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Matthews v. City & County of Denver
Citations: 20 P.3d 1227; 2000 Colo. J. C.A.R. 5404; 2000 Colo. App. LEXIS 1643; 2000 WL 1289472Docket: No. 00CA0078
Court: Colorado Court of Appeals; September 14, 2000; Colorado; State Appellate Court
Defendant City and County of Denver appeals the denial of its motion to dismiss a declaratory relief complaint by plaintiff Wendy R. Matthews, who sustained injuries from an accident involving a City-owned vehicle operated by a City employee. Matthews filed her notice of claim 181 days after discovering her injury, as the 180th day was a legal holiday. The City contended that this was untimely under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (GIA), which mandates a 180-day filing period. The trial court ruled in favor of Matthews, asserting that the law allows for the extension of deadlines when they fall on holidays, citing statutes 24-10-108 and 24-11-110. The court interpreted the GIA's requirement in conjunction with these provisions, confirming that the filing period extends to the next business day if the deadline falls on a holiday. The court referenced previous cases, including Austin v. Weld County, to support its decision that the filing on the 181st day was valid, thus upholding the trial court's ruling and confirming Matthews' compliance with the notice requirements. The court concluded that the term 'any' is interpreted as 'all,' affirming that statute 24-11-110 applies in this case. Although Austin v. Weld County was decided before the 1986 amendment to the GIA, which established a 180-day jurisdictional prerequisite for filing suit, the court disagreed with the City’s assertion that the amendment intended to shorten this period or create complications when the last day falls on a holiday. Citing Regional Transportation District v. Lopez, the court emphasized that barring a claim due to premature filing would lead to an absurd outcome that should be avoided. The court clarified that statutes 2-4-108 and 24-11-110 do not toll, waive, or extend the 180-day requirement but instead provide clarity on the commencement and conclusion of this period. Consequently, the trial court's finding that the plaintiff's notice of claim was timely was upheld, and the judgment was affirmed, with Judges CASEBOLT and VOUT concurring.