape and the State's inadequate response to his petition. He also claims that the lengthy 27-year delay in Mississippi's extradition efforts and Mississippi's non-adoption of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act (UCEA) should lead to a refusal of extradition. 

McLeod had previously pled guilty to multiple robbery and grand larceny charges in Mississippi, receiving life sentences and additional time for the larceny. After escaping from prison, he was arrested in Georgia in 1996 under the alias Edward Patterson, leading to an extradition hold by Mississippi. The Georgia superior court ordered a hearing on his detention, which was subject to delays. 

During the habeas corpus proceedings, the State of Georgia argued that it had established a prima facie case for extradition, despite McLeod's claims regarding the insufficiency of the extradition documents. The court found that Mississippi's extradition request met statutory requirements, as it did not necessitate a separate indictment for escape or a supporting affidavit. Instead, the extradition demand must include allegations of the accused's presence in the demanding state at the time of the alleged crime, accompanied by appropriate documentation, which was satisfied in this case. The court ultimately affirmed the denial of McLeod's habeas corpus petition.

The indictment, information, or affidavit presented to a magistrate must adequately charge the individual with a crime under state law, and must be authenticated by the executive authority making the demand. The second Governor’s Warrant met these requirements, including an Application for Requisition from the Mississippi Department of Corrections, detailing that McLeod was convicted of two counts of robbery with a deadly weapon and two counts of grand larceny, and had escaped from the Mississippi State Penitentiary on January 11, 1972. The Requisition included copies of the indictments, sentencing details, and sworn notarized statements from correctional superintendents regarding McLeod's escape. Even assuming an affidavit concerning the escape was necessary, such statements were provided.

McLeod's claim regarding the lack of judicial determination of his departure from Mississippi is unsubstantiated; the habeas court is tasked with verifying specific facts, including whether the petitioner is a fugitive from justice. The court found a prima facie case against McLeod. He also argued that the State failed to respond to his habeas corpus petition within the specified timeframe, suggesting this waived the extradition. However, even if the State's response was inadequate, it does not preclude McLeod’s detention or extradition, as a failure to respond may lead to contempt but does not mandate release.

Moreover, evidence established McLeod's identity as the individual named in the extradition request. A deputy sheriff testified that McLeod's fingerprints matched those of Riley McLeod from Mississippi, and issues raised by McLeod regarding the deputy's qualifications and the chain of custody were dismissed. The fingerprint evidence is admissible based on its identification with the subject's prints, and no objections were made by McLeod regarding the deputy's qualifications during the hearing.

In the case of Whatley v. State, the habeas court reviewed evidence, including photographs of the appellant, Riley Hampton McLeod, to confirm his identity during extradition proceedings. McLeod sought to challenge his extradition to Mississippi, arguing that the state's twenty-seven-year delay and the lack of adoption of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act (UCEA) should bar his extradition. However, the court found that the delay was attributable to McLeod's own actions to evade law enforcement, including his escape from custody in 1972 and subsequent capture in 1996 under an alias. The court clarified that the extradition process is grounded in the U.S. Constitution, which mandates the return of individuals fleeing from justice. Consequently, the court upheld the denial of habeas corpus relief, affirming the judgment with full concurrence from all Justices.