United States v. Troy Carlos Yerks, (John Doe, A/K/A Spanky, James Dennis Stewart, Prince Gervell Campbell, John Dennis Smith, Tim Smith, James Carlos Smith)

Citations: 918 F.2d 1371; 31 Fed. R. Serv. 885; 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 20391Docket: 89-2621

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; November 20, 1990; Federal Appellate Court

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Troy Carlos Yerks was convicted of possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute and sentenced to thirty years in prison. He appeals on three grounds: the admission of other crimes evidence, denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal due to insufficient evidence, and incorrect application of the Sentencing Guidelines. The case stems from a search of an apartment where officers found a significant amount of crack cocaine hidden in the toilet tank. Yerks arrived during the search, attempted to flee, and made statements suggesting awareness of the illegal activity. Evidence presented included testimonies from four witnesses who had received crack cocaine from Yerks, a police officer's observations of him with known drug users, and other incriminating items found in the apartment.

The court ruled that the admission of other crimes evidence was appropriate under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), which allows such evidence if it is relevant, similar in nature and timing to the charged crime, sufficient to support a jury finding, and more probative than prejudicial. The district court has broad discretion in these matters, and its decision can only be overturned if the evidence lacked relevance to any issues in the case. The appellate court affirmed the district court's decisions on all counts.

The district court's admission of evidence regarding Yerks' prior crack cocaine distribution was upheld, deemed relevant to establish his intent to distribute the crack found in Apartment F-22. The jury was responsible for assessing witness credibility, and the court adequately instructed the jury on the limited use of such evidence. To convict Yerks under Sec. 841(a)(1), the government needed to prove he knowingly possessed cocaine with intent to distribute. Yerks argued that the evidence was insufficient for conviction, but the court reviewed the evidence favorably for the government, allowing reasonable inferences to support the jury's verdict. Constructive possession was established as Yerks had control over the apartment where the crack cocaine was found, supported by testimony from the apartment manager and leasing agent, as well as Yerks possessing the apartment key at his arrest. The intent to distribute could be inferred from circumstantial evidence, including the significant quantity and purity of the cocaine, drug paraphernalia, large amounts of cash found in the apartment and a safe, and prior distribution activities. This evidence collectively supported the inference of Yerks' intent to distribute the crack cocaine.

At the sentencing hearing, the district court assigned Yerks a total offense level of 42 and a criminal history category of III, resulting in a guideline range of 360 months to life imprisonment. Yerks was sentenced to 360 months of imprisonment and five years of supervised release. He contends the court improperly applied the guidelines in four areas: (1) setting his base offense level at 36 instead of 34 under Sec. 2D1.1(a)(3), (2) applying a four-level increase under Sec. 3B1.1(a) for being a leader in extensive criminal activity, (3) a two-level increase under Sec. 3C1.1 for obstruction of justice, and (4) neglecting to consider a downward departure from the guideline range.

Regarding the adjustment under Sec. 3B1.1(a), which allows a four-level increase for organizers or leaders of extensive criminal activities with five or more participants, the court found sufficient evidence supporting that Yerks acted as a leader. Testimony indicated he distributed crack cocaine to multiple individuals involved in the operation, which he organized and controlled, demonstrating a leadership role. This finding was deemed not clearly erroneous.

The court also upheld the upward adjustment for obstruction of justice under Sec. 3C1.1 due to Yerks' use of aliases when interacting with law enforcement. While Yerks argued that this did not result in any loss of resources for the government, the statute accounts for attempted obstruction, which does not require successful obstruction. Thus, his actions warranted the adjustment under Sec. 3C1.1.

The district court's decision to set Yerks' base offense level at 36 instead of 34, based on an additional 460 grams of cocaine not charged against him, was examined. Despite the close question, the guideline range remained 360 months to life for either level due to the proper adjustments under Sections 3B1.1(a) and 3C1.1. Thus, the issue of the base offense level was deemed unnecessary to resolve, as any error in including the additional cocaine was harmless and did not affect the guideline range. Yerks' request for a downward departure from the guideline range was met with the court's statement indicating it could not justify such a departure based on the case's facts, which was interpreted as a discretionary decision rather than a belief of lacking authority to depart. This decision is nonreviewable. Consequently, Yerks' conviction and sentence were affirmed.