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Ada Sandra Kopf, Personal Representative of the Estate of Anthony John Casella v. Joseph P. Wing, Corporal Steven Kerpelman, Corporal James Skyrm Prince George's County, Maryland, a Body Corporate and Politic, and Other Unknown Officers of the Prince George's County Police Department

Citations: 942 F.2d 265; 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 18131Docket: 90-2462

Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit; August 9, 1991; Federal Appellate Court

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Ada Sandra Kopf, representing the estate of Anthony Casella, appeals a district court's summary judgment favoring police officers and Prince George's County in a Section 1983 claim alleging excessive force during an arrest. The Fourth Circuit finds that Kopf presented sufficient evidence to contest the summary judgment, leading to a reversal and remand of the case.

The incident began on February 21, 1988, when police responded to a report of an armed robbery at a pizza shop, where a suspect was identified as a white male with a handgun. The police quickly pursued a van matching the description, apprehending one occupant, Joseph Corcoran, who had discarded the gun. Casella and another individual, Tammy Obloy, fled and hid behind a shed in a narrow passage.

As the situation escalated, Officer Joe Wing, accompanied by a police dog named Iron, attempted to locate the suspects. Wing claimed he warned the suspects loudly to come out or face the dog, but Obloy and other witnesses disputed hearing this warning. Wing released Iron, who subsequently bit Obloy and then Casella after he attempted to intervene. Wing, unable to directly assist due to physical barriers, did not command Iron to stop biting even after confirming Casella was unarmed, while other officers entered the scene to help apprehend him.

Casella was involved in a physical confrontation with police officers Kerpelman, Skyrm, and Wing, during which he struggled while being bitten by a police dog named Iron. Despite Casella's attempts to fend off the dog and officers, Wing struck him in the head with a blackjack. Iron continued to bite Casella until Wing ordered the dog to release him after another individual, Obloy, was removed from the scene. Kerpelman and Skyrm also engaged in efforts to subdue Casella, with Kerpelman striking him with a flashlight and blackjack multiple times, mainly after Casella was pulled away from the defile.

Witnesses, including Obloy, testified that Casella did not resist arrest and attempted to protect Obloy from the dog. Observers nearby reported hearing no announcements regarding the release of the dog but did hear Obloy's screams and sounds consistent with punches. Following the incident, Casella was hospitalized with severe injuries, including a fractured skull and multiple lacerations, ultimately requiring cranial surgery. He remained incoherent due to traumatic aphasia and was hospitalized for over a month.

Casella later pled guilty to armed robbery and was sentenced to seven years in prison. On February 21, 1989, he filed a lawsuit against the officers and Prince George's County, claiming violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, along with state law claims for battery, negligence, and negligent hiring/training. Casella was killed in a prison altercation before he could testify, and his mother subsequently became the plaintiff in the case.

On March 21, 1990, the officers and county filed for summary judgment, which the appellant opposed. The district court granted the motion on August 7, 1990, leading to Kopf's appeal. The legal standard for assessing the use of force in this case is "objective reasonableness," as established in Graham v. Connor. This standard requires evaluation from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, considering the exigencies of split-second decision-making in tense situations. 

In reviewing the summary judgment, the court must determine if the appellant provided sufficient evidence for a jury to find the force used against Casella was not objectively reasonable. The district court made factual determinations that were disputed, such as whether Defendant Wing announced the presence of a K-9 dog; only police officers corroborated this, while civilians did not. The appellant argued that any lack of warning undermined the reasonableness of the force used.

Affidavits from expert witnesses asserted that deploying the dog against cornered suspects was unreasonable, with Thomas Knott emphasizing that the dog's primary role is to locate rather than to bite suspects. Robert diGrazia supported this view, stating the dog's release contradicted legitimate usage. The appellees contended that fears of armed suspects justified the dog’s aggressive deployment.

The district court also noted that Casella allegedly refused to surrender, but whether an announcement was made remains disputed. The court criticized Casella for resisting the dog, while the appellant argued that a reasonable jury could find it unreasonable to expect surrender while being attacked by a police dog. Furthermore, the court assumed Casella fought with the officers, despite evidence suggesting that his struggle may have been primarily against the dog. The lack of significant injuries to the officers led the appellant to claim that Casella's resistance was overstated, a point that a reasonable jury might also consider.

The district court acknowledged that the officers had a reasonable belief that Casella was armed, which influenced their decision to act cautiously. However, once they observed Casella's empty hands, their fear of a weapon diminished, as indicated by their actions of holstering their guns and approaching him closely. The appellant highlighted inconsistencies in the officers' testimonies regarding the events of the altercation, particularly where some officers stated it occurred in a narrow passage, while others indicated it happened in a yard, where a civilian witness reported seeing blood. The physical space available for a struggle was questioned, suggesting it was inadequate for the described confrontation. Additionally, despite a possible justification for using force, a reasonable jury could still consider the degree of force used as excessive, especially since the only injuries documented were lacerations on Casella's head, without medical evidence of injuries elsewhere. The court concluded that Casella was subjected to excessive force, and the circumstances did not warrant summary judgment for the officers. The county's liability under Section 1983 is contingent upon proving that excessive force resulted from an unconstitutional custom or practice. The appellant contended that Prince George's County failed to enforce adequate oversight to prevent excessive force, suggesting a pattern of misconduct. While the county's written policies appeared commendable, the appellant referenced specific incidents of excessive force and presented statistics indicating a low rate of sustained complaints against officers, raising questions about the county's practices. The court found the county's summary judgment less clear-cut compared to the officers'.

Appellant highlights that Commander's Information Reports (CIRs), which document internal investigations of all uses of force, including dog bites, are retained for only six months before being destroyed. Additionally, a county policy prohibits photographing dog bites. Appellant argues that these practices may lead officers to believe that misconduct will not be recorded. Although proving her claims against the county may be challenging, if she successfully demonstrates multiple instances of excessive force alongside circumstantial evidence suggesting a systematic dismissal of police brutality complaints, a fair-minded jury could determine that the county maintains a custom or practice of allowing excessive force incidents to go unpunished. The previous judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. The dismissal of state law claims is also reversed and reinstated due to the restoration of jurisdiction following the reversal of federal claims.