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Seltzer v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office
Citations: 107 P.3d 1158; 2005 Colo. App. LEXIS 20; 2005 WL 82139Docket: No. 04CA0385
Court: Colorado Court of Appeals; January 12, 2005; Colorado; State Appellate Court
Larry Seltzer, the petitioner, seeks review of the Industrial Claim Appeals Office's order that upheld a hearing officer's decision denying him Temporary Extended Unemployment Compensation (TEUC-A) benefits, designated for certain airline-related workers under the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act. Seltzer was laid off from his position as a technical analyst for Galileo International in October 2001 due to a reduction in business stemming from decreased airline travel following the September 11 attacks. The hearing officer initially ruled that Seltzer's layoff was not linked to a reduction in services provided by certified air carriers but rather to a decline in consumer demand for airline tickets. Upon appeal, the Panel recognized that Seltzer had not been adequately informed of the need to demonstrate a direct connection between his employer's loss of revenue and a reduction in airline services, thus remanding the case for further evidence. Seltzer subsequently presented evidence indicating that the drop in his workload was indeed correlated with airlines offering fewer flights. However, the hearing officer again denied benefits, concluding that the reduction in Seltzer's work was primarily due to public reluctance to fly rather than a decrease in services from air carriers. On review, the Panel affirmed the hearing officer's findings. Seltzer contends that the Panel erred by upholding this decision, arguing that he is entitled to TEUC-A benefits under the provisions established for displaced airline-related workers, particularly following amendments made to the TEUC Act in 2003, which clarified eligibility criteria and required state agencies to adhere to federal interpretations of the Act. DOL instructions indicate that certain procedures may differ from state law, particularly regarding the handling of late information from employers, which must be considered for benefit eligibility. The instructions take precedence over state laws when determining eligibility for TEUC-A benefits. To qualify, claimants must show "qualifying employment" in two ways: first, that their employment is connected to the airline industry, specifically as an upstream producer or supplier for an air carrier, which the hearing officer confirmed. The second requirement is that claimants must demonstrate their separation from employment was due to reductions in airline services related to terrorist actions or security measures following the September 11, 2001 attacks. The employer confirmed that the claimant was laid off due to such reductions. If a state disagrees with an employer’s assertion of a claimant's eligibility, it must provide credible evidence to refute that assertion. The hearing officer's role is to evaluate conflicting evidence, with their factual findings binding on appeal if supported by substantial evidence. However, questions of statutory interpretation are reserved for the courts. The hearing officer and the Panel were found to have erred in their application of the statute, leading to a remand for proper evaluation of the employer's assertion regarding the claimant’s eligibility. In Salomon Forex, Inc. v. Tauber, the court emphasized that the interpretation of a federal statute begins with the statute's language, which should reflect Congress' intent. Key principles include assuming that all words were purposefully chosen and that amendments are not mere surplusage. The case involved a claimant whose job was affected by a reduction in airline flights following September 11, 2001. The claimant provided uncontroverted evidence indicating that his workload decreased due to fewer scheduled flights and general fear of flying, leading to his layoff. The Division, however, did not present any witnesses with first-hand knowledge and maintained that a lack of passengers did not equate to a "reduction in service." The Division's position was based on federal government updates regarding the airline extension program. During cross-examination, it was confirmed that the Division linked reduced flights to reduced services. The hearing revealed a lack of documentation, but both parties referenced the same Department of Labor instructions, which clarified that layoffs of security screeners were not due to qualifying reasons related to reductions in service by certified air carriers. The hearing officer concluded that there was indeed a reduction in scheduled flights caused by public reluctance to fly and a decrease in ticket purchases. The hearing officer and the Panel incorrectly interpreted the legal standard regarding eligibility for TEUC-A benefits, concluding that a shortage of passengers was insufficient to establish a causal link between reduced flights and the claimant’s unemployment. The term "reductions in service" is not defined in the relevant Act, and existing case law provides little guidance. Definitions of "reduction" and "service" suggest that the term encompasses more than just a decrease in flight numbers, including other service reductions by air carriers. The interpretation that benefits would only be available when flights were reduced, rather than when services were lessened despite flight numbers remaining the same, was deemed illogical. The findings of decreased flight demand and corresponding reductions in employer services did not negate the claimant's eligibility for benefits. Consequently, the case must be remanded for further proceedings to properly assess whether the claimant's separation was due, at least in part, to reductions in service by an air carrier. The Panel's order is set aside, with directions to remand to the hearing officer. Judge CASEBOLT concurs, while Judge CARPARELLI dissents.