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City of Gainesville v. Georgia Crown Distributing Co. of Atlanta, Inc.
Citations: 231 Ga. 352; 201 S.E.2d 410; 1973 Ga. LEXIS 695Docket: 28175
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia; November 8, 1973; Georgia; State Supreme Court
The appellees sought a declaratory judgment and injunction against the City of Gainesville's ordinance that imposed a $100 license fee on wholesale dealers of malt beverages and wines. The case was presented to the trial court based on a stipulated set of facts without a jury. The appellees argued that they were exempt from the license fees under Code Ann. 92-4105, which protects certain vendors, including traveling salesmen and dealers whose business is located outside the municipality, from such fees. The appellant city countered that the appellees were "doing business" in Gainesville, thus subject to the fees. Key facts included that deliveries were made only for previously ordered merchandise, and payments were collected at the time of delivery, with partial deliveries based on payment capability. The court held that Georgia law (Ga. L. 1950, pp. 185, 186) does not permit the city to impose this license fee, as the statute requires a sufficient trade nexus for such fees to be levied. The court concluded that the stipulated facts did not demonstrate that the appellees were conducting business within the city, referencing precedents that support the notion that merely delivering goods based on prior orders does not constitute "doing business" in a way that would trigger local licensing requirements. Gaissert v. State, 186 Ga. 599 (198 SE 675), addresses the interpretation of Code Ann. 92-4105, amended in 1962, reflecting key legal principles and policy considerations. The case was argued on September 11, 1973, and decided on November 8, 1973, with representation for both appellant and appellees noted. The appellant's argument, positing that the stipulated facts indicated the deliveryman had discretion to make on-the-spot sales, was rejected. The court affirmed the trial court's finding that the Georgia Department of Revenue regulation (Rule 560-2-6-.12) eliminated this discretion, and no evidence supported the occurrence of such sales within Gainesville, the delivery location. The judgment was affirmed with all Justices concurring, except Gunter, J., who was disqualified.