United States v. Johnny L. Motley

Citations: 940 F.2d 1079; 33 Fed. R. Serv. 1022; 68 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5730; 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 19099; 1991 WL 158080Docket: 90-3833

Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; August 20, 1991; Federal Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Johnny Motley prepared tax returns for clients on a contingency fee basis, fabricating deductions to increase refunds and, consequently, his fees. Clients signed the returns, claiming ignorance of Motley's illegal actions. An undercover agent, Sherree Anderson, had Motley prepare her return, resulting in a $4,000 refund that included fictitious claims such as listing her cat as a dependent. Subsequently, a grand jury indicted Motley on nineteen counts for presenting false claims to the federal government under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 287 and aiding or abetting such actions under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2.

Motley was convicted on all counts and sentenced to two concurrent 24-month terms, three years of probation, and a $950 special assessment. On appeal, he raised three issues, primarily arguing that the trial court erred by not giving a jury instruction he proposed related to aiding and abetting. He contended that the instruction was necessary for the jury to consider his defense adequately, emphasizing that conviction for aiding and abetting requires proof that another person committed the underlying crime. Motley claimed that the lack of this instruction denied him a fair trial, as the jury might have convicted him without evidence of another's criminal act.

Motley's instruction to the jury incorrectly suggested that a conviction for aiding and abetting required the prior conviction of a principal taxpayer. Legally, an aider and abettor can be convicted even if the principal is not identified or convicted, as long as proof exists that a crime was committed. However, it is essential that the underlying crime actually occurred for a conviction of aiding and abetting. Motley contended that the government did not demonstrate he aided taxpayers in committing a crime. The jury instructions provided did not adequately inform the jury of the necessity to prove that a crime was committed.

The government argued that under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2, aiding and abetting encompasses two types: traditional aiding and abetting, which requires proof of the principal's offense, and a separate provision where one can be punished for causing an act to be done that would be a crime if performed directly by them. Thus, Motley could be guilty of causing a taxpayer to commit a crime, such as mailing a false claim, regardless of the taxpayer's intent or potential innocence. It is established that one can be held criminally liable for causing another to commit an offense, even if the intermediary lacks intent or is acquitted. The evidence presented by the government was deemed sufficient to support a conviction under the latter provision of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2.

The government's argument regarding section 2(b) is flawed because it did not request, nor did the court provide, jury instructions on this section. The jury instructions pertained only to section 2(a), which necessitates proof of an underlying offense. Consequently, Motley's conviction under section 2(a) was deemed improper due to the government's failure to demonstrate that the taxpayers committed an offense against the federal government. Although Motley does not dispute his connection to the alleged illegal acts, he argues that the government improperly charged him under the wrong statute. He asserts that a valid conviction could be obtained under 26 U.S.C. Sec. 7206(2), which makes it a felony to assist in the preparation of a fraudulent tax return, without requiring proof that the taxpayer committed an offense against the government.

During oral arguments, Motley's counsel acknowledged that section 7206(2) is a lesser-included offense of the charges under sections 2 and 287. A lesser-included offense contains elements that are a subset of a greater offense’s elements, as established in relevant case law. The definition allows for a conviction of a lesser-included offense even if the defendant is not specifically charged with it. In this case, both offenses share similarities except for the requirement of proving an underlying offense. Under section 2(a), the government must demonstrate that taxpayers knew their returns were fraudulent, while section 7206(2) does not necessitate such proof.

Motley was properly convicted under section 7206(2), a lesser-included offense of his original charge. However, the case requires remand for resentencing due to a lack of clarity regarding the original sentence's relation to the Sentencing Guidelines. The original record does not indicate how the district court calculated the sentence, including whether it was within the prescribed range or if it deviated. Without knowing the total offense level for Motley's section 287 conviction or how it compares to section 7206(2), which has a maximum of three years versus five years for section 287, the appeals court cannot ascertain if the district court would impose the same sentence upon resentencing.

Additionally, Motley contended that the exclusion of impeachment evidence regarding witness Cora Gray’s prior misdemeanor conviction for check deception was erroneous. The government argued that the conviction's relevance was unproven, as it might not have involved dishonesty. Under Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(2), evidence of past crimes is admissible for impeachment if they involve dishonesty. The court determined that Motley failed to substantiate that the conviction pertained to deceptive practices rather than mere insufficient funds, leading to its exclusion due to prejudicial effect. Decisions on evidence admissibility are at the district court's discretion and are only overturned for abuse of that discretion, which was not demonstrated in this case.

Motley contends that the court misapplied the legal standards regarding the admissibility of evidence related to his prior convictions during impeachment. He asserts that the court incorrectly utilized Rule 609(a)(1) instead of Rule 609(a)(2). The trial transcript indicates that the court initially assessed Motley's proffer under Rule 609(a)(2) but found he failed to establish that the conviction involved "dishonesty or false statement." Consequently, the court applied the balancing test under Rule 609(a)(1), determining that the prejudicial impact of the evidence outweighed its probative value, rendering it inadmissible. The appellate review finds no errors in this reasoning, and even if there were, such errors would be deemed harmless given the overwhelming evidence of guilt presented at trial. Motley does not demonstrate how the alleged error adversely affected his case; he merely claims an error occurred.

Additionally, Motley raises a general claim of insufficient evidence regarding certain elements of the crime, specifically asserting a lack of testimony regarding his signing or mailing of the tax returns. However, the appellate court notes that the record contradicts his assertion about mailing and emphasizes that, under Section 7206(2), a conviction can occur regardless of the aider and abettor's knowledge or consent regarding the fraudulent activity. Consequently, all challenges to Motley's conviction are rejected, and the conviction is affirmed. However, his sentence is vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of this opinion. The case involved nineteen falsified tax returns prepared for eight taxpayers between January 1986 and January 1989, and the prior conviction was admissible as it met the ten-year requirement stated in Rule 609(b).

Remand to the district court is required for resentencing due to a lack of clarity regarding how the original sentence for Motley was determined. The record does not specify the relationship of his sentence to the Sentencing Guidelines or whether it was an upward or downward departure. Additionally, the total offense level for Motley's section 287 conviction is unknown, as is the total monetary loss he caused. This ambiguity prevents a determination of whether the district court would impose the same sentence under section 7206(2), which has a maximum of three years, as it did under section 287, which has a maximum of five years.

Motley also contends that the court erred in excluding impeachment evidence during his trial. He sought to introduce evidence of a witness's prior misdemeanor conviction for check deception but failed to demonstrate that the conviction involved dishonesty or false statements, as required under Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(2). The court excluded the evidence, agreeing with the government's argument that without proof linking the conviction to deceptive practices, its probative value did not outweigh its prejudicial impact. 

Decisions on evidence admissibility are at the district court's discretion and can only be overturned if there is an abuse of discretion. Motley claims the court misapplied the legal standard by using Rule 609(a)(1) instead of Rule 609(a)(2) for his impeachment evidence. However, the trial transcript indicates that the court evaluated his proffer under Rule 609(a)(2) and found it lacking, subsequently applying the balancing test under Rule 609(a)(1) for any alternative introduction of evidence.

The court evaluated the admissibility of evidence by weighing its probative value against any potential prejudicial impact on the defendant. It concluded that the prejudicial effect outweighed the probative value, rendering the evidence inadmissible. The court found no errors in this assessment, noting that even erroneous evidentiary rulings would not be overturned if the error was deemed harmless, as established in *United States v. Farmer* and *United States v. Hargrove*. In this case, the overwhelming evidence of the defendant Motley's guilt indicated that any potential errors in the evidentiary analysis were harmless, leading to a rejection of his appeal.

Motley also raised a general claim of insufficient evidence, which the court reviewed deferentially, taking all evidence and reasonable inferences in favor of the government. The court emphasized that a conviction would only be reversed if no rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, imposing a heavy burden on defendants. Motley argued that there was insufficient evidence regarding certain elements of the charged crime, specifically that he did not sign or personally mail the tax returns. However, the court found these points irrelevant, given the nature of the lesser-included offense under Section 7206, which holds an aider and abettor liable regardless of knowledge or consent regarding the fraud.

Ultimately, the court affirmed Motley's conviction but vacated his sentence, remanding it for reconsideration in light of the opinion. The charges involved nineteen falsified tax returns for eight different taxpayers from January 1986 to January 1989. Additionally, the court noted that evidence of a conviction is inadmissible if over ten years have passed since the conviction date, but Motley's conviction met this criterion.