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Glenda Smith and Ray Martin v. Howard Barton, Larry Barnes, Jack Ugaki, and Brian Wardle
Citations: 914 F.2d 1330; 1 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 1689; 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 16427; 54 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 40,264; 53 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1552; 1990 WL 134733Docket: 88-4230
Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; September 19, 1990; Federal Appellate Court
Glenda Smith and Ray Martin, former employees of the Idaho Commission for the Blind, filed a lawsuit seeking damages, injunctive, and declaratory relief. They allege that a restructuring of the Commission, which resulted in their job losses, violated their rights under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and their First Amendment rights to free association under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The appeal follows a magistrate's ruling that granted the defendants' summary judgment motion, dismissing the section 1983 claims. The plaintiffs challenge the magistrate's decisions regarding the denial of relief for handicap discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act, the denial of a jury trial, and the exclusion of a newly discovered audiotape and transcript from a Commission meeting. Both plaintiffs are totally blind and were employed in significant roles within the Commission, which is state-funded. The reorganization led by defendant Howard Barton consolidated their positions into a new role, Chief of Rehabilitation Services, which was justified on efficiency grounds and concerns about funding. Although Smith and Martin were informed they could apply for the new position and would retain their salaries, Edward Easterling was ultimately appointed to it. Plaintiffs filed a complaint on September 21, 1984, asserting two main claims against the defendants stemming from actions related to their reorganization. Counts I and II claimed constructive discharge due to the plaintiffs' blindness, violating section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Counts III and IV alleged that the reorganization retaliated against the plaintiffs for their membership in the National Federation of the Blind (NFB), invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of their First Amendment rights to free association and their Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection. The magistrate dismissed the constitutional claims under § 1983, citing preclusion by the Rehabilitation Act, and denied the plaintiffs' request for a jury trial, opting for a bench trial regarding the Rehabilitation Act claim. On August 1, 1988, the magistrate ruled that the plaintiffs did not establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act and denied a post-trial motion to introduce new evidence, an audiotape and transcript from a Commission meeting. The discussion section elaborated on the legal standards, noting that a magistrate's summary judgment is reviewed de novo, with courts viewing evidence favorably towards the non-moving party. It outlined that section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination against handicapped individuals in federally assisted programs. Additionally, while 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides remedies for constitutional rights violations, the Supreme Court has established that such claims cannot proceed if Congress has created a comprehensive remedial scheme in the underlying statute. The magistrate concluded that the Rehabilitation Act sufficiently provided such a remedy, leading to the dismissal of the plaintiffs' First Amendment claims. Defendants support this conclusion in their arguments. The magistrate's finding that the plaintiffs' Section 1983 claims are barred by the Rehabilitation Act is incorrect for two main reasons. First, the Middlesex doctrine only prevents Section 1983 claims if they could have been brought under a separate federal statute that offers sufficient remedies, indicating congressional intent to exclude Section 1983 claims. The plaintiffs' First Amendment claims do not relate to handicap discrimination and therefore could not be pursued under the Rehabilitation Act. The injuries claimed by the plaintiffs stem from their activities, not their handicap status, as they assert two distinct forms of discrimination: one based on their blindness under the Rehabilitation Act and another based on their rights to free association and speech under the First Amendment. The magistrate's reliance on Tyus v. Ohio Dept. of Youth Serv. is misplaced. In Tyus, the plaintiff's claims were intertwined with his alleged handicap-related discrimination, which justified the barring of Section 1983 claims under the Rehabilitation Act. In contrast, the plaintiffs in the current case allege injuries related to their association with the NFB and retaliatory actions due to their support of the organization and ongoing litigation against the defendants. These allegations do not fall under the purview of the Rehabilitation Act, which focuses solely on handicap discrimination. The plaintiffs' First Amendment claims address rights applicable to all citizens and require different proof than that needed for discrimination claims based on blindness under the Rehabilitation Act. The magistrate's ruling that section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act precludes plaintiffs' section 1983 claims is incorrect. The Rehabilitation Act lacks a comprehensive remedial structure that demonstrates Congress's intent to bar section 1983 claims based on the First Amendment. There is a noted division among lower courts on this issue, with cases such as Rothschild v. Grottenthaler and Shuttleworth v. Broward County allowing claims under both statutes. The rights asserted in the plaintiffs' section 1983 claim stem from the First Amendment, not section 504, indicating that Congress did not intend to limit section 1983 claims unrelated to handicap discrimination. Therefore, the magistrate's summary judgment on the section 1983 claim is reversed, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings. Regarding the right to a jury trial under section 504, this is a legal question subject to de novo review. While plaintiffs seek to determine if the Seventh Amendment grants a right to a jury trial for section 504 actions, the statute does not explicitly provide for it. Multiple courts have indicated that a jury trial right may not exist under section 504, although this issue remains undecided. Overall, it appears that jury trials do not constitute a right under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Remedies, procedures, and rights under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act apply to violations of Section 504, prompting an examination of the potential for a jury trial right under Title VI. Title VI does not explicitly grant a jury trial, and judicial interpretations have generally ruled out such a right. Similar to Title VII, the remedies under Title VI are predominantly equitable, with procedures that exclude jury trials. Courts often reference Title VII for guidance due to their similarities, where a jury trial right is also generally denied, as supported by several precedents. Since neither Section 504 nor Title VI provides for a jury trial, the inquiry shifts to whether the Constitution mandates one. The Seventh Amendment ensures a jury trial in common law suits involving claims exceeding $20. In cases based on statutes, the analysis from Tull v. United States applies, requiring an assessment of whether the statutory action resembles common law suits. This involves evaluating the nature of the action and the type of remedy sought, with the remedy's characterization being more crucial than finding an exact common law analogue. Plaintiffs' action resembles historical tort actions or those enforcing employment contracts, with the potential for either legal or equitable relief. The first factor in determining the right to a jury trial does not decisively favor either side, resulting in uncertainty regarding entitlement to a jury trial. However, the second factor of the Tull analysis supports the plaintiffs’ right to a jury trial for their section 504 claims. Plaintiffs seek both injunctive and declaratory relief (equitable in nature) and compensatory money damages, which are traditionally legal remedies. The monetary damages sought are distinct from and not merely incidental to the requested injunctive relief. These damages aim to compensate for specific losses related to job responsibilities and status, thus not qualifying as equitable. The Ninth Circuit permits money damages for section 504 violations, as established in case law, affirming the availability of both equitable and monetary remedies for plaintiffs under the Rehabilitation Act. Money damages were sought in this case, which are available in the Ninth Circuit, thus entitling plaintiffs to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment for their claims under section 504. The magistrate's denial of this right was an error. However, it must be noted that the right to a jury trial is not automatically granted by section 504 itself, as previous cases have held that such a right does not exist under this section. Additionally, courts generally agree that there is no right to a jury trial under Title VI or Title VII, which serve as references for section 504 rights. The right to a jury trial in this context is based on the nature of the relief sought, which is legal, rather than equitable. Actions under section 504 that seek only equitable relief will not be impacted, and preliminary injunctive relief can still be pursued without a jury trial. The Rehabilitation Act, specifically section 504, prohibits discrimination against qualified handicapped individuals in federally funded programs. It allows for a private right of action without requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies, which are deemed inadequate for individual complainants. To succeed in a section 504 claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate they are a handicapped person, qualified for the position sought, excluded solely due to their handicap, and that the position is within a federally funded program. In this case, the magistrate confirmed that plaintiffs were handicapped, qualified for the Chief of Rehabilitation Services position, and that the position existed within a federally funded program. However, the magistrate found that plaintiffs did not meet the requirement of being excluded solely due to their handicap, noting that defendants did not claim to rely on the plaintiffs' handicap in their decision. Most section 504 lawsuits involve plaintiffs who claim denial of employment or benefits due to disability discrimination, focusing on the definitions of "otherwise qualified" and "reasonable accommodation." In this case, the plaintiffs do not seek special accommodations and are undisputedly qualified for their positions, presenting a unique scenario for the courts. Traditionally, courts grapple with whether a failure to accommodate constitutes illegal discrimination, as seen in **Southeastern Community College v. Davis**, where a deaf student was deemed unqualified for a nursing program. Discrimination against handicapped individuals can stem from various sources, including intentional discrimination, neutral standards with disparate impact, and barriers that may be surmountable or insurmountable. The analysis of discrimination claims varies based on the type and whether the employer acknowledges using the plaintiff's handicap as a basis for employment decisions. Since the plaintiffs allege intentional discrimination and the defendants deny reliance on the plaintiffs' handicap, the frameworks from Title VII cases are applicable. The distinction made in **Doe v. New York University** supports using Title VII proof models in cases where defendants disavow reliance on the plaintiff's handicap, while issues related to barriers require a different approach specific to handicap discrimination law. The magistrate concluded that the plaintiffs did not establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Section 504 because they failed to demonstrate exclusion solely due to their handicap, misinterpreting the precedent set in Doe v. N.Y.U. In cases where defendants deny reliance on a plaintiff's handicap, Doe suggests that a prima facie case can be established by showing that the plaintiff was qualified for a position but rejected under circumstances indicating discrimination based on an impermissible factor. Following this, the burden shifts to the defendants to provide legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the rejection. If they do, the burden returns to the plaintiffs to prove that these reasons are pretextual or unjustly consider the handicap. This model is supported by Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. Additionally, Pushkin v. Regents of the Univ. of Colorado rejected applying disparate treatment analysis to Section 504 claims to avoid the intent requirement, noting that demonstrating a discriminatory purpose based solely on handicap is rare. In that case, however, the defendant did not disclaim reliance on the plaintiff's handicap. The analysis proposed here only applies when defendants deny considering the plaintiff's handicap while the plaintiff alleges discriminatory intent. The case is reversed and remanded for a jury trial on the plaintiffs' discrimination claims under Section 504 and 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, as well as for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Frank Smith, the original plaintiff, passed away during the litigation, and his spouse, Glenda Smith, has been substituted as the party plaintiff. The magistrate also noted that the only alleged First Amendment violation pertains to freedom of association, with no amendment made to include a free speech claim, although the summary judgment order suggests a free speech violation may have been implied. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 establishes liability for individuals who, acting under state authority, deprive any person of constitutional rights. The magistrate's analysis suggested grounds for dismissing the plaintiffs' due process and equal protection claims; however, the court did not need to examine this as the plaintiffs did not appeal the dismissal of these claims. The Circuit has not previously ruled on the preclusive effects of the Rehabilitation Act, but courts have allowed claims under both the Rehabilitation Act and Sec. 1983 to coexist, indicating the validity of such claims. In assessing the plaintiffs' handicap discrimination under section 504, the magistrate concluded that there was no conspiracy to exclude NFB members, a decision the plaintiffs are appealing. The magistrate mistakenly conflated the handicap discrimination allegations with the First Amendment free association claims. The evaluation of the free association claims should be conducted based on First Amendment standards rather than under section 504. Additionally, section 505(a)(1) of the amended Rehabilitation Act outlines the remedies and rights similar to those in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Individuals aggrieved by actions or inactions of recipients of federal assistance under Section 794 are entitled to seek remedies. The legal framework surrounding Title VI and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act is interconnected, yet the Supreme Court warns against oversimplifying their relationship. Notably, plaintiffs have not sought front pay or back pay, and the Supreme Court has not definitively ruled on the availability of monetary damages under Section 504. In *Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone*, the Court applied Title VI principles to a Section 504 claim, allowing for back pay. However, in *Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n*, it was indicated that compensatory relief under Title VI requires proof of discriminatory intent. The Fifth Circuit has adopted a similar stance regarding Section 504, asserting that damages necessitate evidence of intentional discrimination. Most cases have focused on specific barriers to access, reflecting the observation that discrimination against individuals with disabilities often stems from apathy rather than animosity. Furthermore, issues related to disparate impact and various barriers present complex legal challenges not yet fully addressed by existing employment discrimination law.