United States v. Harry McNeal Also Known as Major Thompson, Also Known as Robert Lee

Citations: 900 F.2d 119; 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 6229; 1990 WL 47218Docket: 89-2570

Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; April 20, 1990; Federal Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Harry McNeal, also known as Major Thompson, was indicted for unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(g)(1). Following a guilty verdict from a federal jury, the district court sentenced him to 360 months in prison and five years of supervised release. McNeal's appeal contests the sufficiency of the evidence regarding his knowing possession of the firearm, a .357 Magnum, which was found under the driver's seat of a car he was driving after being stopped by Sgt. Thomas Northfell of the Chicago Police Department. The situation escalated after Northfell heard gunshots and observed bystanders indicating towards a fleeing vehicle. Upon arrest, McNeal initially provided false identities and claimed he borrowed the car. Evidence revealed McNeal's prior felony conviction and that the firearm had crossed state lines. The trial court denied his motions to declare the Sentencing Guidelines unconstitutional and to strike the government's minimum penalty notice. The appeal focuses solely on whether the evidence sufficiently demonstrated McNeal's knowing possession of the firearm.

When evaluating a claim of insufficient evidence for establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the court must view the evidence favorably for the government and determine if a rational trier of fact could find the essential crime elements proven. The court does not weigh evidence or assess witness credibility. McNeal contends the government failed to prove his knowledge of the gun's presence or his intent to control it. However, circumstantial evidence can suffice for proving knowing possession. Evidence presented included McNeal driving the car with the gun, shots fired before his car was seen, bystanders pointing at his vehicle, and the gun having recently been discharged. These circumstances allow for a reasonable inference of knowing possession.

McNeal's argument that staying at the scene indicates innocence is noted, but does not outweigh the evidence supporting the jury's verdict. Additionally, McNeal challenges the constitutionality of the federal Sentencing Guidelines, asserting they compel him to choose between a sentence reduction and his Fifth Amendment rights. Specifically, he contests Sec. 3E1.1, which allows a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, but excludes those who obstruct justice. McNeal's provision of false names was deemed obstruction, a finding he does not contest. Thus, he is ineligible for the reduction and lacks standing to challenge the provision's constitutionality.

Finally, McNeal disputes the enhancement of his sentence under Sec. 4B1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines, which applies to career offenders—defined by age, the nature of the current felony, and prior felony convictions.

Section 4B1.2(1) defines "crime of violence" according to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 16, encompassing offenses involving the use or threatened use of physical force, or felonies that inherently risk such force. McNeal argues that his conviction for possession of a handgun by a felon does not qualify as a crime of violence, as it lacks the requisite elements of force or substantial risk. Application Note 1 clarifies that specific offenses like murder and robbery are considered crimes of violence, while others depend on the conduct leading to conviction. The Third Circuit's ruling in United States v. Williams illustrates that active use of a firearm constitutes a crime of violence, whereas mere possession may not. In this case, the district court found that McNeal fired the gun, confirming his conviction as a crime of violence. The government asserts that possession by a felon is inherently a crime of violence, which some courts have supported. However, since McNeal's conviction involved firing the weapon, the court did not need to resolve the broader question of mere possession. The district court's ruling is affirmed. Additionally, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(g) prohibits firearm possession for convicted felons, and Section 3E1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines allows for a two-level offense reduction if a defendant accepts responsibility for their conduct, applicable regardless of the conviction's basis, but not an automatic entitlement for guilty pleas.

At least two circuit courts have upheld Section 3E1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines against constitutional challenges, specifically referencing United States v. Henry and United States v. White. Prior to the Sentencing Guidelines, the court established that leniency shown to defendants who admit guilt does not imply a penalty for those who choose to go to trial, as seen in United States v. Thompson. The Sentencing Guidelines were amended effective November 1, 1989, but these amendments do not apply to the current case since they were not in effect at the time of sentencing. The application notes of the Sentencing Guidelines are considered to hold substantial weight, and the court clarified that these notes, which are crafted by the Commissioners, should be evaluated alongside the Guidelines' text. There is an acknowledged risk in relying on application notes that may conflict with the text, but the court found no such conflict in the present case.