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First National Bank of Colorado Springs v. Morris
Citations: 721 P.2d 1192; 1985 Colo. App. LEXIS 1450Docket: No. 84CA0014
Court: Colorado Court of Appeals; December 25, 1985; Colorado; State Appellate Court
The First National Bank of Colorado Springs, as trustee for the M. Frances Bennett Trust, appeals a judgment favoring defendants Adeline and Louis Morris, which ruled that a $20,000 promissory note owed by Morris to Bennett was canceled and forgiven. The court finds that the note, executed by Morris on February 5, 1970, required quarterly interest payments with the principal due by March 2, 1980. After Bennett's death, Morris reduced the principal to $12,648 and continued making interest payments until April 1980, when he asserted the loan would be canceled upon his next payment, a claim the bank disputed. The bank objected to the testimony of Adeline Morris, citing the Dead Man’s Statute, which restricts testimony from parties involved in claims against the estate of a deceased person. The trial court, however, admitted her testimony, concluding that the principal had been forgiven at Bennett's death, leaving only the interest obligation. The bank contends this ruling was erroneous and that Mrs. Morris’s testimony should have been barred under the statute. The appellate court agrees with the bank, emphasizing that the Dead Man’s Statute aims to protect the estate from claims that cannot be contested due to the decedent's unavailability to testify. The court clarifies that Mrs. Morris, as an adverse party, should not have been permitted to testify on behalf of her own interests, thus reversing the lower court's decision. Morris' claim that the Dead Man’s Statute's exceptions apply to this case is incorrect. He contends that Mrs. Morris' testimony regarding a post-death conversation with a bank officer about forgiving a note falls under the exception in 13-90-102(1)(a)(I). However, this interpretation misrepresents the statute, as her testimony pertains to a transaction with a deceased individual, which is explicitly prohibited regardless of when the conversation occurred. Additionally, Morris argues that the testimony of Gernand, a bank officer, as an agent of the deceased regarding the loan to Morris, allows Mrs. Morris to provide her account of the same transaction under 13-90-102(1)(b) and (1)(c). This argument fails because no bank representative testified about the conversations or transactions related to the note's forgiveness. The bank officer's identification of the bank's role does not permit testimony from an incompetent witness about events prior to Bennett's death. The court reverses the judgment and remands the case for further proceedings, with concurrence from TURSI and METZGER, JJ.