U.S. v. Martinez-Cortez

Citation: Not availableDocket: 92-8080

Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; April 13, 1993; Federal Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the appeal of Antonio Martinez-Cortez, who contested the enhancement of his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) following a prior burglary conviction. Martinez-Cortez argued that the evidentiary basis for the sentence enhancement was inadequate based on the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Taylor. The court acknowledged that the district court erred in accepting the government's evidence as sufficient for enhancement but determined that this error was not reversible under the applicable standard of review.

In December 1991, Martinez-Cortez was convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon and was sentenced to the maximum term of ten years. His sentence was enhanced by an additional five years due to prior convictions, including a 1959 assault conviction, a 1971 burglary conviction, and a 1986 drug conviction for unlawful delivery of heroin. The government also cited a drug conviction for simple possession, which Martinez-Cortez argued should not qualify as a "serious drug offense" necessary for enhancement.

The court confirmed that the possession conviction could not support the enhancement, leaving the government reliant on the other three convictions. It was uncontested that the 1959 and 1986 convictions supported the enhancement, and while Martinez-Cortez did not dispute the existence of the 1971 burglary conviction, he claimed the district court improperly accepted it as legally sufficient. Critically, he failed to object to the pre-sentence report or the inclusion of the burglary conviction during sentencing, which barred him from raising this objection on appeal unless there was plain error. Thus, the court ultimately affirmed the enhanced sentence.

Plain error is defined as a significant mistake in a judicial proceeding that, if uncorrected, undermines the fairness or integrity of the process, potentially leading to a miscarriage of justice. In the case of B. Martinez-Cortez, the appeal centers on the district court's acceptance of a 1971 burglary conviction as a basis for sentence enhancement under 924(e). Martinez-Cortez does not contest the accuracy of the presentence report regarding the conviction or its qualification as a "violent felony." Instead, he argues that the government failed to provide the necessary evidence as established by the Supreme Court for the conviction to support the enhancement. The key precedent is Taylor v. United States, which restricts the use of state burglary convictions for enhancement purposes to those that qualify as "generic" burglary. The Supreme Court defined generic burglary as involving unlawful entry into a structure with intent to commit a crime. Furthermore, the Court outlined the proof required for establishing a prior conviction: the fact of the conviction and the corresponding state statute. If the statute aligns with the generic definition, the trial court need only confirm this alignment. However, an exception to the "categorical approach" exists, allowing the court to consider the specifics of a case where a jury was mandated to find all elements of generic burglary, such as when the defendant is charged with a burglary of a building specifically.

Martinez-Cortez contends that for his sentence to be enhanced under the interpretation of 924(e) set forth in Taylor, the trial court must have either proper copies of the relevant statutes from his prior convictions or the indictment and jury instructions related to those convictions. He argues that without meeting these requirements, any sentence enhancement by the court is void ab initio and must be vacated. While the court agrees that the government must provide proof under one of the two methods outlined in Taylor for an enhancement to be valid, it disagrees with Martinez-Cortez's claim that failure to provide such proof results in a void sentence rather than a voidable one.

The court has previously interpreted Taylor in four cases, affirming sentence enhancements in three of them. Specifically, in United States v. Rodolfo Martinez, the enhancement was upheld because proper judgment copies were presented. In United States v. Silva, the enhancement was affirmed based on certified copies of the defendant's prior convictions. In United States v. Garza, the government demonstrated that the prior burglary conviction met the criteria of generic burglary under Taylor. However, in United States v. Raul Martinez, the court reversed an enhancement based on an attempted burglary conviction, finding that the government failed to provide adequate proof under both methods specified by Taylor.

In the current case, similar to Raul Martinez, the government did not present the necessary charging papers or jury instructions from Martinez-Cortez's 1971 burglary conviction, nor did it provide the state burglary statute under which he was convicted. The only evidence presented was a vague entry in the Presentence Report (PSR) describing an incident involving Martinez-Cortez breaking into a building and threatening a witness with a knife. Martinez-Cortez argues that this information is insufficient to justify a sentence enhancement under the standards established by Taylor.

The government is required to present specific types of evidence to prove generic burglary for sentence enhancement, as outlined by the Taylor decision. The government's evidence regarding a 1971 burglary conviction is deemed insufficient, lacking the requisite clarity and reliability. A mere hearsay statement from an unidentified source presented in the presentence report (PSR) does not meet the evidentiary standards set by Taylor. Had the defendant objected and the government failed to provide appropriate evidence, the enhancement based on this conviction would have been reversible error, necessitating a sentence vacate and remand.

A dissenting opinion suggests that Taylor should allow for broader proof, including statutes, indictments, or other reliable evidence to establish a prior conviction as generic burglary. However, the majority disagrees, asserting that such an interpretation misrepresents Taylor, which mandates a categorical approach focused solely on statutory definitions rather than specific case facts. The majority also critiques an alternative interpretation from a prior case, U.S. v. Fields, asserting that while Fields addressed the reliability of evidence, the current case challenges the legal adequacy of the evidence under Taylor. Ultimately, the majority emphasizes that Taylor requires reliable proof of the statute's elements, which should originate from formal legal documents or equivalent credible sources.

Taylor should not be subjected to an arbitrary standard that lacks rationale. Fields demonstrates that this circuit has recognized Presentence Reports (PSRs) as "legally adequate" evidence for 924(e) enhancement proceedings. The majority's assertion that an uncontested PSR, which serves as an admission confirming the elements of generic burglary, is "legally inadequate," is puzzling. The majority's mechanical interpretation of the Taylor opinion undermines its intent. A sensible reading of the opinion should permit reliable evidence of a generic burglary. Given the Fields case, the uncontested PSR referenced by the trial judge, detailing the specific burglary for which the defendant was convicted, provides adequate proof under Taylor for its use in 924(e) enhancements. Thus, the majority's establishment of a per se rule in this instance is both unnecessary and unjustified. While agreeing with the outcome, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s interpretation of Taylor.