In re the 2000-2001 District Grand Jury in and for the First Judicial District

Citations: 77 P.3d 779; 2003 Colo. App. LEXIS 195; 2003 WL 297513Docket: No. 00CA2081

Court: Colorado Court of Appeals; February 12, 2003; Colorado; State Appellate Court

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Appellant City of Black Hawk appeals the trial court's orders that denied all pending motions and mandated the release of a grand jury report from the 2000-2001 District Grand Jury, in accordance with 16-5-205.5, C.R.S. 2002. The appeals court affirms the trial court's decisions. A grand jury was established to investigate alleged illegalities concerning annexation procedures, but it did not issue any indictments; instead, it opted to release a report. Black Hawk and others received the report in July 2000 and subsequently filed various motions, including for discovery. The trial court ruled in September 2000, clarifying its limited role in reviewing grand jury reports and denying suppression of the report and other motions. 

The Colorado Supreme Court addressed the grand jury's authority to issue the report and the trial court's role in its public dissemination, affirming that the grand jury had discretion to release the report and that the trial court's review should be limited to ensuring compliance with statutory requirements. The court confirmed that the trial court need only assess whether the report addresses matters of public interest, as defined by the statute, and that it cannot inquire into the evidence's sufficiency. The Supreme Court concluded that the grand jury, district attorney, and trial court complied with the statute, allowing for the report's release. The case was remanded to the trial court to address any other pending issues before the report's release. On remand, the trial court considered Black Hawk's motions to quash, arguing that the grand jury was improperly impaneled, lacked authority to issue the report, and received incorrect legal instructions.

The trial court denied pending motions without a hearing and recertified the matter to the appellate court. Black Hawk raised discovery issues that were previously denied by the trial court in September 2000 and not addressed by the supreme court. The district attorney did not object to these issues, allowing the appellate court to review them. The court analyzed § 16-5-205.5, emphasizing the need to interpret statutes according to the General Assembly's intent, as indicated by the statute's plain language.

Black Hawk argued that the district court's failure to convene and select the district grand jury as per the procedures outlined in § 13-74-101 et seq. C.R.S. 2002 stripped the grand jury of jurisdiction to issue a report under § 16-5-205.5. The appellate court disagreed, noting that the Colorado Constitution grants the General Assembly the authority to regulate grand juries. 

According to § 16-5-205.5(4)(a), the court must accept and file a grand jury report if it confirms the grand jury and prosecuting attorney acted within their statutory jurisdiction. The district attorney had filed a motion to impanel the grand jury, and the chief judge had ordered this upon finding good cause. For efficiency, the district attorney and chief judge previously agreed to impanel one district grand jury for both the district and Gilpin County.

The district attorney stated that instead of issuing annual orders, the chief judge provided a standing instruction to the state court administrator to generate names for the grand jury each year. The chief judge clarified that the state court administrator automatically prepares a list of grand jury members annually, which is used for summoning jurors. The only deviation from the statute was that the court order was not sent to the state court administrator, but this was deemed unnecessary since the administrator routinely supplies the list.

Black Hawk contended that § 13-74-101 does not permit the court to adopt procedures for county grand juries when impaneling district grand juries, arguing that this constitutes an improper delegation of authority and violates the separation of powers in Colorado's Constitution. The appellate court disagreed with this assertion.

The district attorney acknowledges that the impanelment procedure did not strictly adhere to the sequence outlined in 13-74-103(8), but asserts that Black Hawk has not demonstrated any significant deviations from procedures in 13-74-108, aside from the issuance of a standing order. The trial court deemed the procedural variance insignificant regarding the statutory jurisdiction of the grand jury and the prosecuting attorney. It also found no connection between the failure to file the court order with the state court administrator and the grand jury's criticisms of Black Hawk. Citing 13-71-140, C.R.S. 2002, the court determined that Black Hawk did not show sufficient injury or prejudice, as required for declaring a mistrial or overturning a verdict due to jury selection irregularities. The court concurred with the conclusion that Black Hawk had not established any prejudice related to the grand jury's impanelment. Although the grand jury reporting process under 16-5-205.5 applies when no indictment is issued, the court maintained that Black Hawk failed to demonstrate prejudice from the impanelment process. Procedural issues not specifically covered by 13-74-101 et seq. fall under other Colorado statutes. Black Hawk did not claim that the grand jury's composition would have differed due to the alleged irregularities. Black Hawk's counsel acknowledged the purpose of notifying the state court administrator was to prepare a grand jurors list, and no legal basis was provided for extending inquiries beyond procedural adherence. Consequently, the court found that the necessary steps were substantially followed, and Black Hawk suffered no prejudice. Regarding the grand jury report, Black Hawk argued that the statute does not prevent discovery related to challenges of grand jury jurisdiction, but the court found no reversible error. Black Hawk conceded that 16-5-205.5 does not authorize discovery of grand jury proceedings to contest the report. While public access to court records exists, it is limited by grand jury secrecy rules. The trial court denied Black Hawk's request for discovery of various documents related to the grand jury's impanelment, affirming that 16-5-205.5 does not allow for such release, although Black Hawk received the district attorney's motion and the chief judge's order to impanel.

Black Hawk acknowledges that it acquired some jurisdictional materials from other sources and seeks a ruling on this matter for future cases. The argument for disclosure based on grand jury secrecy principles is rejected. Reasons for maintaining grand jury secrecy include ensuring freedom in deliberations, preventing perjury and witness tampering, promoting open disclosures, and protecting the privacy of individuals under investigation. The court denied Black Hawk's request due to insufficient statutory authority and the principles of secrecy.

Black Hawk further argues for discovery rights connected to due process protections for individuals and businesses mentioned in grand jury reports, asserting that such discovery would assist in preparing responses. This argument is also dismissed. The supreme court has established that the trial court and appellate courts should not investigate the details behind grand jury reports, which limits discovery rights. Colorado's criminal procedure mandates secrecy in grand jury proceedings, with exceptions only after an indictment or the public issuance of a grand jury report.

An indicted defendant is entitled to specific grand jury testimony and evidence related to their case, but access does not extend to all grand jury proceedings. Black Hawk cites a New York case advocating for the availability of grand jury evidence, but the Colorado supreme court emphasizes that legislative history reflects a decision to restrict the trial court's role. The court also highlights that procedural safeguards require the trial court to ensure compliance with the report's certifications. The authority to regulate grand juries lies with the General Assembly, thus any concerns must be directed there.

The General Assembly did not mandate the disclosure of grand jury proceedings and restricted the court's review of grand jury reports, indicating that individuals named in such reports should only respond to the information contained within them. The court dismissed Black Hawk's claim for a hearing to demonstrate a specific need for access to the grand jury record, noting that Black Hawk failed to provide any statutory basis for such disclosure and only referenced general rules of grand jury secrecy. The court also rejected Black Hawk's argument to quash the grand jury report based on claims of inadequate instructions, emphasizing that the responsibility for accurately instructing the grand jury lies with the district attorney. Although Black Hawk contended that the district attorney's instructions regarding preponderance of evidence and public interest were insufficient, the court found the instructions adequate and noted that Black Hawk did not cite any authority requiring further explanation. The grand jury's investigation into Black Hawk's official conduct was deemed appropriate, and the court affirmed the grand jury's certification that the report pertained to matters of public interest, concluding that the district attorney provided sufficient guidance. Ultimately, the court upheld its earlier decisions, with Judges NEY and STERNBERG concurring.