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Frazelle-Foster v. Foster
Citation: 250 Md. App. 52Docket: 2716/18
Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland; May 4, 2021; Maryland; State Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
In the case of Donna Frazelle-Foster v. Preston H. Foster, the Maryland court addressed the interpretation of "cruelty of treatment" as grounds for divorce, affirming that it includes verbal and psychological abuse, not just physical violence. The court clarified that the Maryland Family Law Article does not require the complaining party to demonstrate recent incidents of cruelty or a pattern of abuse throughout the marriage to establish grounds for divorce. Donna Frazelle-Foster filed for absolute divorce, claiming her husband, Preston H. Foster, had persistently engaged in cruel treatment, including verbal abuse and conduct that endangered her safety and happiness. The Circuit Court for Prince George’s County denied her complaint, prompting Donna to appeal, arguing the court erred in its application of the law regarding cruelty of treatment. The appellate court found that the lower court failed to apply the updated and broader standards for proving cruelty of treatment, leading to a vacated judgment. The case background includes the couple's history of marriage, their living conditions, and Donna's claims of Preston's abusive behavior, which she argued made the continuation of their marriage untenable. The appeal centers on whether the trial court misapplied the legal standards concerning the grounds for divorce. Donna testified that marital issues began in 1998, shortly after their son's birth, primarily due to Preston making significant household decisions independently. Over the years, the situation worsened, with Donna describing Preston's cruel treatment, including belittling her in front of their son, withholding financial support, and leaving home for extended periods without notice. She recounted that Preston purchased two homes in North Carolina in 2005 without informing her, asserting that his financial dominance gave him decision-making power. Donna introduced a letter from Preston, which contained derogatory language and expressed his frustration with her, claiming that as the primary financial provider, he deserved respect and unquestioned authority. This letter, and similar communications from him, deeply hurt her and contributed to her feelings of humiliation and worthlessness. Preston often used offensive names for her in front of their son, aiming to silence her, and he closely monitored her social interactions and communications. Financial control was a significant point of contention, with Donna noting that her income was minimal compared to Preston’s. His control over household finances restricted her independence, requiring her to seek permission for basic needs. In January 2017, Preston significantly reduced his financial support, compelling Donna to beg for money for essentials and even canceling her Costco membership without notice. Donna stated that Preston’s financial control negatively impacts her relationship with their son, noting that their interactions are pleasant when Preston is absent but become strained in his presence due to the pressure he exerts. Donna described Preston's controlling behavior, including his tendency to withhold financial support as retaliation for their son's actions. She expressed feelings of being mentally undermined by Preston, who has publicly questioned her mental health and manipulated family dynamics, including requiring her to sign apology notes to obtain money for necessities. An example of this was provided through a letter where she apologized for her behavior in exchange for car repairs, reflecting her diminished sense of self-worth. Donna recounted an instance of physical violence in February 2006 when Preston pushed her, leading her to call the police, although no charges were filed. Despite the absence of physical harm since, she reported ongoing mental abuse, intimidation, and fear of physical violence from Preston. She described her living situation as akin to a prison and acknowledged a decline in her mental well-being. In a 2010 incident during a car ride, Preston's reckless driving in response to a request for a bathroom break further illustrated his controlling behavior. Donna mentioned that she sought a divorce in 2012, after which they began living separately and ceased sexual relations. In early 2013, Preston emailed Donna with a proposed divorce settlement, expressing concern for their son's education and reflecting on his perceived failures as a husband. He later forwarded this email to their son, attempting to manipulate the situation to his advantage. Donna testified that following a 2016 incident where she suspected Preston of encouraging their son to pursue assault charges against her, she stopped communicating with him and avoided being in his presence. The parties cook separately and avoid spending time together in the same rooms. Preston testified that he did not separate from Donna and denied pressuring their son to file assault charges against her. He claimed to have had a detailed conversation with their son about the implications of pursuing legal action against Donna. Preston wrote a letter, admitted as Plaintiff’s Ex. 1, after Donna informed their young son about their divorce, which upset him. Preston felt compelled to share the letter with neighbors after Donna criticized him publicly. Although he apologized for the letter, Donna did not accept his apology. Donna recounted that Preston drove their son to court to file second-degree charges against her; she was later found not guilty, and the charges were expunged, but the incident strained her relationship with their son. Preston stated he provided various documents to Donna during their marriage to ensure clarity on events and responsibilities. He alleged that Donna's aggressive behavior during an altercation led to police involvement, in which she claimed he pushed her, a charge he denied. He accused Donna of verbal abuse and described how, in 2012, she forced him into a separate bedroom to avoid conflict. Preston acknowledged that he was the primary financial provider during their second marriage and explained that he had Donna sign documents he created, sometimes with their son as a witness. He denied withholding financial support but admitted to having conditioned financial assistance in the past. He recently provided money for Donna's prescriptions and removed her from their Costco account due to communication issues regarding purchases. Notably, Preston confessed to forging Donna’s signature and falsifying a notary stamp to access retirement benefits. Preston admitted that his marriage to Donna has not been ideal, but he expressed his commitment to fulfilling his marital obligations and a desire to remain married. The judge ruled against Donna’s request for divorce, citing a financial disparity but noting that her claims were based on allegations of cruelty and constructive desertion. The judge described a letter submitted by Donna as "horrific" and "cruel," but acknowledged she only presented one such instance. In contrast, a letter of apology from Donna suggested some reconciliation efforts after a holiday discussion, yet a proposed settlement email was deemed not to constitute cruelty, despite questioning Preston’s judgment in sharing it with their son. The judge emphasized that establishing fault requires more than isolated incidents throughout a long marriage, particularly under Maryland law, which necessitates evidence of a continuing pattern of behavior. Donna was unable to provide sufficient evidence post-2012 to support her claims of ongoing cruelty. Regarding constructive desertion, the judge concluded that Preston did not desert Donna simply because she chose to separate physically due to dissatisfaction. The circuit court formally denied Donna’s request for divorce on August 2, 2018. After her motion to amend the judgment was denied, she filed an appeal on October 5, 2018. While Donna did not challenge the ruling on constructive desertion in her appeal, historical case law, such as Scheinin v. Scheinin, indicates that a spouse could obtain a limited divorce if the other’s behavior rendered cohabitation unbearable, even if they continued living under the same roof. The court noted that Maryland’s legal precedent shows a concerning tolerance for abusive behavior in marital relationships. In Bonwit v. Bonwit, the Court of Appeals determined that a husband's violent temper and occasional slapping of his wife did not meet the legal standard for cruelty (169 Md. 189, 193 (1935)). In Hasting v. Hastings, constant abusive language and drunkenness were also deemed insufficient for a cruelty claim, especially since the wife was aware of her husband's drinking issues before marriage. Courts have recognized cruelty sufficient for a limited divorce when there is serious, continuous, and corroborated physical abuse indicative of future violence, as exemplified in Sharp v. Sharp, where the court reversed a denial of the wife's limited divorce request based on clear evidence of the husband's violent behavior, including physical assaults and threats to kill (105 Md. 581, 582-83 (1907)). In Scheinin v. Scheinin, the Court expanded the definition of cruelty by incorporating modern interpretations from both English and American case law (200 Md. at 289). Although the court's ultimate decision was based on desertion rather than cruelty, the wife reported abusive language, ridicule, and physical aggression from her husband, who had invited his secretary, with whom he appeared to have an affair, to live with them. The court acknowledged that a single act could suffice for a cruelty claim if it indicated intent to cause serious harm, and it noted that physical violence is no longer a prerequisite for establishing cruelty in Maryland. The definition now encompasses any behavior that could seriously impair a spouse's health or happiness. Judge Delaplaine emphasized the evolving societal understanding of emotional suffering as significant in cruelty cases. However, this progressive view faced challenges, as illustrated in Harrison v. Harrison, where the court found the wife's evidence of only three violent incidents insufficient to establish a legal claim for cruelty. The court noted two minor incidents of domestic violence involving a husband slapping or pushing his wife, which were deemed too trivial to warrant detailed discussion. A serious incident was highlighted where the husband attempted to force sexual intercourse, leading the wife to bite his tongue in self-defense, after which he severely beat her. In previous cases, such as Neff v. Neff and Galvanga v. Galvanga, it was established that isolated acts of violence or verbal abuse alone were insufficient for divorce on cruelty grounds unless the victim demonstrated a significant fear for their health and safety. However, the definition of cruelty evolved, as seen in Golas v. Golas and Ballan v. Ballan, where the court recognized that any conduct endangering a spouse's health or creating reasonable apprehension of harm could constitute cruelty. The increasing prevalence of domestic violence prompted legislative responses, including the Violence Against Women Act in 1994, which was the first federal law to address gender-based violence comprehensively. In Maryland, following an alarming rise in family violence reports, the Family Violence Council was established in 1995 to address and reduce such incidents. By the late 1990s, both federal and state laws classified partner violence as a criminal offense, reflecting a significant shift in legal and social attitudes toward domestic violence. In 1996, the Maryland Family Violence Council published a report with twenty recommendations to combat the rising issue of family violence. A significant recommendation was the amendment of Maryland's divorce law to address the needs of abuse victims, who often sought divorce but were constrained by a one-year separation requirement. The Council argued that victims should not remain married to their abuser for an additional year if a history of abuse was established. Consequently, the Council proposed legislation to eliminate this waiting period. In response to these recommendations, the Maryland General Assembly modified divorce laws in 1998, adding cruelty and excessively vicious conduct as grounds for absolute divorce. This amendment aimed to allow victims of domestic abuse to file for divorce without enduring the one-year waiting period. The relevant statutory language in Section 7-103(a) was further amended in 2003 to include provisions for abuse affecting a minor child of the complaining party. Currently, Section 7-103(a) outlines grounds for absolute divorce, including adultery, desertion, felony conviction, 12-month separation, insanity, and cruelty toward the complaining party or their minor child, with the latter not requiring a waiting period if no reconciliation is expected. Excessively vicious conduct towards a complaining party or their minor child, when reconciliation is not reasonably expected, constitutes grounds for divorce. Mutual consent for divorce is valid if the parties submit a signed settlement agreement addressing alimony, property distribution, and child custody/support, along with a completed child support guidelines worksheet if applicable. No party should file to contest the agreement before the divorce hearing, and the court must find that terms regarding children serve their best interests. In *Das v. Das*, the court affirmed an absolute divorce granted to the wife based on allegations of cruelty and excessively vicious conduct during their twenty-year marriage. The husband did not participate in the proceedings, claiming improper service. The wife's testimony, while lacking specific incidents of violence, illustrated a pattern of ongoing cruelty, including physical abuse and emotional isolation. A protective order had previously been issued due to a history of domestic violence. The wife also reported health issues stemming from the stress of the marriage. The husband argued that the wife's testimony was insufficiently specific and uncorroborated, but the court acknowledged the evolving understanding of cruelty in domestic violence cases, indicating a shift in public policy towards permitting divorce in such circumstances. The legal framework surrounding absolute divorce has evolved to better protect victims of domestic abuse. Constructive desertion is now recognized, allowing for divorce without a lengthy proof process. In 1998, legislation was enacted to enable immediate filing for absolute divorce in cases of domestic violence, expanding acceptable grounds to include cruelty and excessively vicious conduct. Historical cases from the 1920s no longer align with contemporary views on family interactions, especially regarding verbal and physical abuse. Courts are urged to grant relief in cases of violence or threats, emphasizing that existing protective orders and testimony can substantiate claims of abuse without extensive corroboration. The case of Das v. Das illustrates the shift in legal standards, indicating that cruelty encompasses actions that significantly harm a spouse's health or happiness, not just physical violence. In 2016, the General Assembly repealed a requirement for corroboration in divorce cases, reflecting a growing recognition of domestic violence issues. The evolving definition of cruelty now includes a broader range of abusive behaviors, which are recognized as factors contributing to the dissolution of marriage. The husband's controlling behaviors included isolating the wife from her family and friends and demanding detailed accounts of her time. Maryland's General Assembly has enacted measures enhancing protections for victims of violence, notably lowering the evidentiary standard for protective orders from "clear and convincing" to "preponderance of the evidence" in 2014. In 2017, the Assembly repealed provisions that restricted the use of protective orders as evidence in divorce cases and limited court consideration of compliance with such orders in divorce decrees. Experts recognize threats as a common coercive tactic that instills fear and compliance, often encompassing threats of harm to the victim, the abuser, or property destruction. It was determined that the wife's testimony sufficed to demonstrate that the husband's conduct constituted cruelty threatening her physical and emotional well-being without requiring exhaustive documentation of mistreatment. Maryland law acknowledges domestic abuse as including emotional and psychological abuse, with courts permitted to consider psychological abuse in defenses such as Battered Spouse Syndrome. Controlling tactics often deprive victims of essential resources, foster dependence, and regulate behavior, rooted in control over basic necessities like money and housing. While a few cases have addressed divorce on grounds of cruelty, none have clarified the definition of cruelty in relation to absolute divorce. Property matters in divorce cases involving cruelty can hinge on patterns of abuse. In Flanagan v. Flanagan, the court recognized that verbal abuse could be so degrading as to constitute intolerable treatment. Similarly, in State v. Peterson, the court granted post-conviction relief based on evidence supporting expert testimony regarding the defendant’s battered spouse syndrome. This case highlighted the psychological abuse inflicted by a possessive and jealous husband, who used coercive tactics and threats, thus creating an environment of fear despite a lull in physical violence due to the husband's rehabilitation. The court noted that the psychological abuse, characterized by constant criticism and intimidation, provided a sufficient basis for expert testimony about the syndrome. In 2017, the Court of Appeals in Porter v. State affirmed that a defendant's history of domestic violence justified an imperfect self-defense jury instruction, despite the absence of recent abuse. The court considered the defendant's comprehensive evidence of escalating abuse over the years, including the husband's controlling behaviors and verbal threats, which contributed to her belief of imminent danger. Additionally, in Wallace-Bey v. State, the court ruled that a trial court's refusal to allow the defendant to present evidence of her deceased boyfriend's words constituted a reversible error, warranting a new trial. Wallace-Bey experienced physical, psychological, and emotional abuse from her boyfriend, culminating in her killing him. During her trial, attempts to present evidence of his controlling behavior and psychological abuse were hindered by court objections to his verbal statements. The defense argued this exclusion prevented a proper defense under the battered spouse syndrome, a position the court supported. It was determined that evidence of psychological and verbal abuse should have been permitted, emphasizing that the cycle of violence includes both words and actions. The court recognized that verbal conduct can signify psychological abuse and that specific derogatory remarks made by the boyfriend were relevant to understanding the abuse Wallace-Bey suffered. Additionally, Maryland law acknowledges that domestic abuse encompasses verbal and psychological abuse alongside physical violence. Legislative changes, such as the amendment to FL. 7-103(a), were intended to eliminate the 12-month waiting period for a victimized spouse to file for absolute divorce and clarified that psychological pain can constitute cruelty. The court concluded that "cruelty of treatment" does not necessitate physical violence, but can arise from verbal and psychological abuse that significantly harms the victim's health or happiness. The analysis highlighted that FL. 7-103(a)(6) does not require the complaining party to demonstrate multiple incidents of cruelty spread throughout the marriage or that these incidents must be recent. The circuit court was found to have erred in denying an absolute divorce based on the timing of cruelty incidents, having applied an outdated interpretation of “cruelty of treatment” instead of the current standard established in Das v. Das. The court's decision regarding Donna's testimony on verbal and psychological abuse by Preston is ambiguous, either suggesting a failure to consider her testimony as grounds for divorce or a determination of its credibility. Donna detailed a pattern of abuse, including name-calling, humiliation, intimidation, financial control, and emotional manipulation, which she claimed worsened around her 2017 divorce filing. Despite these allegations, Preston disputed some claims but admitted to behaviors including reading derogatory letters aloud, coercing Donna into signing apology notes for financial favors, and forging her signature on retirement documents. The trial court did not reference any relevant case law in its ruling, although prior cases were cited during oral arguments to define "cruelty." The appellate court vacated the circuit court's judgment, ordering a limited remand to ensure the proper legal standard is applied in evaluating the evidence for potential grounds of divorce, including "cruelty of treatment" or constructive desertion. The circuit court retains discretion to determine the appropriate grounds for divorce and may consider further briefing if necessary. Costs are to be borne by the appellee.