Daiva Richardson and Ronnie Richardson v. City of South Euclid Arnold C. D'Amico Jack Clifford James Farrell and John Doe

Citation: 904 F.2d 1050Docket: 89-3056

Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; July 26, 1990; Federal Appellate Court

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A 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 claim was brought by plaintiffs Ronnie and Daiva Richardson against the City of South Euclid and its officials following their prosecution under a now-unconstitutional ordinance prohibiting brothel operations and related activities. The ordinance was deemed vague and overbroad, leading to the dismissal of charges against the Richardsons in June 1987, a decision upheld by the Ohio Court of Appeals and later the Ohio Supreme Court.

The Richardsons alleged that the prosecution caused them humiliation, emotional distress, physical harm, loss of earnings, and legal expenses, seeking $250,000 in damages. However, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, determining that the prosecution alone did not constitute a constitutional deprivation necessary for a Sec. 1983 claim, despite acknowledging the ordinance's unconstitutionality. The court found no genuine issue of material fact and evaluated the case under the standards of summary judgment.

The appellate court affirmed the district court's decision, confirming that it was bound by the municipal court's ruling on the ordinance's unconstitutionality due to collateral estoppel, even while an appeal was pending. The ruling emphasized that issues litigated in state court carry preclusive effects in subsequent federal suits.

The Ohio Supreme Court's ruling during the Richardsons' appeal confirms the unconstitutionality of the ordinance in question, establishing that the court is obligated to accept this judgment under Ohio collateral estoppel principles. The Richardsons claim that their prosecution under this unconstitutional ordinance constitutes a constitutional deprivation sufficient for a claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. They argue that the prosecution imposed a hardship that infringed upon their liberty interest.

However, the Fourteenth Amendment protects against deprivations of liberty only when they occur without due process. In support of this, the excerpt cites *Baker v. McCollan*, where the Supreme Court ruled that a lawful arrest, even if subsequently deemed erroneous, does not constitute a constitutional injury if due process is followed. The Richardsons were not deprived of their rights; they were prosecuted under a valid process, given notice, and allowed to defend themselves, ultimately having all charges dismissed when the ordinance was declared unconstitutional. Therefore, their claim under section 1983 lacks merit as the prosecution itself adhered to due process requirements.

The Richardsons claim that their unsuccessful prosecution deprived them of a constitutionally protected interest in avoiding criminal prosecution, arguing this supports their section 1983 suit. They reference Dunn v. State of Tennessee, where the plaintiff successfully argued that his arrest and prosecution violated his Fourth Amendment rights due to unreasonable searches and seizures. However, the court clarified that for a malicious prosecution claim under section 1983 to succeed, a plaintiff must demonstrate egregious misuse of legal proceedings resulting in a constitutional deprivation by state actors. The court distinguishes between state prosecution for refusing to waive Fourth Amendment rights and prosecution under a valid city ordinance, asserting only the former leads to constitutional violations. 

The court also notes its reluctance to expand protected interests for section 1983 claims in alignment with Supreme Court precedents, specifically citing Paul v. Davis, which held that reputational harm, without deprivation of a recognized liberty or property interest, does not constitute a constitutional violation. The Supreme Court emphasized that constitutionally protected interests arise from state law recognition or direct guarantees in the Bill of Rights, concluding that freedom from criminal prosecution is not constitutionally protected. Thus, states do not recognize a right to be free from the burdens of defending against unsuccessful prosecutions, and such burdens do not invoke due process protections.

Reluctance to expand the scope of protected interests under section 1983 is supported by precedent, specifically in *Bacon v. Patera*, where a private investigator sued a police chief for malicious prosecution after being cited for not obtaining a commission. Although the investigator claimed a deprivation of due process, the court found that he demonstrated a sufficient loss of liberty only because he had lost a job due to the chief's actions, not merely the inconvenience of defending himself. 

The Richardsons argue for a rule that prosecution under an unconstitutional ordinance should automatically create a section 1983 claim. However, referencing *Carey v. Piphus*, the court indicates that compensatory damages for procedural due process violations require proof of actual distress caused by the deprivation, rather than mere presumption. The *Carey* court noted that distress could stem from justified deprivations, complicating causation and making it essential for plaintiffs to demonstrate direct injury from procedural deficiencies.

Thus, the court concludes that there is no inherent cause of action under section 1983 for those prosecuted under a law later deemed unconstitutional, as there is no entitlement to damages when conduct could have been legitimately regulated, regardless of the law's drafting issues.

The Court expressed concern about the integrity of the judicial function regarding the prosecution of individuals under a law later deemed unconstitutional. It noted that proving mental and emotional distress linked to the denial of procedural due process should be straightforward, as such distress is a recognized personal injury in law. The Court rejected the notion of a per se cause of action for individuals prosecuted under unconstitutional laws, arguing it would unfairly burden law enforcement officials with the task of determining a law's validity before enforcing it. The Richardsons did not demonstrate a constitutional deprivation related to their prosecution under the invalid South Euclid ordinance, nor did they show any deprivation of 'liberty' interests as defined by the Fourteenth Amendment, which undermined their malicious prosecution claim. Consequently, their Section 1983 action was not valid based solely on the ordinance's later classification as vague and overbroad. The district court's judgment was affirmed.

In dissent, Chief Judge Merritt argued that individuals should be able to sue a city under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 for damages resulting from an unconstitutional ordinance. Merritt contended that the majority's focus on establishing a deprivation of 'property' or 'liberty' interests was misplaced and that the adoption of an unconstitutionally vague statute constitutes a direct violation of due process. He maintained that if the ordinance was void for vagueness, it inherently denied the Richardsons due process, thereby justifying a Section 1983 claim without needing to establish additional rights.

A vague statute violates due process in two significant ways: it fails to provide clear warning about what actions are permissible or prohibited, thereby forcing individuals to guess the meaning of penal laws—this principle is supported by the case Lanzetta v. New Jersey. Additionally, vague laws enable law enforcement to arbitrarily determine whom to prosecute, effectively delegating policy decisions to police and judges, leading to potential discrimination, as noted in Grayned v. City of Rockford. When individuals are subjected to such statutes, they face a dual deprivation of liberty, undermining their constitutional rights.

The majority's argument that prosecution itself suffices as due process is flawed; prosecution under a vague law exacerbates the violation of rights rather than rectifying it. In contrast to a mistaken identity scenario, where a wrong individual could prove their case and be released, prosecution under a vague ordinance constitutes unchecked authority and arbitrary application of law.

The majority also misinterprets the malicious prosecution argument, suggesting that prosecution under a potentially valid ordinance does not equate to a constitutional deprivation. However, prosecuting under a vague ordinance indeed deprives individuals of constitutional rights, as established in Dunn v. Tennessee, and the Ohio courts' invalidation of such ordinances aligns with due process requirements. The majority's reference to a "presumptively valid" ordinance raises concerns about potential immunity for cities without adequately addressing liability under Sec. 1983, which requires that a city's actions stem from an unconstitutional policy or custom.

Finally, while the majority cites cases that delineate constitutional rights, it overlooks that vague statutes themselves constitute a constitutional deprivation. The Richardsons have a valid cause of action under Sec. 1983 based solely on this violation, as reinforced by the ruling in Kolender v. Lawson, which recognized the implications of vague laws.

The majority's reliance on Carey v. Piphus asserts that damages cannot be presumed in a Sec. 1983 action, necessitating that plaintiffs demonstrate actual damages resulting from a due process violation. However, the Richardsons' complaint specifies easily provable damages, including lost wages, legal expenses, and emotional distress. Should concerns about proving injuries persist, the issue should be remanded to the District Court for a damages hearing. Additionally, Carey v. Piphus establishes that while damages are not presumed, actual damages must be compensated, and nominal damages are available for proven due process violations without evidence of actual injury. The Ohio Supreme Court has confirmed the Richardsons' due process violation, and they are not seeking an automatic claim under Sec. 1983 but can substantiate their damages. Even without proof of damages, they may still qualify for nominal damages. The majority's apprehension about law enforcement officials having to evaluate new laws is mitigated by the potential for official immunity, suggesting that only the City should be liable in this context. The majority's decision undermines the Ohio Supreme Court's ruling that the ordinance in question is unconstitutional due to vagueness and oversteps its authority by disregarding principles of comity and collateral estoppel. The Richardsons did not claim malicious prosecution as a basis for their case; they merely referenced it as a comparable situation.