Carol Van Strum Paul E. Merrell v. John C. Lawn

Citations: 940 F.2d 406; 91 Daily Journal DAR 8897; 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 15894Docket: 89-35656

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; July 23, 1991; Federal Appellate Court

Combined Opinion SummaryCombined Opinion Original

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Carol Van Strum and Paul Merrell appeal the dismissal of their lawsuit against federal and Lincoln County officials, claiming retaliatory overflights by aircraft due to their opposition to herbicides on national forest land. They pursued Bivens claims, Section 1983 claims, and NEPA claims. The district court dismissed their claims, ruling that the two-year statute of limitations under Oregon law (O.R.S. 12.110(1)) applied, rendering any incidents before August 22, 1983, non-actionable. The appellants argue that a ten-year statute of limitations (O.R.S. 12.140) should apply instead. The district court's decision was based on the Supreme Court's ruling in Wilson v. Garcia, which established the statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims, without addressing whether Bivens actions should be treated differently or considering retroactivity issues as outlined in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson. The Ninth Circuit will address these questions regarding the applicable statute of limitations for the appellants' claims.

In Wilson, the Supreme Court addressed the statute of limitations for Section 1983 actions, noting that Congress did not set a specific time frame, instead instructing the adoption of state limitations that align with federal law (42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988). The Court determined that all Section 1983 claims should be uniformly characterized, regardless of differing factual scenarios or legal theories, and concluded that the state statute of limitations for personal injury best served the objectives of Section 1983. 

The Wilson decision did not clarify whether the same personal injury statute of limitations would apply to Bivens actions. Prior to Wilson, there was inconsistency within the circuit regarding the application of statutes of limitations to Section 1983 and Bivens claims. In Marshall v. Kleppe, the Ninth Circuit rejected the application of California's statute for Section 1983 to Bivens claims, reasoning that the comparison should focus on the most analogous state statute. It identified California's statute regarding 'liabilities created by statute' as applicable to Section 1983, while deeming constitutional torts distinct, leading to the use of California's 'catch-all statute' for Bivens actions.

If Marshall's principles were applied to the current case, Oregon's catch-all provision (O.R.S. 12.140) would govern Bivens claims, allowing a 10-year period for initiation. The implications of Wilson on Marshall's ruling remain unexamined; however, Wilson appears not to apply directly because its reasoning rests on statutory construction principles not relevant to Bivens actions. Instead, Wilson's holding was based on inferred legislative intent from the 1871 Congress concerning judicial administration, rather than the text or legislative history of Sections 1983 and 1988.

The Supreme Court articulated three primary concerns in the Wilson analysis regarding the statute of limitations for civil rights claims under Section 1983. First, there is a need for a uniform and generic limitations period within each state to avoid uncertainty and protracted litigation, as seen in cases that rely on specific facts of each claim. Second, the Court emphasized the importance of a limitations period that protects civil rights litigants, asserting that personal injury claims should not discriminate against federal claims. Third, the Court found that the personal injury statute of limitations highlights the personal nature of constitutional violations.

The Wilson Court rejected the application of limitations periods tied to statutory rights because Section 1983 is remedial rather than substantive, with its authority rooted in the Constitution. The same rationale applies to Bivens actions, which mirror Section 1983 claims but involve federal actors. A uniform limitations period is essential to serve the purposes of Bivens actions, especially since these actions derive solely from constitutional protections.

The analysis further notes practical concerns, particularly when plaintiffs can choose to bring claims under Section 1983 or directly under the Constitution. The Seventh Circuit argued for a consistent limitations period to prevent plaintiffs from favoring jurisdictions with longer periods, which would reintroduce uncertainty. Consequently, the conclusion is that the personal injury statute of limitations should apply to Bivens claims.

Next, the document addresses the issue of retroactivity concerning the newly extended application of Wilson to Bivens actions. The appellants, who filed their suit more than three years after some claims accrued, argue that they believed the applicable statute of limitations was Oregon's ten-year general provision, suggesting their claims should not be barred.

In Usher v. City of Los Angeles, the court examined the retroactive application of the Wilson decision regarding the statute of limitations for Sec. 1983 actions that were filed after Wilson but arose before it. The court referenced Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, which outlines three factors for determining retroactivity: (1) whether the decision establishes a new principle of law, (2) whether retroactive application would further or hinder the rule's purposes, and (3) whether it would yield substantial inequitable results. 

The court found that all three factors weighed against applying Wilson retroactively. First, Wilson introduced a one-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims, replacing the existing three-year period, marking a significant departure from established circuit law. Second, retroactive application would undermine the protection of federal civil rights, a key purpose of Wilson. Lastly, applying Wilson retroactively would result in inequitable outcomes, as plaintiffs would be penalized for not anticipating the change in law, which they had no prior notice of, while defendants would not be significantly disadvantaged. 

Consequently, the court concluded that Usher's precedent suggests the Wilson rule should not apply retroactively to Bivens actions, asserting that the intended safeguarding of federal rights takes precedence over merely finding a uniform statute of limitations.

The third Chevron factor, concerning substantial inequitable results from retroactive application of a new decision, weighs against such application in this case. Holding appellants accountable for 'sleeping on [their] rights' when they were unaware of the legal time limitation would be inequitable. Appellees have not established any prejudice from enforcing the existing rule at the time of their alleged wrongful acts. Thus, similar to Usher, the Chevron factors indicate that applying the Wilson rule retroactively to Bivens claims, which would shorten the limitations period, is inappropriate. Litigants who filed Bivens claims before March 5, 1991, are not time-barred for claims related to injuries within ten years prior. Those filing after this date must do so within ten years of the injury or two years from the decision date, whichever is earlier. The district court's application of Wilson to bar timely claims will be reversed and remanded. The discussion also references previous cases, noting that claims were timely filed before Wilson and that the statute of limitations applies uniformly under both Wilson and Marshall. The relevant Washington statute provides a three-year limitation for personal injury claims, aligning with Wilson's direction for personal injury-related statutes. The text further asserts that Congress likely did not anticipate the extensive range of claims under Section 1983, which would be more akin to personal injury tort claims.