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McConnell v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.
Citations: 894 P.2d 11; 18 Brief Times Rptr. 1656; 1994 Colo. App. LEXIS 298; 1994 WL 541824Docket: No. 93CA2188
Court: Colorado Court of Appeals; October 6, 1994; Colorado; State Appellate Court
St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company appeals a trial court judgment that awarded personal injury benefits to Carol McConnell, a passenger in a vehicle insured by St. Paul. The court's decision is reversed and remanded for further proceedings. James Dart owned the vehicle, which was primarily used by his daughter, Jean. Jean explicitly instructed Byron Brewer not to drive the vehicle, yet Brewer, who lacked a driver's license and knew he had no permission, drove McConnell, resulting in an accident. McConnell, unaware of Brewer's lack of permission, sought personal injury protection (PIP) benefits from St. Paul. The trial court ruled that under the Colorado Auto Accident Reparations Act (No-Fault Act), McConnell was entitled to coverage because she reasonably believed Brewer had permission to operate the vehicle. St. Paul contended that Brewer's actual lack of authority to operate the vehicle meant McConnell's belief was irrelevant, and thus, the insurer should not be liable under the No-Fault Act for benefits to an injured passenger who was unaware of the owner's lack of consent. The appellate court agreed with St. Paul, determining that the insurer is not obligated to provide benefits under the No-Fault Act when a vehicle is driven without the owner's consent. The Act requires that coverage applies only to individuals using the vehicle with the permission of the named insured. The definition of 'insured' does not extend to individuals using the vehicle without permission from the named insured. The court cited precedents indicating that general permission does not allow the permittee to grant third-party access to the vehicle beyond the scope of the original permission. The No-Fault Act allows insurers to deny coverage for non-permissive users of a motor vehicle, as established in Winscom v. Garza. According to Section 10-4-712(2)(b), C.R.S. 1994, coverage can be excluded if the injured party operated the vehicle without a legitimate belief of entitlement. In this case, Brewer is excluded from coverage. Notably, the plaintiff's status as a non-operator of the insured vehicle does not automatically grant her benefits under the No-Fault Act. Although the Act aims to ensure adequate compensation for accident victims, the Colorado General Assembly intentionally limited the scope of individuals entitled to Personal Injury Protection (PIP) benefits, as confirmed in Murphy v. Dairyland Insurance Co. and Budget Rent-A-Car Corp. v. Martin. Under Section 10-4-707(1)(c), C.R.S. 1994, the plaintiff did not incur bodily injury while occupying the vehicle with the necessary consent, disqualifying her from PIP benefits. Unlike Bukulmez v. Hertz Corp., Brewer had no authority to operate the vehicle, meaning the plaintiff cannot claim benefits based on Brewer's unauthorized use. The judgment is reversed and remanded for further proceedings.