Thanks for visiting! Welcome to a new way to research case law. You are viewing a free summary from Descrybe.ai. For citation and good law / bad law checking, legal issue analysis, and other advanced tools, explore our Legal Research Toolkit — not free, but close.
United States v. William James Dixon, Jr.
Citations: 952 F.2d 260; 91 Daily Journal DAR 15391; 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 29189Docket: 91-30136 to 91-30138
Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; December 16, 1991; Federal Appellate Court
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether a defendant can receive a sentence for probation violation that differs from the sentencing options available at the time of the initial probation sentence. The Sentencing Guidelines suggest allowing a different sentence, while the probation revocation statute mandates that the sentence must be one that was "available" during the initial sentencing. The court determined that where the Guidelines conflict with the statute, they are invalid. Consequently, the court vacated the sentence imposed on William James Dixon, Jr., for violating probation and remanded the case for resentencing. Dixon had previously pleaded guilty to mail fraud and possessing stolen mail, leading to a probation sentence after a calculated range of four to ten months. However, after committing a bank robbery while on probation, he was sentenced to 41 months for that crime. His probation was revoked, and he was subsequently sentenced to 15 months for the probation violation, based on the Guidelines' provisions that included the later conduct in determining the sentence range. The court emphasized that the underlying probation revocation statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3565(a)(2), requires the use of the initial sentencing range when imposing a new sentence for probation violations, as any conduct occurring after the initial sentencing cannot justify a higher sentence. The revised Guidelines, which allow for consideration of the probation-violating conduct in recalculating the sentencing range, were deemed contradictory to the statutory requirement that such a sentence must be one that was available at the time of the initial sentencing. Congress authorized the Commission to create probation revocation guidelines that align with the probation revocation statute, specifically section 3565 of title 18, as stated in 28 U.S.C. 994(a)(3) (1988). The Commission's role is to develop policies consistent with the statute, not to create alternatives. In Dixon's case, the applicable sentencing range for his initial mail convictions was four to ten months. However, under the new revocation guidelines, he faces a 12 to 18 month range, which was not available at his original sentencing. Additionally, Dixon challenges a 41-month robbery sentence but did not request a downward departure from the district court, leading to the conclusion that his appeal pertains to the court's discretionary sentencing within a valid range. The court lacks jurisdiction to hear such appeals, resulting in the dismissal of Dixon's robbery sentence appeal. The court vacated his 15-month probation-violation sentence and remanded for resentencing within the original four to ten month range. The distinction between policy statements and guidelines issued by the Commission is deemed irrelevant in this context. A different interpretation of 'available' by the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Williams, which stated that it means 'in effect,' is rejected by this court as inconsistent with the language of section 3565 and previous rulings.