Ivey v. Myers v. James A. Collins, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division

Citations: 919 F.2d 1074; 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 22235; 1990 WL 197951Docket: 90-2114

Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; December 28, 1990; Federal Appellate Court

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A federal habeas corpus case involving Ivey V. Myers addresses the issue of exhaustion of state remedies. Myers was convicted of aggravated robbery and sentenced to 25 years in Texas. He appealed his conviction on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, which the Fourteenth Court of Appeals rejected. Myers subsequently filed a petition for review in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, which declined to hear the case without opinion, as such review is discretionary under Texas law.

Myers later sought federal habeas relief, presenting the same claims as in his state appeals. The district court dismissed his petition, claiming he failed to exhaust state remedies because his claims were not "fairly presented" to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. This dismissal was based on an interpretation of the Supreme Court's ruling in Castille v. Peoples, which states that raising a claim for the first time in a discretionary review does not satisfy exhaustion requirements.

However, the Fifth Circuit Court clarified that the Castille decision does not require a petitioner, whose claims have been ruled upon by an intermediate state court, to pursue those claims in a state habeas proceeding to satisfy exhaustion. The court vacated the district court's judgment, concluding that Myers had adequately presented his claims and met the exhaustion requirement as established in previous cases.

Myers filed a petition for discretionary review regarding his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, which he had previously raised and lost in the Fourteenth Court of Appeals. The state of Texas and the district court did not argue that Texas criminal procedure prevented Myers from raising this claim on direct review. The court assumes Myers pursued his claim correctly to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. However, the State contends that Myers must seek state habeas relief in addition to his direct appeal to exhaust state remedies, a position the court disagrees with. 

The court references Richardson v. Procunier, indicating that a Texas prisoner satisfies the exhaustion requirement by raising a claim in a petition for discretionary review or in a habeas corpus application, without needing to pursue both. The State's attempt to broaden Castille’s impact is rejected, as federal courts maintain that only one post-conviction relief avenue needs to be exhausted before seeking federal habeas relief. The court cites Riddick v. Edmiston, where the Third Circuit affirmed that adequate exhaustion occurred when a defendant raised all issues in both the state appellate court and in a petition for certification. 

The State also references Satterwhite v. Lynaugh, but the court distinguishes this case. Satterwhite's situation involved submitting a pro se brief after his attorney had already filed one, which was not permissible under Texas law. Consequently, Satterwhite's claims were not considered fairly presented, unlike Myers's case where his claims had been properly addressed by the relevant courts.

Satterwhite's failure to present his claims in a procedurally cognizable manner in his pro se brief means that any subsequent presentation in a petition for discretionary review to the Court of Criminal Appeals would constitute "new claims," failing to meet the exhaustion requirement under Sec. 2254. Conversely, Myers raised his ineffective assistance of counsel claims correctly by presenting them on direct appeal and obtaining a ruling from the Fourteenth Court of Appeals, thereby not introducing a "new claim" to the state's highest court. Thus, further state proceedings on these claims would be deemed futile. The exhaustion doctrine does not necessitate repetitive efforts in state courts, provided the claims are not first presented in a discretionary review petition. Myers pursued an appropriate post-conviction relief avenue, properly exhausting his state remedies. The district court's judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. Additionally, Myers's allegations about the district court's judgment were corrected by the court of appeals, and he sought federal habeas review for separate ineffective assistance claims that were exhausted in state court. Texas courts typically require ineffective assistance claims to be raised in post-conviction proceedings when the trial record is inadequate; however, in this case, the claims were sufficiently developed for direct appeal, negating the necessity for a state habeas proceeding. The State concedes that if a claim is procedurally barred under Texas law, raising it in a collateral review would be futile, thus exhausting it for federal habeas corpus purposes.