In re Amending & Revising Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions-Civil-No. 1.7, 3.26, 6.16, 21.4, 21.7, 23.10, & 23.31

Citations: 217 P.3d 620; 2009 OK 26; 2009 Okla. LEXIS 26Docket: SCAD No. 2009-41

Court: Supreme Court of Oklahoma; April 29, 2009; Oklahoma; State Supreme Court

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The Oklahoma Supreme Court has reviewed and accepted the recommendations from the Oklahoma Supreme Court Committee for Uniform Civil Jury Instructions, adopting proposed revisions to the Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions-Civil (Second Edition). The amended instructions, which include specific instruction numbers (1.7, 3.26, 6.16, 21.4, 21.7, 28.10, and 28.31), will be accessible online and provided to West Publishing Company for publication. The Administrative Office of the Courts is tasked with distributing copies to District Court judges, and these revisions will take effect 30 days from the order's filing date. The Court retains the authority to review the legal correctness of these instructions when necessary. 

Instruction No. 1.7 outlines guidelines for juror note-taking, emphasizing that note-taking is optional and should not distract from assessing witness credibility. Jurors are encouraged to take notes sparingly and for personal use only, with strict instructions on sharing notes and their destruction post-trial. The instruction also notes that its use is at the trial judge's discretion, and if it is given, Instruction No. 1.10 must also be included. It is based on a suggestion from the case Sligar v. Bartlett.

Instruction No. 3.26 outlines the use of video or computer animations as visual aids in court to help jurors understand testimony or evidence. It specifies that such animations are not actual re-creations of events but representations of a witness's perspective. Jurors have the discretion to accept or reject these aids. The instruction can be presented alongside the visual aids and should be adjusted if the demonstration pertains to scientific principles rather than an event. It is based on Tull v. Federal Express Corp.

Instruction No. 6.16 establishes the criteria for a plaintiff to recover damages for injury under an employer's liability based on substantial certainty. The plaintiff must prove that the employer's conduct was intentional and resulted in injury, with the employer either desiring the injury or knowing that it was substantially certain to occur. Knowledge can be inferred from the employer's conduct and surrounding circumstances. This instruction references Parret v. Unicco Serv. Co.

Instruction No. 21.4 addresses wrongful discharge claims based on public policy, specifically regarding unlawful employment discrimination. The plaintiff must demonstrate that they were discharged, identify their protected status, show that discrimination played a significant role in the discharge, and prove damages resulting from the discharge. This instruction should be used in conjunction with several others when a plaintiff claims wrongful discharge due to discrimination.

Plaintiffs claiming wrongful discharge due to retaliation for refusing to violate public policy can refer to Instruction No. 21.2, while those asserting retaliation for actions consistent with public policy should reference Instruction No. 21.8. The Oklahoma Supreme Court, in Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., recognized the public policy exception for racially motivated discharges and retaliation against employees filing racial discrimination complaints. Subsequent rulings, including Kruchowski v. Weyerhaeuser Co. and Shirazi v. Childtime Learning Center, extended this exception to all forms of unlawful discrimination, affirming that victims must be treated equitably under the Oklahoma Constitution.

For wrongful discharge claims based on discrimination, Instruction No. 21.7 stipulates that plaintiffs must demonstrate their protected status was the reason for their discharge. Protected statuses include race, color, national origin, religion, gender, disability, and age, with the judge determining the applicability of such status.

Instruction No. 23.10 addresses quasi-contract claims, permitting plaintiffs to recover for valuable goods or services provided to defendants under specific conditions: the plaintiff must have provided goods/services expecting compensation, the defendant must have knowingly accepted the benefit, and it would be unjust for the defendant to benefit without compensating the plaintiff. This instruction applies to cases seeking value under quasi-contract theory, which is distinct from implied contracts, as clarified in T. S Inv. Co. v. Coury, where quasi-contracts are legal implications without an express agreement, while implied contracts are factual inferences.

Intention in contracts can either be disregarded or enforced, with duties and contracts either defining each other or being defined independently. The Oklahoma Supreme Court has clarified that unjust enrichment serves as the basis for recovery in quasi-contracts, distinguishing these from express and implied contracts where the parties' intentions are central. Unjust enrichment claims are generally equitable, typically not requiring jury instructions, and courts refrain from granting equitable relief if an adequate legal remedy exists. A jury is not guaranteed in equitable actions, but common counts like money had and received are triable by jury. The measure of damages in quasi-contract cases is defined as compensation for detriment caused by a breach. Lack of capacity to contract, which can arise from factors such as mental illness, incompetence, intoxication, or being underage, relieves a party from contractual obligations. Clear and convincing evidence is required to prove lack of capacity. Relevant statutes outline the capacity to contract, indicating that generally, all individuals can contract except minors, those of unsound mind, and certain deprived persons, with specific rules regarding minors and their ability to disaffirm contracts post-majority.

A person deemed 'entirely without understanding' lacks the capacity to enter into a contract but remains liable for necessary goods and services. Conversely, individuals who are 'of unsound mind, but not entirely without understanding' can have their contracts rescinded if made prior to a judicial determination of their incapacity. Intoxication can also affect contractual capacity; complete intoxication that renders a person unable to understand the nature of a transaction can be grounds for setting aside a contract, irrespective of fraud or undue advantage. There is a legal presumption favoring a person's capacity to contract, which can only be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. When a contract is executed, it is assumed that the party had the capacity to enter into that agreement, and any claims of incompetence must also be supported by clear and convincing evidence.