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Estes v. John Bleakley Ford, Inc.
Citations: 246 Ga. 747; 272 S.E.2d 703; 1980 Ga. LEXIS 1255Docket: 36548
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia; November 25, 1980; Georgia; State Supreme Court
The appellant initiated a dispossessory action against the appellee, the tenant, who maintained possession under a prior court order. A consent judgment on February 28, 1979, allowed the tenant to stay until September 30, 1979, unless a new agreement was made, and dismissed the tenant's counterclaim with prejudice. Prior to the expiration of this agreement, the appellant obtained a writ of possession without notice, effective October 1, 1979. On October 3, 1979, the appellee filed an "Extraordinary motion to set aside" the writ, claiming a new lease agreement was verbally established on September 18, 1979, which would not be documented until after October 1, 1979. The appellee paid the October rent into court. Subsequently, on October 18, 1979, the appellee sought reinstatement of the counterclaim, alleging that it had been dismissed based on fraudulent claims made by the appellant, who was also accused of negotiating a lease with another party while discussing terms with the appellee. On November 7, 1979, after a hearing, the trial court ruled that substantial factual questions existed warranting a jury trial and allowed the appellee to remain in possession of the property during this process. The court determined that the tenant would suffer irreparable harm if dispossession occurred, while the appellant's damages could be calculated monetarily. The appellee was required to pay rent into the court registry and secure a $15,000 bond for any proven damages. The order from which the appeal was taken is deemed non-final due to the pending jury trial and lack of injunctive relief. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as premature for not adhering to the interlocutory-appeal procedure outlined in Georgia law. All Justices concurred in the dismissal.