C. Vernon Mason v. Departmental Disciplinary Committee, Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, First Judicial Department: Office of Chief Counsel

Citations: 894 F.2d 512; 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 627Docket: 545

Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit; January 15, 1990; Federal Appellate Court

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C. Vernon Mason, a lawyer, appeals the dismissal of his complaint by the District Court for the Southern District of New York, which sought to halt a disciplinary investigation by a state court committee regarding possible violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The court found that Mason's complaint did not present adequate circumstances to invoke an exception to the abstention doctrine established in Younger v. Harris and further clarified in Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Ass'n. The investigation, initiated by the Departmental Disciplinary Committee of the New York Supreme Court in June 1988, followed numerous allegations regarding Mason's conduct in connection with Tawana Brawley’s controversial claims of abduction and rape. A special grand jury, appointed by the Governor, concluded that Brawley’s claims lacked factual basis. During this inquiry, the Committee informed the special prosecutor, Attorney General Robert Abrams, of its investigation into Mason, leading Abrams to suggest disciplinary actions against Mason. The Committee formally notified Mason of the investigation and provided him with allegations from Abrams, requesting a response. Mason's attempts to extend the response deadline were denied, and issues arose with his legal representation. Mason pursued multiple state court actions, including motions for disclosure of grand jury materials and to recognize his lawyer, which were largely dismissed or denied. The Appellate Division ultimately granted Mason additional time to respond to the Committee and allowed his lawyer to represent him, but dismissed his second proceeding seeking to halt the investigation. Leave to appeal this ruling was denied.

Mason filed a lawsuit in the District Court before the deadline for his response to the Committee. The parties agreed to postpone Mason's response pending the District Court's resolution. The lawsuit claimed that the Attorney General’s disclosure of allegations against Mason, along with the Committee’s involvement in this process, violated his due process rights and hindered his First Amendment rights. Mason's claims are tied to the resignation of the Committee's chief counsel, Gentile, which occurred on January 23, 1989, at the request of Justice Murphy, who cited deficiencies in Gentile’s management, including issues related to Mason’s investigation. Following this, Chief Judge Wachtler ordered an inquiry into Gentile’s resignation to uphold the integrity of the Court and the Committee, leading to a report by the Appellate Division that concluded no Court members had been involved in any disciplinary investigations. The District Court denied Mason’s request for a preliminary injunction and dismissed his complaint, citing abstention grounds. Although the District Court heard oral arguments, it denied a request for an evidentiary hearing. An expedited appeal was granted, temporarily halting the Committee's information requests from Mason, but the stay was later vacated. Mason acknowledges the applicability of Younger abstention in attorney disciplinary matters but argues that his situation involves extraordinary circumstances such as bad faith and bias, which undermine his ability to present constitutional claims effectively. He asserts that the Committee is biased and lacks jurisdiction to address his misconduct claims, leaving him without proper judicial review within the state court system.

Mason’s claims of bias against the Committee do not justify federal court intervention, as established in Kugler v. Helfant. The Committee's actions, including seeking evidence from the Attorney General regarding Mason's alleged unethical conduct and sharing allegations with Mason, do not indicate bias or prevent the Committee from proceeding. The Committee has not yet filed charges against Mason but is merely conducting an inquiry to determine if charges are warranted. Speculative claims regarding the impartiality of Committee members, or the resignation of Gentile and Justice Murphy's involvement, do not demonstrate bias. Additionally, the Committee's rejection of Mason's bias claims and the state courts' refusal to halt the inquiry do not support his bias allegations. Mason's contention that the Committee is unable to adjudicate his claims against others is both irrelevant and incorrect, as the Committee's inquiry focuses solely on his conduct. If charges are brought, Mason will have the opportunity to present his defenses in New York courts. His assertion of the futility of state judicial review is unfounded, as state courts have shown willingness to rule on his claims, evidenced by their refusal to stop the Committee’s inquiry at this early stage.

Mason argues that state law prohibits judicial review of a potential action by the Committee—issuing a letter of caution—citing N.Y. Rules of Court Secs. 605.6(e)(3), 605.7, and 605.8. He references Parker v. Commonwealth of Kentucky Board of Dentistry, which states that Younger abstention does not apply when judicial review of disciplinary actions is contingent on the type of sanction imposed. In Parker, there was no review for any disciplinary action except license revocation. However, in New York, all disciplinary actions are subject to review, and a letter of caution is not deemed disciplinary by the Committee per N.Y. Rules of Court Sec. 605.8(b)(2)(ii). While a state cannot use labeling to evade judicial scrutiny over actions that infringe on constitutional rights, the mere possibility that a letter of caution could affect Mason's federal rights is too speculative to merit relaxing Younger abstention. Mason has not demonstrated that the Committee or state courts are acting in bad faith or provided other sufficient grounds for an exception to Younger abstention. Consequently, the District Court correctly dismissed Mason's complaint without the need for an evidentiary hearing, leading to the affirmation of its judgment.