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St. Jude's Co. v. Roaring Fork Club, L.P.
Citations: 15 P.3d 281; 1999 Colo. J. C.A.R. 6814; 1999 Colo. App. LEXIS 332; 1999 WL 1243305Docket: No. 98CA1025
Court: Colorado Court of Appeals; December 22, 1999; Colorado; State Appellate Court
Plaintiff St. Jude Company appeals the trial court's judgment that granted limited injunctive relief in its favor and denied attorney fees without a hearing. Defendant Roaring Fork Club cross-appeals the judgment favoring the plaintiff. The court's decision is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions. Both parties own neighboring properties and co-own unincorporated water ditches. St. Jude, as the downgradient property owner, holds historic easements for inspecting and maintaining three irrigation ditches, which are essential for its agricultural operations. Following the acquisition of its property in 1995, Roaring Fork developed a golf course and other facilities, leading to the destruction and alteration of the ditches and their banks, diversion of water flows, and unauthorized construction within the easements. After unsuccessful negotiations for a ditch maintenance agreement and an offer to purchase parts of St. Jude's property, St. Jude initiated a trespass action seeking an injunction for restoration of the ditches. The trial court found Roaring Fork guilty of trespass and rejected its counterclaim regarding an alleged oral contract. The court granted St. Jude a mandatory and permanent injunction and allowed Roaring Fork to choose between two remedial actions, ultimately selecting the second option. On cross-appeal, Roaring Fork contended that the trial court erred in finding trespass due to their co-ownership of water rights. However, the court maintained that the servient estate owner must not unreasonably interfere with the easement owner's rights, concluding that Roaring Fork's actions constituted trespass by obstructing St. Jude's ability to maintain the ditches. Evidentiary support exists to confirm that the defendant's development of the servient estate interfered with the plaintiff's easement rights, as established in Lazy Dog Ranch v. Telluray Ranch Corp. The servient tenement can utilize the burdened property as long as it does not unreasonably hinder the easement's intended use. The defendant presented no legal authority justifying the destruction or damage of the ditch easement, leading to the trial court's correct determination of trespass, supported by People v. Vigil. Although the defendant argued for an exception to the general rule protecting easement rights due to co-ownership of water, the court found the defendant's developments unrelated to ditch maintenance or water rights improvement. The trial court's March 19, 1998, order allowed for two alternative forms of relief: either the defendant must remove developments interfering with the ditches and restore them, or assume all operational responsibilities for the ditches and ensure water delivery to the plaintiff. Following post-trial motions for clarification, the court mandated the defendant to choose one of the alternatives, which ultimately led to the issuance of a permanent injunction on May 6, 1998. The injunction required the defendant to take responsibility for the operation and maintenance of the ditches. The court's decision regarding the injunction is within its discretion, and will only be reversed if an abuse of that discretion is demonstrated. While the plaintiff contended that only removal of the encroachments would suffice, the court recognized that alternative one adequately addressed the interference with the ditches while also affirming the validity of the alternative remedies provided. A court may require a servient property owner to restore an obstructed easement and prevent future interference if their trespass significantly encroaches on the easement. The case of Hornsilver Circle, Ltd. v. Trope establishes that the first alternative remedy is appropriate for the plaintiff. The trial court rejected the defendant's claim that a ditch maintenance agreement was accepted by the plaintiff, concluding that no oral contract existed regarding ditch operations, and that the defendant was aware of the inconsistency between their development and the plaintiff's easement rights. Under Colorado law, a servient owner cannot alter a ditch's location or obstruct a dominant owner’s rights without consent, as reinforced by Valley Development Co. v. Weeks. The trial court found that the defendant’s development obstructed access and destroyed parts of the ditches, which was supported by the record. Consequently, the second alternative remedy proposed by the trial court, which allowed the encroachment to remain, was deemed improper and set aside. The defendant's reference to Brown v. Bradbury, which suggests a servient owner can relocate a ditch under certain conditions, was found to conflict with established property law. The Weeks court clarified that Brown does not support unilateral actions by servient owners without consent. Unlike the situations in Brown and Weeks, the current case lacked evidence of prior remedial measures or minimal damage, as the trial court merely aimed to provide an alternative water supply without permitting the defendant to maintain control over water delivery. The court concluded that there was insufficient evidence of third-party equity interests to support the defendant's claims, referencing cases such as Valley Development Co. v. Weeks. It emphasized that equitable relief should not favor a party that has engaged in improper conduct detrimental to the plaintiff when no innocent third-party interests are affected. As a result, the case was remanded for the trial court to issue a permanent and mandatory injunction favoring the plaintiff. The court found that the trial court did not err in adopting specific compliance measures regarding ditch improvements included in the plaintiff's injunction draft, despite the defendant's claims that these were not part of the trial management order. The trial court's discretion in crafting equitable remedies was upheld, supported by evidence of the defendant's trespass. Regarding the denial of attorney fees to the plaintiff, the court agreed with the trial court's finding that the defendant’s counterclaims were not frivolous or groundless, thus negating the need for a hearing on the matter. The court confirmed the trial court's decision, affirming the judgment in favor of the plaintiff while reversing the injunction and ordering the trial court to enter a permanent injunction consistent with the plaintiff's alternative one. The order denying attorney fees was also upheld. Judges METZGER and VOGT concurred in part and dissented in part.