Randy Greenawalt v. James R. Ricketts, Director, Arizona Doc Donald Wawrzaszek, Superintendent, Asp Robert K. Corbin, Attorney General, State of Arizona

Citations: 943 F.2d 1020; 91 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6692; 91 Daily Journal DAR 10303; 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 19176Docket: 88-1828

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; August 22, 1991; Federal Appellate Court

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Randy Greenawalt, after escaping from an Arizona state prison, committed multiple serious crimes, including the kidnapping of three individuals, the murder of four (including a two-year-old), two armed robberies, and vehicle theft. He confessed to some crimes and was sentenced to death, with his conviction affirmed on direct appeal over a decade prior. Following this, he filed a habeas corpus petition, which was initially denied by the district court. However, a remand was ordered by the Ninth Circuit due to violations of his right to counsel as established in Edwards v. Arizona, leading the district court to grant the petition on remand. 

The state appealed, and upon reviewing the case again, the Ninth Circuit ordered full briefing on all issues, not just the remanded Edwards issue. The court had jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254 and 2253. 

Greenawalt's escape involved assistance from fellow inmate Tison and Tison's sons, who smuggled firearms into the prison. After evading capture for nearly two weeks, they committed the murders and were linked to the crimes through physical evidence. Greenawalt and two accomplices were eventually apprehended following a high-speed chase, during which one accomplice was killed. 

Upon arrest, Greenawalt underwent a search and was initially left without clothing, later provided a blanket. He was informed of his Miranda rights but invoked his right to counsel, which halted initial interrogation. Despite this, he confessed to some subsequent officers, though he continued to assert his right to counsel. The court's opinion details these developments and the legal implications surrounding his confessions and rights.

Greenawalt was taken to jail, where he initially consulted with his counsel before confessing again after receiving a Miranda warning. The state trial judge excluded the earlier confessions but allowed the final one. Greenawalt argued that his confessions violated his Fifth Amendment right to counsel, asserting that the admission of the last confession warranted granting his petition. The district court agreed, citing the Edwards ruling, which dictates that any confession obtained through police interrogation after a request for counsel must be excluded if counsel is not present. This ruling aligned with the Supreme Court's decision in *Minnick v. Mississippi*, where a confession obtained after a request for counsel was deemed inadmissible unless the defendant reinitiated communication. Although the district court's ruling conformed with *Minnick*, the case was not on direct review, and federal courts have limited authority to apply new constitutional rules retroactively in collateral proceedings, as established in *Teague v. Lane*. The Supreme Court has affirmed this principle in subsequent cases, which includes a prohibition on announcing new rules in collateral reviews. The State argued that *Minnick* introduced a new rule that could not be applied retroactively, while Greenawalt contended he was merely seeking the benefits of *Edwards*. However, it was determined that if *Minnick* established a new rule, then the district court’s *Edwards* analysis did as well, as both were based on similar facts.

A new rule cannot be announced or retroactively applied in collateral review, as established in Penry and Teague. This principle is applicable across all federal judicial levels, meaning that a district court cannot create a rule with greater retroactive effect than the Supreme Court. The key issue is whether the rule in question is new and thus barred from retroactive application. Teague defines a new rule as one that breaks new ground or imposes new obligations, not dictated by precedent at the time of a defendant's final conviction. 

In Butler, the Court determined that a rule from Arizona v. Roberson was new for retroactivity purposes, as it established that an Edwards request for counsel applies to all charges, despite arguments that it was merely an application of Edwards. The Court emphasized that the existence of contrary interpretations justified this characterization, underscoring that courts often view their decisions as governed by prior rulings, even with contrary conclusions present. 

Minnick mirrors the Roberson situation, claiming to apply the Edwards rule without creating exceptions. However, it diverges from previous interpretations, as evidenced by decisions from the Mississippi Supreme Court and other circuit courts that allowed for interrogation post-counsel availability. These prior rulings, while ultimately overturned by Minnick, were deemed reasonable and not illogical.

Edwards asserts the importance of ensuring that a defendant has 'access' to counsel rather than restricting questioning solely to instances when counsel is present after a request is made. In this case, Gallagher had access to both court-appointed and private counsel, indicating that a second interrogation by the FBI was permissible after his request for counsel. While Halliday, Griffin, and the state court decision in Minnick diverge from a strict interpretation of Edwards, they reflect reasonable applications, illustrating that Minnick is an extension, not a direct dictate of Edwards. Therefore, it is concluded that Minnick established a new rule, which the district court similarly enacted.

Generally, new rules are not retroactively applicable on collateral review, with exceptions existing for rules that either limit the criminal law's reach over certain conduct or are deemed 'watershed rules of criminal procedure.' The first exception does not apply here, as Minnick’s procedural requirements do not hinder the state's ability to prosecute serious crimes such as capital murder. The second exception is also inapplicable because violating the added restrictions from Roberson would not significantly affect the accuracy of convictions. As neither exception is relevant, the new rule from Minnick cannot be applied retroactively in this case.

In Greenawalt's situation, he requested counsel while in custody and confessed multiple times, with the State ensuring he had access to counsel. The state trial court reasonably excluded confessions made after his request for counsel but allowed those made after he consulted with counsel. Therefore, the district court erred in imposing this new rule on collateral review, necessitating a reversal of its ruling regarding the Edwards issue.

Greenawalt's appeal does not necessitate a remand for further fact-finding, as he had the chance to challenge the state court's factual findings in the original district court proceedings but failed to do so. The court finds no error in the district court's assessment. Furthermore, Greenawalt's sixth amendment argument, which pertains to the right to counsel after the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings, is deemed irrelevant to his fifth amendment claim; thus, there is no need to resolve whether he was charged before interrogation. While the rights under the fifth and sixth amendments are not identical, in the context of custodial interrogation, they can be analyzed under the same standards set by the Edwards rule. The court previously determined that extending Edwards to this case would improperly create a new rule for collateral review.

Additionally, the district court had dismissed all of Greenawalt’s other claims of error, which he is entitled to have reviewed de novo. Greenawalt contends that his trial confession was influenced by earlier inadmissible statements, citing the case of Brown v. Illinois, which involved coercion. However, subsequent jurisprudence has limited Brown to instances of actual coercion, as established in Oregon v. Elstad, which clarifies that a voluntary confession that is merely inadmissible due to Miranda does not taint a subsequent voluntary confession. The court concludes that the principles from Elstad apply to other Miranda violations as well, holding that a confession deemed inadmissible under Edwards does not affect the admissibility of a later voluntary confession. This position aligns with other circuit decisions on the matter.

Determining the voluntariness of Greenawalt's confessions involved examining both the initial and subsequent confessions. The courts, including the Arizona trial court and the Arizona Supreme Court, concluded that the confessions were voluntary. Greenawalt argued that the circumstances of his arrest, including a lengthy manhunt and a high-speed chase, indicated police coercion. However, the court found that there was no evidence of threats or rough handling by police; rather, their actions were focused on apprehending him. His glasses were lost in the crash of his vehicle, and while his clothes were taken for evidentiary reasons, he received a blanket for modesty, and his handcuffs were loosened upon request. Greenawalt’s familiarity with the arresting officers and his prior convictions for murder were also noted to undermine his claims of coercion. Although media coverage about the crime may have influenced his admissions, the Supreme Court clarified that such influence does not constitute coercion under the Fifth Amendment. The court concluded that Greenawalt's initial confessions, even if obtained in violation of prior legal standards, were voluntary. Similarly, his later confession was determined to be voluntary and free from coercion, allowing it to be admitted at trial.

Greenawalt argues that his death sentence is unconstitutional, primarily relying on Enmund v. Florida, which requires a special finding of mens rea in cases of accomplice felony murder before the death penalty can be imposed. He contends that the trial court failed to make these findings. However, most of his arguments are precluded by Walton v. Arizona, which upheld the death penalty statute, and he conceded all but this specific contention during oral arguments.

The legal precedent established in Teague v. Lane restricts the retroactive application of new rules on collateral review. Since Enmund was decided after Greenawalt's conviction became final, he seeks its retroactive application. Enmund introduced a significant change in the law, establishing that the death penalty cannot be applied in felony murder cases without a finding of mens rea, thus creating a new rule that is not eligible for retroactive application unless it meets one of Teague's narrow exceptions.

The second exception does not apply as Enmund is not considered a "watershed rule of criminal procedure." The first exception pertains to rules that prohibit certain punishments for specific classes of individuals. The document notes that Greenawalt's case must be examined to see if he fits within such a class that the state cannot constitutionally punish with death. Enmund prohibits the death penalty for convicted felony murderers unless the state demonstrates that the defendant was a major participant in the felony and displayed a reckless indifference to human life, as later clarified by Tison and Cabana. This positions Enmund as a substantive rule, albeit implemented with new procedural requirements.

The case involves the application of the Teague principle regarding the retroactivity of judicial decisions, specifically concerning the Enmund ruling on felony murder. The Arizona courts did not anticipate Enmund prior to its announcement and only required proof of mens rea for the underlying felonies. Greenawalt was tried for felony murder after key witnesses refused to testify, complying with existing law and the Eighth Amendment as previously interpreted. 

The court determined that even if Enmund were retroactive, it would not affect Greenawalt's case, as he met the criteria of being a major participant in the felony and showed reckless indifference to human life. The state trial judge's sentencing remarks indicated Greenawalt's actions created a grave risk to others, fulfilling Enmund’s requirements. The Arizona Supreme Court also found him to be an active participant in the crimes.

Greenawalt's arguments regarding jury instructions on lesser included offenses were dismissed, as Arizona law does not recognize lesser included offenses for felony murder, aligning with precedent that such instructions are not required when no legal basis exists. Lastly, Greenawalt's claim about the district court's failure to obtain exhibits related to pretrial publicity was rejected, as he did not demonstrate an inability to provide those materials, adhering to the ruling in Austad v. Risley.

The record fails to demonstrate prejudice regarding the jury's impartiality, which is established as a historical fact and is presumed correct during collateral review. The state trial court found that Greenawalt was not prejudiced by pretrial publicity, a determination upheld on direct review. Greenawalt's main argument is his desire to introduce publicity exhibits in a new habeas corpus petition; however, the potential for abuse of this future petition is not addressed in the current petition. Although the issue was considered in Austad, the Supreme Court's recent test for abuse of the writ in McCleskey v. Zant means that Austad cannot be solely relied upon. Consequently, the district court's grant of the petition is reversed. Nonretroactivity governs the Edwards issue, and Greenawalt's confessions were deemed voluntary, negating the Elstad argument. Many sentencing claims are foreclosed by Walton, which Greenawalt acknowledged, and he cannot reverse his conviction based on his remaining sentencing argument. Arizona law does not require a lesser included offense instruction for felony murder. The district court was not obligated to consider the publicity exhibits that Greenawalt failed to present, and the record shows no prejudice from pretrial publicity. Therefore, the State adhered to the applicable federal constitutional standards at the time of Greenawalt's direct review, warranting the affirmation of his conviction and death sentence on collateral review. The decision is partially affirmed and partially reversed.