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City of Atlanta v. Royal Peacock Social Club, Inc.

Citations: 225 Ga. 474; 169 S.E.2d 807; 1969 Ga. LEXIS 536Docket: 25272, 25273

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia; September 8, 1969; Georgia; State Supreme Court

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Royal Peacock Social Club, Inc. initiated litigation against the City of Atlanta and several officials, seeking to prevent the enforcement of the city's "Bottle House" ordinance and declaring it unconstitutional. The club operates on weekends, charging a $3 admission fee, providing food and soft drinks, and earning additional income from merchandise and coat checks, while not selling alcoholic beverages. It alleged that patrons sometimes bring their own alcohol, but only 15% of its revenue comes from non-alcoholic items. The ordinance defines a "Bottle House" as a venue allowing patrons to bring and consume alcohol, where a significant part of the business involves providing mixers and set-ups. 

The club's complaint presented two arguments for enjoining the ordinance: that a substantial portion of its business does not involve providing mixers for alcohol and that the ordinance violates the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment and Georgia's Constitution. The defendants countered by asserting that the club’s income from mixers and soft drinks constituted a substantial portion of its business, claiming it was subject to the ordinance. 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment was denied, leading to an appeal, while the club filed its own motion on the grounds that no material facts were in dispute, asserting it was not subject to the ordinance. This motion was granted, and the defendants appealed this decision. The court did not rule on the ordinance's constitutionality but determined that, based on the existing pleadings and affidavits, the club was not legally subject to the ordinance's requirements.

The trial court's limited ruling, permitted under Code Arm. 81A-156 (d), is reviewed regarding the order granting the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment in Case 25273. The evidence presented included the club's gross receipts from May 6-8, 1967, totaling $4,391.29, along with affidavits from police officers. One officer indicated the club primarily allowed patrons to consume their own alcoholic beverages, while another detailed observations of numerous patrons at tables with bottles of alcohol. A third officer described his entry and purchase of mixers within a crowded setting. The central question was whether the plaintiff's business substantially involved providing set-ups and mixers for patrons' alcohol consumption. The court determined that the evidence raised genuine issues of fact that should be resolved by a jury, thus concluding it was an error to grant the plaintiff's summary judgment. In Case 25272, concerning the defendants' appeal against the denial of their summary judgment motion, the court ruled that the City of Atlanta's ability to collect licensing fees hinged on whether the club fell under the "Bottle House" ordinance, which also required jury determination. The judgment in Case 25272 was affirmed, while it was reversed in Case 25273, with all Justices concurring.