David Moore Ernest Aldridge Lynn Bolden Chester Bright Addie Clark Willie Farrow Ruth Mann Timothy Moore James Parker, Sr. Velma Roland David Williams, Jr., on Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated v. Beaufort County, North Carolina Beaufort County Board of County Commissioners Ledrue Buck, in His Capacity as Chairman of the Beaufort County Board of County Commissioners Frank Bonner Cecil Cherry, Jr. Arthur Lee Moore Marion Dilday, in Their Capacity as Commissioners of Beaufort County, North Carolina, and Their Successors and Agents Beaufort County Board of Elections Mary Van Dorp, Chairman of the Beaufort County Board of Elections and Her Successors and Agents Charlotte Nicholls, in Her Capacity as Supervisor of the Beaufort County Board of Elections

Citation: 936 F.2d 159Docket: 90-3122

Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit; June 21, 1991; Federal Appellate Court

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Beaufort County appeals a district court decision enforcing a settlement agreement in a class action lawsuit brought by Black voters under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Despite Black residents constituting approximately 30% of the county's population, no Black candidates had been elected to the five-member Board of County Commissioners in over thirty years. The plaintiffs claimed the at-large election system denied them an equal opportunity to elect candidates of their choice. 

Settlement negotiations began in early 1989, focusing on a limited voting plan, which restricts the number of votes a voter can cast, allowing minorities to support a single candidate. On April 4, 1989, the Board discussed resolving the litigation and announced a meeting to approve a plan. During an executive session on April 18, the Board agreed to settle by implementing a limited voting system and expanding the Board to seven members with staggered elections. 

The Board's attorney, Mr. Crowell, communicated the settlement terms to the plaintiffs, proposing the new election method, which included one-vote-per-election, to take effect in 1990. The terms detailed in a subsequent letter confirmed the Board’s willingness to court-order the new election method to avoid further litigation. The court affirmed that a complete agreement had been reached, thus upholding the district court's decision.

Mr. Crowell requested that plaintiffs discuss a settlement offer with their counsel, resulting in plaintiffs agreeing to the offer on April 24, 1989. On April 26, Ms. Winner communicated this acceptance to Mr. Crowell, leading both attorneys to agree that Mr. Crowell would draft the motion and consent judgment. A draft was sent to Ms. Winner on April 28, which outlined election procedures and stipulated that any application for attorney's fees should be submitted within 90 days of the order's entry. Ms. Winner made several minor revisions to the draft to ensure consistency with prior documents, after which Mr. Crowell's office incorporated these changes into a final version.

However, during a Board meeting on May 2, 1989, the Board expressed dissatisfaction with the revised wording regarding the Section 2 violation and raised concerns about potential liability for attorney's fees. Following this, Mr. Crowell attempted to address the Board's concerns and sent a new draft of the consent order. On May 22, 1989, the Board, in Mr. Crowell's absence, voted to reject any settlement involving limited voting, citing public opposition and potential legal ramifications. Subsequently, the plaintiffs moved to enforce the settlement agreement.

A district court hearing on June 1, 1989, led to the court granting the plaintiffs' motion to enforce on June 11, 1989, though the decision was stayed pending an appeal. The Board appealed, arguing that no settlement was reached due to unresolved issues regarding the wording of the Section 2 violation and the amount of attorney's fees. The appellate court found these arguments unpersuasive and affirmed the district court's decision, noting that enforcement of a settlement agreement involves two distinct inquiries.

The court first evaluates whether the parties have reached a settlement agreement and then clarifies the terms of that agreement. It affirmed that an agreement was established when Ms. Winner accepted Mr. Crowell's oral settlement offer. The settlement terms, as determined by the court, were outlined in a document signed by Ms. Winner on May 1, 1989. The court assesses the parties' intentions based on objective evidence. Mr. Crowell's April 19 letter indicated the Board's readiness to settle, and Ms. Winner's signing of a document signified acceptance. Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court found that Mr. Crowell's oral offer on April 18 was confirmed by his subsequent letter. The May 1 agreement represented the final terms, despite the Board's claims regarding wording and attorney's fees. Mr. Crowell acknowledged the need for the Board to admit a violation for a new voting plan, and the May 1 document included the agreed wording. The Board's assertion that attorney's fees were unresolved was dismissed; the court found that the parties intended to address fees separately, as indicated in the settlement documents. Testimony demonstrated that similar cases often settle without immediate resolution of fees. The district court concluded that the settlement was not contingent on the fee discussion, characterizing the Board's argument as an attempt to evade the established agreement.

Mr. Crowell was found to have both actual and apparent authority to settle the case on behalf of the Board. The district court determined that during an executive session on April 18, 1989, the Board authorized Crowell to settle the lawsuit, contradicting the Board's claim that he was only authorized to negotiate. The court noted that negotiations had been ongoing for months; therefore, a mere authorization to negotiate would have been redundant. Crowell's April 19 letter outlined an election plan the Board would accept and was acknowledged by Chairman Buck, who did not correct Crowell’s assertion of authority, indicating that the Board was fully informed of the settlement discussions.

Under North Carolina law, public bodies can direct their attorneys to settle litigation if the terms are recorded in an open session. The Board’s oral offer, conveyed through Crowell, sufficed to establish a binding settlement. Additionally, Crowell displayed apparent authority by representing that he acted on behalf of the Board without indicating that the settlement was contingent on further approval. The Board's inaction to limit Crowell's authority further reinforced this impression.

The trial court correctly concluded that Crowell was authorized to settle and that the Board could not later deny the agreement based on a belief that formal approval was necessary. On appeal, the Board's argument that the district court should have deferred to its judgment regarding the remedial election plan was dismissed as unpersuasive, as the plan was devised by the Board itself, and the court acted appropriately in enforcing the settlement agreement.

Appellant's argument suggests that district courts should alter voting plans with each shift in local governing bodies' preferences, as seen with the Board of Beaufort County's change regarding limited voting. However, the district court is not obligated to reassess the Board's current stance before applying a previously approved plan. The enforcement of this plan does not violate federalism principles. The Board's claim that limited voting contradicts North Carolina public policy is unsupported, given that four jurisdictions in the state have implemented limited voting through consent decrees, with Bladen County's plan receiving legislative approval. The district court determined that the parties had settled the case, referencing an agreement signed by Ms. Winner on May 1, 1989. This decision is upheld, and the case is remanded for preclearance under the Voting Rights Act. The Board's assertion that the agreement was erroneous due to a later draft is dismissed, as the May 3 draft constitutes a counter-offer and did not invalidate the finalized agreement from May 1. The court found no clear acceptance of the May 3 language, thus upholding the initial agreement. Although the Board disputed the acknowledgment of a section 2 violation and attorney's fees arrangement, the court established that an accord was reached, and attorney's fees do not need to be finalized at the time of settlement, aligning with precedents in similar cases.

Crowell's offer letter dated April 19, 1989, did not mention attorney's fees, and all related documents indicated that fee resolution would occur separately at a later date. A document signed by Ms. Winner on May 1, 1989, specified a fee application submission deadline of November 15, 1989. The discussions on attorney's fees in mid-May were independent of the settlement agreement, with no evidence of any agreement tying the settlement to the fee issue. Testimony from Ledrue Buck, the Board Chairman, confirmed that the Board rejected a limited voting method prior to knowing the plaintiffs' fee requests. The district court determined that Crowell's settlement offer was not contingent on the fee resolution and viewed the Board's position as an attempt to evade the settlement agreement.

The Board contended that Crowell lacked the authority to bind them in the settlement. However, the district court found evidence of both actual and apparent authority, as the Board had authorized Crowell to settle during an executive session on April 18, 1989. The Board had publicly indicated a desire to resolve the lawsuit, and their claim that they only authorized negotiation was dismissed by the court, noting that negotiations had been ongoing for months. Crowell's April 19 letter proposed an election plan that the Board was to accept, and despite receiving this letter, no Board member sought to amend or clarify Crowell's representation of their authority. The court ruled that Crowell's oral offer to settle on specific terms was sufficient, and no formal signing by the Board was necessary, as North Carolina law permits public bodies to instruct attorneys to settle, provided the terms are later recorded in open session. Furthermore, the court affirmed Crowell's apparent authority to settle, as attorneys generally possess the authority to bind their clients. Crowell communicated to Ms. Winner that he was acting on behalf of the Board without suggesting that the offer required final Board approval. The final consent order included a signature line for Crowell, but not for the Board members, indicating that they allowed Crowell to represent them throughout the settlement process.

Crowell's authority to settle the case was never limited by the Board, which allowed him to possess apparent authority for settlement. The trial court concluded that Crowell was authorized to settle and had demonstrated this authority. The Board cannot reject the settlement offer on the grounds of a subjective belief that formal approval was necessary for a binding agreement. On appeal, the Board argued that the district court erred in not deferring to its judgment on the election plan, but this argument was deemed unconvincing. The district court adopted a voting plan initially devised by the Board, and it is not obligated to reassess the Board's current stance on the plan. The Board's contention that limited voting contradicts North Carolina public policy was countered by examples of four jurisdictions that successfully employed limited voting under consent decrees, with legislative approval for one instance. The district court's decision to enforce the settlement agreement was upheld, as the Board did not demonstrate that the plan violated state or federal policy. The court affirmed that the parties had reached a settlement, as evidenced by the document signed by Ms. Winner on May 1, 1989, despite later discussions and a draft exchanged on May 3 being considered a counter-offer. The May 1 agreement remains enforceable as the final decision, as there was no acceptance of the May 3 counter-offer. Consequently, the case is remanded to the district court for preclearance under the Voting Rights Act.