James C. Matlock v. Thomas v. Barnes, in His Capacity as the Mayor of the City of Gary

Citations: 932 F.2d 658; 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 9795; 1991 WL 77512Docket: 90-1047

Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; May 15, 1991; Federal Appellate Court

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James Matlock filed a lawsuit against the city of Gary, Indiana, and several city officials, including Mayor Thomas V. Barnes, claiming he was transferred from his position as a legal investigator in retaliation for supporting Barnes' political opponent, former mayor Richard Hatcher. Matlock's suit, brought under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, alleged violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. After a five-day trial, the jury found that Matlock's transfer was politically motivated, awarding him $5,307.58 in back pay and $20,000 for emotional distress. The defendants appealed several decisions made by the magistrate, including the denial of their summary judgment motion and the jury's damage awards.

Matlock began his employment in the Law Department in January 1972, where he performed well without any complaints from superiors. Following Barnes' election in 1988, Matlock, a known Hatcher supporter, was transferred on May 23, 1988, to the position of correctional officer at a reduced salary, despite lacking relevant training. He filed his lawsuit in December 1988, initially against the city and its officials, later adding deputy mayor Comer as a defendant and seeking damages in their individual and official capacities.

Defendants argued that Matlock's transfer was not politically motivated. Comer acknowledged observing Matlock with Hatcher at a political event and reporting this to King and Ware, while King discussed Matlock's transfer with the Mayor afterward. They contended the transfer was necessary to protect departmental confidentiality due to Matlock's personal loyalty to Hatcher amid ongoing litigation. After discovery, both parties sought summary judgment, but the magistrate found unresolved material facts, particularly regarding Matlock's role as a legal investigator. Citing Supreme Court precedents, the magistrate granted partial summary judgment to Matlock, determining that Comer, Ware, and King acted with political motives in the termination, while the Mayor's involvement remained undecided. Following a five-day trial, the jury ruled in favor of Matlock, leading to a judgment against the defendants in their official capacities, with total compensatory damages of $25,307, plus front pay, costs, and attorney's fees. Defendants appealed the denial of summary judgment regarding Matlock's job classification, the partial summary judgment related to political motivation, and the jury's verdict, including the awarded damages and fees. The legal context references Elrod v. Burns and Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, establishing that political loyalty cannot be a basis for termination unless it is a job requirement.

The prohibition against patronage practices allows for the dismissal of public employees who are involved in policy formulation and implementation if they lack the appropriate political affiliation. This exception supports a newly elected administration's interest in executing its policies without disruption from disloyal personnel. The distinction between "policymaking" or "confidential" employees, who can be terminated for political beliefs, and non-policymaking, non-confidential employees, who cannot, is established in Elrod v. Burns. In Branti v. Finkel, the Supreme Court refined this distinction, asserting that public employees are protected from patronage dismissals if party affiliation is essential for effective job performance.

The court has characterized the Branti test to determine if a position grants significant input into governmental decision-making, allowing for divergent views on goals and implementation. Although a functional approach is preferred, the terms "policymaking" and "confidential" still generally apply to legitimate patronage positions.

In the case involving Matlock, the defendants argued that his role as a legal investigator was policymaking and confidential, justifying his transfer due to political motivations. They claimed Matlock had considerable discretion in investigations and access to sensitive files, which posed a risk during ongoing litigation against a former mayor. However, the magistrate rejected their claims, emphasizing that the assessment should focus on the inherent powers of the position rather than the specific duties performed by Matlock. The magistrate found insufficient evidence in the depositions and affidavits to grant summary judgment for either party, indicating a lack of clarity regarding the legal investigator's responsibilities.

The magistrate highlighted that a mere fear of potential breaches of confidentiality by an employee does not qualify an employer for the Elrod exception. The court cited a prior case, stating that extending the Elrod exception to include political support as a basis for presuming a breach of duty would be overly broad. Evidence indicated that after Matlock's transfer, the defendants may have fabricated concerns about confidentiality to rationalize their actions, especially since Matlock had never breached confidentiality in his 16 years of service. It was noted that King, aware of Matlock's political affiliations, took no action until a specific political event.

The magistrate appropriately denied summary judgment for the defendants regarding the legal investigator's status, as the determination of whether a position is policymaking or confidential is typically factual. Both parties failed to adequately describe the legal investigator's duties in their affidavits and depositions, leaving genuine issues of material fact for a jury to evaluate. The jury ultimately found that Matlock did not hold a policymaking or confidential position, and the defendants' subsequent motions for a directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) were rejected. The denial of JNOV was reviewed de novo, confirming that the jury’s verdict was well-supported by trial evidence. In political patronage cases, defendants must prove that political affiliation is a legitimate qualification for the employee's position, which involves demonstrating a valid government interest that justifies the employee's dismissal and outweighs any infringement on constitutional rights. Here, defendants attempted to invoke the Elrod and Branti exceptions by asserting the policymaking or confidential nature of Matlock's role.

Matlock's role as a legal investigator was assessed for its potential classification as a policymaking position. Initially, it appeared that his duties were limited and primarily ministerial, which would not qualify him as a policymaker under legal precedents. His responsibilities involved handling small property claims and accident investigations, following instructions from supervising attorneys without the authority to settle cases or supervise others. This lack of significant responsibility compared to other law enforcement roles deemed policymaking by courts was highlighted.

However, a precedent from Hudson v. Burke indicated that investigators could still be considered policymakers if they contributed substantial input into policy decisions, warranting political considerations in hiring and firing. In Hudson, evidence showed that investigators engaged in politically sensitive tasks and that political affiliation influenced hiring decisions within a politically charged environment.

The defendants in Matlock's case failed to provide similar evidence of a policymaking nature for the legal investigator role in the Gary Law Department. Testimonies indicated that the Department did not treat claim settlements as political matters and did not hire or fire based on political affiliation, suggesting a non-policymaking classification. Matlock himself stated he had no political affiliation at the time of his hiring.

Additionally, the defendants argued that Matlock held a "confidential" position due to his proximity to former Mayor Hatcher and ongoing lawsuits involving him. However, the trial testimony revealed that all Department employees had access to court files, undermining the claim of confidentiality and the assertion that Matlock could be considered a confidential employee under legal standards.

Defendants argued that "confidentiality" implies a need for political loyalty rather than merely a duty to maintain office secrets. The court expressed skepticism about the claim that access to court records combined with political animosity poses a significant risk to confidentiality. However, it acknowledged that in small offices, political animosity could create a hostile work environment, making it unreasonable to expect an elected official to work closely with someone perceived as a political adversary. 

In the case of Matlock, the defendants could have substantiated their claim of confidentiality by demonstrating genuine concerns about working in close quarters with Matlock, a supporter of Hatcher. The jury, however, found the defendants' concerns about confidentiality unconvincing, supported by evidence showing that Matlock had not previously breached security and that no one had raised concerns about his association with Hatcher until after his transfer. Notably, other Hatcher loyalists had access to the same confidential information without any expressed concern from the Department. Furthermore, the Department appeared lax in its litigation against Hatcher, even facing a dismissal motion for failure to prosecute.

The jury determined that Matlock's position was neither confidential nor policymaking, and this finding will not be overturned. There is no indication that political affiliation is a legitimate requirement for the legal investigator role. 

Regarding Matlock's termination, a public employer can avoid liability for a politically motivated decision by proving it would have made the same decision regardless of the protected conduct, advancing legitimate non-political reasons for its actions.

Magistrate Rodovich granted partial summary judgment to Matlock, preventing the jury from examining the motivations behind the actions of defendants Comer, Ware, and King regarding Matlock's transfer. The defendants contended that their affidavits created a genuine issue of material fact, suggesting Matlock was transferred due to a political statement or his superiors' loss of confidence in him. However, the court found the issue moot because the defendants failed to appeal the jury verdict against Barnes and the city, leaving only official capacity suits against the officials, with the city of Gary liable for any judgments. Since the jury already found the city liable for Matlock's politically motivated transfer, further inquiry into the individual defendants' motivations was unnecessary.

Consequently, the judgments against Comer, Ware, and King were vacated, and the magistrate was instructed to dismiss the suits against them. Regarding damages, the defendants argued that Matlock did not mitigate his lost wages and that the jury's emotional distress award lacked evidentiary support. However, the jury's determination that Matlock had no duty to mitigate damages was upheld, as it was the defendants' responsibility to prove otherwise. Matlock's actions post-transfer indicated reasonable efforts to mitigate damages, and the defendants failed to show any additional effort could have led to comparable employment at his previous salary.

The $20,000 award for emotional distress is upheld as it is neither "monstrously excessive" nor lacking a rational connection to the evidence presented. Unlike the case of Nekolny, where minimal emotional injury was established, Matlock provided substantial evidence of his emotional distress, including details of his long tenure and responsibilities before and after his job transfer. The jury was able to assess his emotional suffering based on the contrasting nature of his prior and current positions. The amount awarded is consistent with similar cases, where emotional distress awards have varied widely, affirming that the $20,000 is reasonable.

Additionally, the award of $57,675 in attorney's fees to Matlock is deemed appropriate under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988, as he is considered a prevailing party despite losing some claims. The magistrate conducted a thorough review of the fee petition, including an evidentiary hearing and consideration of objections, and did not abuse discretion in concluding the fees were reasonable.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed concerning Thomas Barnes and the city of Gary, while the judgments against Comer, Ware, and King are vacated, and the suits against these officials are dismissed.

The trial was conducted before a magistrate with the parties' consent. Defendants filed a "Motion to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment," which the magistrate treated as a motion for summary judgment, a stance this Court will also adopt. The defendants claimed they were entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity, a point previously raised in two interlocutory appeals that were consolidated and dismissed on the grounds that the dismissal of individual capacity suits rendered the qualified immunity issue moot. The Court upheld this prior ruling. 

Defendants now argue that the magistrate's decision to allow them to succeed in their individual capacity suits was prejudicial, asserting they should have received a judgment exonerating them of wrongdoing, which was undermined by the plaintiff's voluntary dismissal. They contend a merit-based victory would have been preferable, but the Court emphasized that a favorable judgment, regardless of the circumstances, cannot be appealed if it is not adverse.

Additionally, defendants argue that the Barnes administration lacked a widespread policy of retaliating against city employees who supported a rival faction. However, municipal liability can arise from a single decision by policymakers, and it suffices that Barnes, as a decision-maker with the final authority, authorized Matlock’s termination, irrespective of any general policy against political affiliation-based employment actions.

Lastly, the lack of personal stake in the official capacity suits by defendants Comer, Ware, and King is highlighted, as their roles would simply be filled by successors in the event of their departure, reflecting a limited interest in the litigation's outcome.