State ex rel. Division of Forestry, Fire & State Lands v. Tooele County

Citations: 44 P.3d 680; 2002 UT 8; 439 Utah Adv. Rep. 10; 2002 Utah LEXIS 8Docket: No. 20000493

Court: Utah Supreme Court; January 17, 2002; Utah; State Supreme Court

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The State of Utah, represented by its Division of Forestry, Fire, and State Lands, appeals a summary judgment that upheld Tooele County’s decision to vacate its interests in a section of West Stansbury Road. The appeal follows the County’s approval of a petition by landowners on Stansbury Island, known as the Bleazards, who sought the vacation due to vandalism concerns. The County announced the public hearing to consider the petition in the Tooele Transcript-Bulletin from May 18 to June 8, 1993, and subsequently held the public hearing on June 15, 1998. Although the County provided notice to neighboring landowners, it failed to notify the State, which, after the County enacted Ordinance 93-9 on August 17, 1998, challenged the ordinance in court. The State argued that the County did not comply with the notice requirements of Utah Code sections 27-12-102.3 and 102.4, as the road in question crossed sovereign lands owned by the State. These sections mandate that a county must provide notice to all owners of record abutting the proposed vacated road. The court's decision to reverse and remand indicates agreement with the State's position regarding the notice requirement.

On September 8, 1999, the State filed for summary judgment, asserting the County failed to comply with section 27-12-102.4's notice requirements regarding the vacation of West Stansbury Road. The State argued that the County was obligated to provide mailed notice to abutting landowners, and its failure to do so rendered the road vacation null. The County countered that the State did not qualify for mailed notice since it was not listed as an owner of record on the county assessor's rolls. 

Subsequently, the Bleazards filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing that the County's failure to mail notice did not invalidate Ordinance 93-9, as section 27-12-102.4 only necessitated written notice when publication was unavailable. They maintained that the State was not an abutting landowner and thus not entitled to mailed notice. Additionally, they claimed that even if mailed notice were required, it was not necessary for the State due to the County's interests terminating before reaching the road.

After a hearing on the motions, the district court found a factual question regarding the State's status as an abutting landowner but determined that the County had complied with section 27-12-102.4 by publishing notice in the Transcript-Bulletin. The court ruled that the statute allowed for either notice by publication or notice by posting and mailing, concluding that written notice to abutting landowners was not required when publication was conducted. The court also held that the County was not obligated to send notice to the State, as it was not an abutting property owner on county records. 

On May 8, 2000, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the County and the Bleazards. The State is appealing this decision, with the standard of review indicating that summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine material facts are in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Legal interpretations by the district court are reviewed for correctness without deference.

The State raises two issues on appeal regarding the district court's interpretation of section 27-12-102.4 of the Utah Code. First, it argues that the court incorrectly determined that counties must send mailed notice of a proposed road vacation to abutting landowners only when publication notice is unavailable and only if the land ownership is recorded on the county assessor's rolls. Second, the State asserts that the court erred by denying summary judgment in its favor, as a proper reading of section 27-12-102.4 mandates that counties must provide mailed notice to abutting landowners, which the County failed to do.

In interpreting the statute, the primary goal is to uncover the Legislature's true intent, primarily through the plain language of the act. The court emphasizes the importance of making all parts of the statute relevant and meaningful, presuming that the Legislature used each term deliberately. 

At the time of Tooele County's enactment of Ordinance 98-9, a county could vacate its interests in a road if the county legislative body determined there was good cause. Notice to abutting landowners was required in all circumstances except when written consent for vacation was provided. Section 27-12-102.4 specifies that notice of the proposed vacation must be published in a newspaper or, if unavailable, posted in three public places, and that mailed notice must be sent to all owners of record of abutting land, using the mailing addresses on the county assessor's rolls.

The State argues that the district court incorrectly granted summary judgment to the County and the Bleazards based on a misinterpretation of Utah's road abandonment statute, specifically section 27-12-102.4. The court erred by asserting that mailed notice is only required when publication is unavailable and that it applies solely to abutting landowners whose ownership is recorded. The plain language of section 27-12-102.4 mandates both public notice through newspaper publication or posting and private notice by mail to affected landowners. The presence of commas in the statute clarifies that the notice by posting is only an alternative when publication is not possible, reinforcing that mailed notice is always required. If the statute were interpreted to allow for a lack of mailed notice, it would render the consent exemption in section 27-12-102.3 unnecessary, as counties could vacate roads without informing abutting landowners. This interpretation would undermine the statutory requirement for comprehensive notice. Therefore, the district court's ruling that section 27-12-102.4 does not mandate written notice to abutting landowners was incorrect, as the statute requires both public and private notifications when a county proposes to vacate a road.

Mailed notice is mandated under section 27-12-102.4 to all abutting landowners, not just those whose ownership appears on the county assessor's rolls. The district court erroneously limited the requirement to abutting landowners listed on these rolls, whereas the statute clearly states that notice must be mailed to all owners of record of land abutting the proposed county road vacated, using their contact information from the assessor's rolls. The statute's language indicates that the requirement for mailed notice extends to any abutting landowner of record, defined as a property owner whose title is recorded in public records. In Utah, this recording occurs in the county recorder's office. For state-owned lands, the state does not require notice by recording since ownership is established upon statehood, with the state's designation of such lands serving as the public record of ownership. Thus, the inquiry focuses on whether a landowner qualifies as an abutting owner of record, rather than whether their contact information is listed on the county assessor's rolls.

Lands underlying navigable waters within a state are owned by the state in its sovereign capacity, as established by the U.S. Supreme Court. A party qualifies as an "owner of record" under Utah law if they have recorded title to the land or if the land is state sovereign land designated by public record. The term "abut," in property law, refers to properties that border or join at a boundary. Therefore, land that directly borders a county road proposed for vacation is considered to "abut" that road under Utah law.

The State contends that the County erred by not providing mailed notice of the proposed vacation of West Stansbury Road to the State, as required by statute. The County acknowledges that it did not send such notice. This failure is significant, as proper notice is essential for the county legislative body to assess comments on the proposed vacation. Consequently, failing to provide notice renders the vacation null and void. 

The issue at hand is whether the State qualifies as an "owner of record" deserving of notice. The State is indeed an "owner of record" because the land in question is sovereign land beneath the Great Salt Lake, with title vested in the State since Utah's admission to the Union in 1896, as outlined in the Utah Constitution and confirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court under the equal footing doctrine.

The Utah Code defines 'sovereign lands' as those below the ordinary high water mark of navigable waters owned by the state. The Great Salt Lake is recognized as such a body of water, with the state owning the lake bed since its admission to the Union. Consequently, neither the County nor the Bleazards can dispute the state’s ownership of lands below the meander line of the lake. The court affirmed that the state is the rightful owner for the purposes of section 27-12-102.4. 

If the state’s property below the meander line borders West Stansbury Road, the County's Ordinance 93-9, which vacated interests in the road, is void. However, the district court did not resolve whether the state’s land actually abuts the road, leading to a material fact dispute. The court incorrectly interpreted section 27-12-102.4, suggesting mailed notice is only necessary when publication is unavailable, and limited notice to those listed on county assessment rolls. 

The ruling was reversed, and the case was remanded to the district court to determine if the state’s sovereign lands abut West Stansbury Road, applying the correct legal standard. If they do abut, the court must grant summary judgment to the state, invalidating Ordinance 98-9; if not, judgment should favor the County and the Bleazards, upholding Ordinance 93-9.

Chief Justice HOWE, along with Justices DURHAM, DURRANT, and WILKINS, concurs with Associate Chief Justice RUSSON's opinion regarding Stansbury Island, which is currently a peninsula due to fluctuating water levels in the Great Salt Lake. The legal context involves a historical overview of the lake's elevation changes since 1850 and relevant legislative amendments to the Utah Code, notably section 72-3-108, which replaced section 27-12-102.4. The applicable law is that in effect at the time of the alleged violation, specifically the 1993 version of section 27-12-102.4.

A meander line, defined as a survey line following a river's course, was established for the Great Salt Lake between 1855 and 1966. The opinion emphasizes the absurdities that would arise if the State were required to record title to sovereign lands, given that these lands are owned by the State inherently as a sovereign entity rather than through written title. The interpretation of statutes should align with sound public policy to avoid nonsensical outcomes.

The document notes the "equal footing" principle, which grants newly admitted states the same submerged land rights as the original thirteen states. It references legal rulings affirming that lands below the meander line, designated as navigable in 1896, belong to Utah. Despite the district court identifying a material fact dispute regarding West Stansbury Road's proximity to State lands, the Bleazards claim on appeal that the State lacks legal status as an abutting landowner. They assert that the road is a private easement. However, the Bleazards did not contest the district court's factual findings or provide sufficient evidence to support their claim. Consequently, the matter of abutment is remanded to the district court for further examination.