Royal Russell Long v. Duane Shillinger

Citations: 927 F.2d 525; 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 3473; 1991 WL 26873Docket: 89-8091

Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; March 6, 1991; Federal Appellate Court

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Royal Russell Long, an inmate at the Wyoming State Penitentiary, filed a civil rights lawsuit against Warden Duane Shillinger under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming his extradition to Oklahoma for trial on criminal charges violated his rights. Long argued that he was not provided due process as required by Wyoming's extradition statutes, which could have allowed him to contest the extradition through a writ of habeas corpus. He contended that this lack of due process resulted in incurred attorney's fees and other expenses while in Oklahoma, as well as a dangerous situation during his transport back to Wyoming. Long sought compensatory damages for his expenses and punitive damages totaling $10 million.

Following the district court's request for affidavits and documentation from both parties, the defendant moved for summary judgment, citing the Eleventh Amendment and qualified immunity. The district court initially denied this motion and awarded Long nominal damages of one dollar. Subsequently, Long requested the court to reconsider the damages awarded, submitting documentation of $150,230 in attorney's fees and $200,000 for pain and suffering. However, the district court denied this motion, leading to Long's appeal.

Plaintiff contends on appeal that the district court erred by not appointing counsel and awarding only nominal damages. Under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915(d), the district court has broad discretion to appoint counsel for indigent litigants, and this decision can only be overturned if it results in fundamental unfairness affecting due process rights. Factors for consideration include the merits of the claims, the nature of the factual issues, the litigant's ability to present their claims, and the complexity of the legal issues. The appellate review concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to appoint counsel.

Plaintiff's underlying claim was based on his transfer to Oklahoma for trial without being informed of his right to file a habeas corpus petition against the extradition or having a hearing. Wyoming's extradition act stipulates that a prisoner must be informed of the extradition request and the charges, as well as their right to legal counsel. If a prisoner wishes to contest the legality of their extradition, they must be presented before a judge who will establish a timeframe for filing a habeas corpus writ and scheduling a hearing.

While plaintiff was transferred under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, he retained the rights provided by Wyoming's extradition act. The Act does not require relinquishing any preexisting state or federal rights to contest the transfer, and failing to uphold such rights constitutes a violation actionable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

The district court accepted the defendant's affidavit and documentation, concluding that the defendant violated plaintiff's due process rights before extradition. However, it also needed to determine whether this violation resulted in injury to the plaintiff. Actual injury must be demonstrated and cannot be presumed from a procedural due process violation. The district court found it difficult to see how the plaintiff suffered injury from the extradition process, a conclusion with which the appellate court agreed, albeit for different reasons. The appellate court affirmed the district court's decision based on the supporting record.

Plaintiff claimed injury due to the lack of due process in preventing his extradition, asserting he could have presented evidence of his innocence through a habeas corpus petition. However, the legal framework governing extradition limits the inquiry to the validity of extradition documents, the existence of charges in the demanding state, the identification of the petitioner, and the status of the petitioner as a fugitive, as established in Michigan v. Doran. Consequently, the courts are bound to accept the demanding state's judicial determination of probable cause, and the petitioner cannot contest the underlying facts of the alleged crime.

Since the plaintiff did not allege that he could have prevented extradition based on these four grounds, and as a matter of law, he could not have demonstrated his innocence to avoid extradition, his extradition was deemed justified despite procedural deficiencies. Therefore, he cannot recover damages for injuries arising from the extradition but may only seek compensation for emotional distress caused by the due process deprivation itself.

The attorney's fees and expenses incurred in Oklahoma were deemed a result of the extradition, not due process violations, making them non-recoverable. Emotional distress linked to defending against charges in Oklahoma or the risks during his return to Wyoming also stemmed from the extradition, not from due process violations. The plaintiff did not prove any injury specifically due to the deprivation of due process, thus he is entitled only to nominal damages.

Additionally, the plaintiff's claim regarding solitary confinement upon his return was not raised as a due process violation in the district court, so it will not be considered on appeal. The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming is affirmed. The record indicates the plaintiff was extradited in August 1985, returned in December 1985, and acquitted of all charges in Oklahoma. The defendant has not appealed the judgment against him in his official capacity, and the plaintiff's request for appointed counsel in the district court was properly documented, contrary to the defendant's argument. Lastly, the plaintiff's separate claim regarding a threat to his life during an inmate escape attempt was dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).