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Stevenson v. Superior Court

Citations: 23 Cal. 3d 847; 592 P.2d 318; 153 Cal. Rptr. 831; 1979 Cal. LEXIS 233Docket: Crim. No. 20665; S.F. No. 23919

Court: California Supreme Court; March 27, 1979; California; State Supreme Court

Narrative Opinion Summary

In a criminal case involving charges of attempted receipt of stolen property, the court addressed the issue of when jeopardy attaches during jury selection. The defendants, Mendes and Stevenson, faced challenges in their respective proceedings. Mendes, convicted and sentenced to probation, sought habeas corpus relief on double jeopardy grounds, while Stevenson attempted to prevent retrial through a writ of prohibition. The court concluded that jeopardy does not attach until all jurors, including alternates, are sworn, thereby denying Mendes' habeas corpus petition. During trial, a juror was excused without a hearing due to a family death, a decision upheld by the court under Penal Code section 1089, allowing for such actions when 'good cause' is shown. Furthermore, the court permitted peremptory challenges to sworn jurors, emphasizing the fluidity of jury selection until alternates are finalized. The court referenced precedents, including Crist v. Bretz and People v. Hess, to support its findings. Ultimately, the petitions for writs of habeas corpus and prohibition were denied, as no trial proceedings had commenced, negating double jeopardy claims. This decision underscored the court's discretion in jury management and adherence to statutory guidelines.

Legal Issues Addressed

Constitutional Protection against Double Jeopardy

Application: The court concluded that the constitutional protection against double jeopardy was not applicable since trial proceedings had not commenced.

Reasoning: The constitutional protection against double jeopardy was deemed non-applicable here, as no trial proceedings had commenced.

Discharge and Replacement of Jurors under Penal Code Section 1089

Application: The court found that excusing a juror due to 'good cause' and replacing them with an alternate was permissible without a hearing, aligning with section 1089.

Reasoning: According to section 1089, a trial court may opt to include alternate jurors, and the impanelment is not considered complete until they are sworn in.

Habeas Corpus as a Remedy for Double Jeopardy Claims

Application: The court recognized habeas corpus as an appropriate remedy to address claims of double jeopardy, as asserted by Mendes.

Reasoning: The court affirmed that habeas corpus is a valid remedy for such claims.

Jeopardy Attachment in Jury Selection

Application: Jeopardy does not attach until all jurors, including alternates, are sworn in, which means that defendants' claims of double jeopardy were unfounded.

Reasoning: The court determined that jury selection in a criminal case is not finalized and jeopardy does not attach until all jurors, including alternates, are sworn in.

Peremptory Challenges Post-Swearing of Jurors

Application: The court allowed peremptory challenges to sworn jurors, asserting that jury composition can be adjusted until alternate jurors are sworn.

Reasoning: The court noted that peremptory challenges could be exercised during this interval for valid reasons, particularly when the jury's composition was subject to change.

Prohibition Relief in Cases of Former Jeopardy

Application: Prohibition relief is suitable when a defendant claims that they have already been in jeopardy, as sought by Stevenson to prevent a retrial.

Reasoning: The court acknowledged that prohibition relief is appropriate when a defendant has already been in jeopardy.