Flores v. Los Angeles Turf Club, Inc.

Citations: 55 Cal. 2d 736; 361 P.2d 921; 13 Cal. Rptr. 201; 1961 Cal. LEXIS 252Docket: L. A. No. 26202

Court: California Supreme Court; May 8, 1961; California; State Supreme Court

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Plaintiff appeals a judgment that dismissed his request for an injunction against future exclusion from the defendants' racetrack and denied his claims for statutory, general, and special damages related to wrongful ejection and assault. On January 22, 1959, after purchasing tickets, he was requested to leave the Santa Anita Race Course and was forcibly ejected when he refused. This action was executed by track personnel under Business and Professions Code section 19561.5, which allows exclusion of specific individuals, including those with past convictions related to bookmaking, in order to protect the interests of legitimate horse racing. The trial court determined that the plaintiff, having been convicted of bookmaking in 1953, fell under the category of persons that defendants were required to eject. The court concluded that the plaintiff's only remedy was an administrative hearing before the racing board, which he did not pursue, leading to the dismissal of his injunction claim for lack of jurisdiction. Additionally, the court found that the plaintiff became a trespasser upon refusing to leave and that the force used for his ejection was justified. The court denied his claims for damages. The plaintiff argues that his exclusion violates his rights to equal access to public amusement under California civil rights statutes and infringes on the equal protection and due process clauses of both the U.S. and California Constitutions. A similar case, Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club, established that exclusion based solely on past convictions of bookmaking is invalid if the individual has paid for admission.

Civil Code sections 51 and 53 grant the right to equal access and accommodation, excluding past illegal wagering convictions as grounds for exclusion. The term "persons of lewd or immoral character" lacks a definite standard for constitutional exclusion unless it pertains to current illegal wagering activities. This reasoning was supported in Pacific Turf Club, Inc. v. Cohn, where a temporary injunction against a previously convicted bookmaker was reversed. Following these cases, the Legislature enacted Business and Professions Code section 19561.5, enhancing rule-making powers for the racing board, which the appellant argues infringes on his constitutional rights to equal access. The court clarified that the Civil Code sections do not create new rights but affirm existing statutory rights, which the Legislature can alter. There is no recognized constitutional or common-law right to access race tracks absent statutory authority. The legality of section 19561.5 depends on whether its provisions are reasonably classified and substantially related to a legitimate legislative goal. The appellant cites cases that upheld licensees against similar statutes, arguing that they lacked clear standards for exclusion based on past conduct rather than current actions.

The Vallerga court revoked a prior decision based on testimony regarding homosexual patronage, emphasizing that such testimony lacked evidence of improper acts on the premises. This interpretation of Business and Professions Code section 24200 was necessary to uphold its constitutionality. The court inferred from Vallerga, Stoumen, and Tarbox that the state cannot impose liability on licensees for actions beyond their control or require them to undertake unrelated actions to state objectives. Consequently, licensees could not lose their licenses due to the unrelated conduct of their customers.

In the current case, the link between the regulated party's past conduct and the aim of regulation is more direct, as the statute involves prior convictions for closely related offenses. The reasonableness of the regulation is acknowledged, particularly in section 19561.5, which specifies prior convictions as a clear and applicable standard. When challenging legislative classifications, any conceivable facts supporting the classification are presumed. Factual data, such as illegal wagering's economic impact and the recidivism of convicted bookmakers, likely influenced the Legislature's classification system in section 19561.5 to exclude individuals with a propensity for repeated offenses.

The text also references similar legislation in New York that restricts felons from holding positions in labor unions, which was upheld against constitutional challenges, highlighting the legislative response to perceived issues related to ex-convicts' influence in specific environments.

Legislative investigations identified ex-convicts on the waterfront as a significant corrupting influence, leading to the conclusion that New York's measures to regulate this issue, including the disqualification of convicted felons, were justified and constitutionally valid. Specifically, section 19561.5, which restricts individuals with felony convictions directly related to regulated activities, is deemed to have a rational basis and is constitutional. The appellant's claim that this section and its regulations are unconstitutional and do not require respondents to remove him from their premises is rejected. 

Furthermore, the trial court's dismissal of the appellant's injunctive action for lack of jurisdiction was upheld due to the appellant's failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The appellant argued that pursuing remedies under an unconstitutional statute is unnecessary and that the provided remedies were inadequate. However, since section 19561.5 is deemed constitutional, this argument was dismissed. The California Legislature has established an extensive regulatory framework for horse racing and wagering, with jurisdiction vested in the California Horse Racing Board, which has the authority to create rules for conducting races. The Board's rule-making and exclusion procedures, including administrative hearings, have been validated by precedent. Given the comprehensive administrative system in place, it is unlikely that the Legislature intended for individuals to bypass these remedies, and courts typically require exhaustion of administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief.

The appellant contends that the available administrative remedy is cumulative rather than exclusive and asserts its inadequacy, referencing cases such as Orloff, Jewett, and Estate of Ward. However, the Orloff decision predates the enactment of section 19561.5, which establishes a statutory scheme that allows for injunctive relief alongside monetary damages. The Jewett and Ward cases support the notion that a statutory remedy is cumulative when enforcing a common-law right; however, there was no common-law right of access to racetracks before the civil rights statutes were enacted, making those cases irrelevant.

The court emphasizes that the exhaustion of administrative remedies is necessary when a statute provides such a remedy, even if it doesn't explicitly state that exhaustion is a prerequisite. In this case, section 19561.5's provision for judicial review reinforces the requirement to exhaust administrative remedies, particularly concerning future actions. The appellant's claim that the administrative remedy is exclusive yet inadequate is flawed, based on the mistaken belief that it prevents recovery of damages under former Civil Code sections 52 and 54, and that the board's rules of exclusion apply without discretion.

The trial court's findings indicated that the respondents acted within their rights to eject the appellant, which was not predicated on the exclusiveness of the remedy but on the merits of the case. The dismissal of the appellant's injunctive action was due to a lack of jurisdiction, not a denial of damages based on the administrative remedy. Furthermore, the claim that the administrative hearing is inadequate simply because the rules of exclusion apply is rejected; the appellant could present evidence at the hearing to contest the application of these rules. Ultimately, the judgment is affirmed.

Gibson, C. J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., McComb, J., Peters, J., and White, J. concurred regarding the regulations governing pari-mutuel wagering under the California Horse Racing Board, specifically referencing Civil Code sections 51-54, which were in effect when the alleged actions occurred. Key provisions include:

1. **Section 2103** prohibits individuals convicted of violating the Bookmaking Act (Penal Code Section 337a) from participating in pari-mutuel wagering.
2. **Section 2104** extends this prohibition to the physical presence of such individuals in any enclosure where wagering is conducted on race days.
3. **Section 2105** mandates that racing associations eject any prohibited individual found in the racing enclosure on racing days.

Additionally, the 1959 amendments to the Civil Code established the Unruh Civil Rights Act, consolidating earlier provisions into sections 51 and 52. These sections guarantee all citizens equal access to business establishments regardless of race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin, and provide a cause of action for damages resulting from violations of these rights.

Article IV, section 25a of the California Constitution allows the Legislature to regulate horse racing and associated wagering. It confirms the authority of the California Horse Racing Board, which oversees licensing and regulation, and stipulates the process for handling exclusions and ejections, including daily reports by racing associations, hearings for excluded individuals, and criteria for reinstatement. Specific procedural rules are detailed in the California Administrative Code, title 4, article 42, sections 2109-2114.