United States v. Violeta Paskett

Citations: 950 F.2d 705; 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 185; 1992 WL 23Docket: 90-5196

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit; January 10, 1992; Federal Appellate Court

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Violeta Paskett was convicted of bribing a DEA agent, violating 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1)(A). On appeal, she contested both her conviction and sentence. The key issue regarding her conviction was the admission of statements made during a custodial interrogation. The court upheld her conviction, ruling that the bribe offer itself was admissible and not subject to suppression under Miranda v. Arizona. Other statements made by Paskett did not influence the conviction. Regarding sentencing, the court affirmed her prison term but vacated the $100,000 fine due to insufficient records concerning her ability to pay, remanding the case for reconsideration of this penalty.

The background of the case reveals that on September 28, 1989, DEA agents, after monitoring Paskett's residence for suspected money laundering, entered her apartment with her consent. During a search, Paskett, visibly distressed, indicated the presence of a large amount of cash in her bedroom. When confronted by Agent Renee Robinson, Paskett offered the money to the agent in exchange for silence, which the agent interpreted as a bribe. Following this, Paskett provided conflicting accounts regarding the ownership of the money, which led to her arrest after the discovery of over one million dollars in her apartment.

Paskett was indicted for bribery and sought to suppress statements made to Agent Robinson before receiving Miranda warnings, claiming they were obtained during a custodial interrogation. The trial court denied this motion, ruling Paskett was not in custody at the time of the statements and that her admissions were voluntary, not resulting from interrogation. Subsequently, a jury convicted Paskett of bribery, and during sentencing, the court determined she had knowledge that the bribe money was sourced from illegal narcotics trafficking, leading to an enhanced sentence of sixty months and a $100,000 fine.

The discussion on the admissibility of Paskett's statements references Miranda rights, which prohibit the use of statements made during custodial interrogation without prior advisement of rights. Paskett argued that the agents' search of her residence constituted custody. However, the precedent set in United States v. Castro, where a defendant's spontaneous statement during a custodial encounter was deemed admissible, was cited to counter Paskett's argument. The court concluded that Paskett's unsolicited bribe to Agent Robinson was an independent crime and not a result of coercive interrogation, thus affirming the admissibility of her statements.

Accepting Paskett's argument would allow suspects to bribe arresting officers without consequence, as statements made during custodial questioning prior to Miranda warnings would be inadmissible for a bribery conviction. Judge Kravitch noted that there is no constitutional right to be warned of rights before committing a crime, supporting the admissibility of Paskett's bribe attempt as evidence. The trial court also allowed testimony regarding Paskett's other statements, which she claimed violated Miranda rights, arguing for a new trial. However, the court found that even if there was an error in admitting these statements, it was harmless because the overwhelming evidence of guilt, specifically her offer of money to Agent Robinson, would have led to the same verdict regardless of the suppressed statements. The trial court imposed a $100,000 fine instead of the requested $1 million, adhering to the United States Sentencing Guidelines, which require a fine unless the defendant proves inability to pay or undue burden on dependents. The court considered various factors in determining the fine amount.

The court found that the record was inadequate to support the district court's decision to impose a $100,000 fine on Paskett, as there was no explicit discussion of the justifying factors for the fine. The presentence report lacked clarity regarding Paskett's financial ability to pay the fine, particularly in light of the mentioned assets, such as a partially financed automobile and property under a lien. Additionally, the presence of over one million dollars in Paskett's bedroom did not independently justify the fine. Consequently, the fine was vacated, and the case was remanded for the district court to reevaluate Paskett's ability to pay the fine according to the Sentencing Guidelines.

Paskett's arguments concerning Miranda rights were deemed unmeritorious; the court affirmed her conviction and prison term. However, there was a dissenting opinion from Judge Hatchett, who concurred with the vacation of the fine but would have reversed the convictions. The dissent emphasized that the circumstances in Paskett's apartment indicated she did not feel free to leave, as demonstrated by her needing permission to change clothes and the presence of law enforcement. The dissent argued that Paskett's statements should not be considered voluntary due to perceived coercion, contrary to the majority's view.

Paskett's statements to Agent Robinson should have been suppressed due to a violation of her Miranda rights. After allegedly offering a bribe to avoid arrest, Agent Robinson interrogated Paskett without informing her of her rights and sought a witness for further questioning about the money's origin and potential contraband in her home. The crime was complete upon the bribe offer, yet the officers delayed advising Paskett of her rights until after this interrogation, suggesting their intent was to elicit incriminating responses. 

The majority's reliance on United States v. Castro to argue that Paskett's statements were spontaneously volunteered is flawed, as Castro involved spontaneous utterances, whereas Paskett's statements occurred during a formal investigation into her suspected money laundering. Consequently, the majority's conclusions are deemed misplaced.

Paskett's conviction and sentence should be vacated. The voluntariness of her consent to the search is not contested, and while the circumstances of her questioning may be considered custodial, her claims about the admission of physical evidence lack merit. Evidence such as a videotape of the search and her warranty deed were relevant to the charged offense and admissible, despite being associated with a separate crime. Items that were briefly admitted but later withdrawn did not prejudice the jury due to the trial court's corrective instructions.

Paskett's argument regarding a variance between the indictment and the government's proof is also unsubstantiated. Although there is a distinction between offering a bribe to prevent investigation versus arrest, Paskett failed to demonstrate that this variance prejudiced her rights or defense preparation. 

Finally, Paskett's challenge to the sentence enhancement based on inadequate proof of her knowledge regarding the money's connection to narcotics trafficking is unsupported. The trial court's conclusions were based on substantial evidence, including the packaging of money found in her bedroom and her admission regarding its possible origins, which collectively met the necessary evidentiary standard.