Hayes v. Municipality of Anchorage

Citations: 46 P.3d 971; 2002 Alas. LEXIS 54; 2002 WL 850204Docket: No. S-10602

Court: Alaska Supreme Court; May 3, 2002; Alaska; State Supreme Court

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Robert Hayes filed a lawsuit to disqualify Brian Whittle from the ballot for the upcoming run-off election in Anchorage's District 5, arguing that Whittle did not meet the one-year residency requirement outlined in the Anchorage Municipal Charter 4.02(b)(2). Hayes contended that prior to the redistricting in September 2001, Whittle's residence was outside the former District 5. Superior Court Judge Peter A. Michalski denied Hayes's motion for a temporary restraining order and injunction to halt the May 7 election, concluding that Hayes's claims lacked legal merit. Judge Michalski noted that Whittle had resided at his current address for over 20 years, and the redrawing of district lines did not alter his residency status. The court interpreted the Charter to require that a candidate must have lived in the newly defined district for at least one year, thus allowing Whittle's candidacy to proceed. The court emphasized the importance of timely resolutions in election-related cases to avoid public confusion and unnecessary expenses.

Mr. Hayes's interpretation of the Charter would lead to widespread ineligibility for office following redistricting, potentially incentivizing misconduct among redistricting authorities and defying common sense. The request for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction was denied. Judge Michalski's ruling on Charter 4.02 finds strong backing from an Alaska Attorney General's opinion and relevant case law from other states. Hayes contends that Whittle should be disqualified because he has not resided in 'District 5' for a full year prior to the election, interpreting 'district' to require continuous residency in the specific district before redistricting. However, this interpretation is flawed as it would imply that no one qualifies for office in the newly constituted district, given that it did not exist a year prior. The Municipality of Anchorage supports Hayes's view, arguing that voters need to know their candidate and vice versa to maintain an informed electorate. Yet, this reasoning similarly misapplies the focus of Charter 4.02 by referencing the former district rather than the newly defined one. If Whittle were disqualified for not knowing the issues of the previous district, the same logic would disqualify candidates like Hayes who reside in what was formerly District 5. Ultimately, the arguments from both Hayes and the Municipality overlook the equal rights granted to all residents of the current district under the Alaska Constitution. Charter 4.02 thus must be interpreted to require a one-year residency within the current district boundaries as defined at the time of the election.

The superior court's interpretation of the residency requirement is legally supported, aligns with public policy, and is logical. Consequently, Hayes's claim lacks legal merit, leading to an affirmation of the superior court's decision and a remand for the entry of a final judgment to dismiss the action. The document notes that Judge Michalski's decision was modified to meet publication standards and to remove irrelevant content. A referenced opinion indicates that a candidate affected by redistricting may run for a new senate district if they have resided there for over a decade. Relevant legal precedents and local charter provisions are cited to bolster these conclusions.