United States v. Javier Martinez-Mercado

Citations: 888 F.2d 1484; 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 17212; 1989 WL 136218Docket: 89-1343

Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; November 15, 1989; Federal Appellate Court

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Javier Martinez-Mercado was found guilty by a jury of importing marihuana and possessing it with intent to distribute, violating 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a) and 841(a)(1). He appealed on several grounds, including failure of the prosecution to disclose evidence, denial of a motion for acquittal, violation of due process through witness testimony that he claims was false, comments on his silence during interrogation, and infringement of the Speedy Trial Act. The court affirmed the lower court's decision.

On October 31, 1988, Martinez drove a Dina truck from Juarez, Mexico, into El Paso, Texas. Customs Inspector Jose Trejo ordered a secondary inspection due to the truck's unusual fuel tank configuration. During the inspection, Martinez claimed he was bringing "nothing" into the U.S. and presented a border crossing card that limited his activities in the country. Trejo, suspicious of the truck's condition, conducted a further search, which revealed that the fuel tanks were likely altered. A canine unit subsequently alerted agents, leading to the discovery of 306 pounds of marihuana worth $240,000 packed within the tanks.

Martinez was arrested after being informed of his Miranda rights. During the search, he was found with $132 and denied ownership of the truck, also failing to recognize the names on vehicle registration forms found inside.

DEA Special Agent Felipe Garcia testified regarding the interrogation of suspect Martinez after advising him of his Miranda rights in Spanish. Martinez claimed he was offered $300 to drive a truck to El Paso to pick up a semitrailer but could not provide details about the semitrailer's location or the journey's duration. When pressed about his employer's identity, Martinez ended the questioning. Witnesses Trejo and Reyna noted that drivers in the border area typically earned $400 to $600 per month. Following his conviction on two counts, Martinez was sentenced to sixty-three months in prison for each count, to be served concurrently, along with four years of concurrent supervised release.

On appeal, Martinez argues that the prosecution denied him a fair trial by failing to disclose crucial information before trial, which contradicted the information presented by Trejo and Reyna during their testimonies. He claims this misrepresentation violated Brady v. Maryland and the district court’s discovery order. The Supreme Court has ruled that while there is no general constitutional right to discovery in criminal cases, due process requires that the prosecution not suppress favorable evidence that is material to guilt or punishment. This includes evidence that could impeach the credibility of key witnesses or exculpate the defendant. However, since the evidence in question was presented at trial and not suppressed, Martinez's complaint does not constitute a Brady violation, as it centers on the timing of the disclosure rather than actual suppression of evidence.

No Brady violation occurred due to the lack of exculpatory evidence in the allegedly suppressed material, which could not impeach the prosecution's witnesses. Martinez claimed that the testimony of Trejo and Reyna regarding their observations of him and his truck did not exonerate him; instead, he argued it provided the government with the necessary basis for establishing knowledge and intent for his conviction. The testimony did not undermine the credibility of the prosecution's witnesses, as the omission of these details from investigative reports indicated agents' inattention to detail—an angle utilized by Martinez's attorney during the trial. Since the omitted information was not favorable to Martinez, it could not qualify as Brady material. Furthermore, the information was not suppressed but disclosed and used at trial. The court noted that prosecutors are not obliged to provide a comprehensive account of all investigatory work. Martinez also argued that the omission of Trejo and Reyna's testimony violated the district court's standing discovery order, which aligned with Fed.R.Crim. P. 16. However, the evidence did not fall under the discovery requirements of Rule 16, as it pertained solely to the agents' observations and not to other types of evidence. The Jencks Act, which mandates producing witness statements after their direct examination for impeachment purposes, defines a statement and clarifies that the goal is to ensure defendants receive statements for cross-examination rather than during pre-trial discovery.

An investigative report can be classified as a Jencks Act statement if it meets the criteria outlined in section 3500(e) and is relevant to the agent's testimony. The prosecution is not required to document every detail of witness testimony in writing, and therefore, is only obligated to disclose what is contained in the reports provided to the defendant, Martinez. Consequently, the prosecution did not breach Rule 16 or the discovery order set by the district court.

Martinez's appeal includes a claim that the district court wrongly denied his motion for judgment of acquittal based on undisclosed agent testimony prior to trial. He argues that without this testimony, the evidence was inadequate to support his conviction. However, since nondisclosure did not violate his rights, this evidence can be considered in assessing the overall sufficiency of the evidence.

To convict for possession of marihuana with intent to distribute, the prosecution must establish that the defendant had knowing possession of the substance with the intent to distribute it. For the additional charge of importation, it suffices to show that Martinez was involved in bringing the marihuana into the U.S. The evidence is deemed sufficient if a rational jury could find the essential elements of the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. 

In evaluating Martinez’s case, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, granting the prosecution all reasonable inferences. The jury could reasonably conclude that Martinez exercised control over the truck concealing the marihuana, indicating possession, and the large quantity (306 pounds) suggests intent to distribute. Knowing possession can be inferred from control over the vehicle and other circumstantial evidence indicating guilty knowledge, which was present in Martinez's case.

Martinez's explanations for his travel to the United States evolved during his detention on October 31, 1988. Initially, he claimed an unidentified group loaned him a truck to seek work without a permit. Later, he stated he was paid $300 to drive the truck to retrieve a semitrailer. These inconsistencies suggest his guilty knowledge. His inability to identify who provided the truck and the unusually high payment amount, compared to typical travel costs, further indicate suspicious circumstances. Coupled with his control over a drug-laden truck, which had observable unusual fuel tanks, this evidence supports the jury's conclusion that he knew about the marihuana. Additionally, Martinez's crossing of the border with a large quantity of the drug allows for an inference of intent to distribute, justifying the district court's denial of his acquittal motion.

Martinez's appeal also claims prosecutorial misconduct, alleging that perjured testimony was elicited and commenting on his silence during questioning violated his due process rights. To establish a due process violation, he must demonstrate the prosecution knowingly presented false evidence. However, he failed to show that any witnesses perjured themselves, merely suggesting that their testimony "may well have been false." Omissions from witness statements do not indicate perjury and instead pertain to the credibility of the witnesses, which is for the jury to assess. Ultimately, Martinez's contention reflects dissatisfaction with the verdict, which is insufficient to overturn it, as the evidence supports the verdict's validity.

Martinez's claims regarding prosecutorial comments on his silence during interrogation lack specificity and detail. He asserts that the prosecutor implied his guilt by referencing his silence and the shared last name with the truck's owner, suggesting a violation of Doyle v. Ohio regarding the use of silence against a defendant. However, he fails to provide direct quotations or context from the trial, nor does he follow local procedural rules for citing the record. The court notes that it is not its role to search the record for errors, placing the onus on counsel to identify specific issues. 

Despite reviewing the record, the court finds only brief references by the prosecutor that may be improper under Doyle but acknowledges that no objections were raised during the trial. For reversal based on "plain error," the standard requires that any error be so obvious that it would undermine the fairness of the proceedings. The court concludes that no such error exists here, as the prosecution presented strong evidence of guilt with little contrary evidence.

Additionally, Martinez argues that the prosecution violated the Speedy Trial Act, claiming his trial began too late after his indictment. The trial commenced ninety-nine days after the indictment, exceeding the seventy-day requirement. However, the court cites an exception in the Act for delays due to the consideration of pretrial motions, suggesting his claim may not warrant dismissal of the indictment.

Martinez filed multiple pretrial motions, including a motion to dismiss the indictment on December 23, 1988, which was denied twenty-seven days later, and another motion on February 9, 1989, denied after fourteen days on February 23. He argues that the prosecution's delay in responding to his December motion contributed to the overall delay in the court's ruling, making the delay nonexcludable under section 3161(h)(1)(F) of the Act. Specifically, he claims that the fifteen-day period from January 3 to January 18, 1989, during which the prosecution failed to respond, should not count toward the forty-one days that can be excluded under section 3161(h)(1)(F). If these fifteen days are included, it would result in seventy-three days of nonexcludable time between the indictment and the trial, violating the Act's time limitations. However, based on the Supreme Court's ruling in Henderson v. United States, all forty-one days related to the pretrial motions are excludable under section 3161(h)(1)(F). Consequently, Martinez's argument fails, and his conviction is affirmed. Additionally, there are discrepancies in the names listed on various documents related to Martinez.

Key points of Trejo's testimony indicate the following: Two days prior, a vehicle with unusually long tanks was observed entering the port of entry but escaped before being stopped. Upon spotting a similar truck, Trejo and others directed it for secondary inspection. Trejo noted that the nozzle appeared altered, with visible weld marks suggesting modifications to facilitate gasoline flow. The truck had three straps instead of the usual two, which was atypical for such trailers. Trejo expressed suspicion due to the truck's cleanliness, lacking typical items a driver would carry, such as clothing or food, indicating it had been unusually well-maintained, which is uncommon for vehicles traveling through dusty Mexican roads.

Upon further inspection, they requested mechanics to assist in examining the tanks. Trejo highlighted that, typically, drivers carry personal items for unpredictable delays at the import lot, but this truck lacked such essentials. He estimated that a truck of this nature could travel around 70 to 80 miles before running out of gas. When mechanics arrived, they discovered loose bolts on the tank's straps and evidence of bondo, suggesting concealed modifications. The tank required significant effort to remove, and upon doing so, they found a tightly secured lid. Trejo noted that the driver had $132 in cash and some Mexican currency, which raised his suspicions given that the individual was unemployed and ostensibly seeking work.

Reyna's testimony corroborated Trejo's observations, describing the vehicle as a bright green tractor with a canvas stake and chrome wheels. Reyna mentioned that their supervisor had warned them about the type of vehicle likely to carry contraband. He identified the approaching truck and alerted fellow inspectors, who intercepted it. Reyna did not conduct an internal inspection as that had already been done by another inspector.

Rule 16(a) outlines the government's obligations regarding the disclosure of information to defendants. Upon a defendant's request, the government must allow inspection and copying of:

1. **Defendant's Statements**: Written or recorded statements made by the defendant, oral statements intended for trial evidence, and grand jury testimony relevant to the charged offense.
2. **Defendant's Prior Record**: The government must provide copies of the defendant's known prior criminal record.
3. **Documents and Tangible Objects**: The defendant can inspect items material to their defense or intended for use as evidence, including books, papers, and objects in the government's control.
4. **Reports of Examinations and Tests**: The defendant is entitled to results or reports of physical or mental examinations and scientific tests pertinent to the defense or prosecution.

However, certain internal government documents, reports, and witness statements are not subject to disclosure, except as specified in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3500. Additionally, the discovery of grand jury transcripts is limited by specific rules.

The prosecution exceeded its obligations under the Jencks Act by providing documents to Martinez pre-trial, allowing him to use incomplete reports for witness impeachment. Martinez implied that the evidence was sufficient if it included testimony he claimed should have been suppressed. He also raised an issue on appeal regarding the prosecutor's reference to his silence, though this was not elaborated upon in his summary.