State v. Steffen

Citation: 2020 UT App 95Docket: 20180467-CA

Court: Court of Appeals of Utah; June 18, 2020; Utah; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Jordan Vincent Steffen was convicted by a jury on multiple charges, including child endangerment, lewdness involving a child, and aggravated child sexual abuse, stemming from allegations of sexual abuse against his girlfriend’s daughter, A.Z., when she was between eleven and twelve years old. Steffen appealed, arguing that the district court (1) improperly excluded evidence of A.Z.'s prior sexual abuse by her grandfather, claiming it was relevant to her sexual innocence, (2) made erroneous rulings regarding discovery under rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and (3) wrongly denied his motion for a mistrial. 

The court, led by Judge Diana Hagen, affirmed the convictions. The district court ruled the prior abuse evidence inadmissible under rule 412, finding minimal relevance to the present case. Before trial, Steffen successfully obtained a three-month continuance due to late evidentiary disclosures by the State. However, during the trial, the State disclosed for the first time that A.Z.'s mother would testify about coercion related to A.Z.'s disclosures of abuse, prompting the court to require the State to provide all relevant investigative notes or reports related to this testimony.

The district court declared a mistrial due to the State's failure to disclose evidence. Following this, the State provided the defense with paralegal notes from interviews with witnesses A.Z. and her mother. Steffen subsequently requested the complete witness interview notes, claiming that the lack of access violated his due process rights. The court denied this motion, stating that the complete notes comprised the prosecution's core opinion work product, and deemed the paralegal notes sufficient for effective cross-examination.

Afterwards, the State sought discovery of the defense's investigative materials. Steffen opposed this based on attorney work product privilege, but the court found good cause for disclosure, ordering that any prior inconsistent statements from defense investigator reports must be shared with the State 10 days before trial.

Before the retrial, Steffen again attempted to admit prior abuse evidence to counter an expert witness's testimony about A.Z.'s self-harm, arguing it stemmed from her grandfather's abuse. The State clarified it would not claim that A.Z.'s injuries were linked to Steffen, leading the court to reject Steffen's admissibility argument under rule 412.

During the trial, the State introduced a law enforcement interview with A.Z., which inadvertently included her statement about self-harm. The State acknowledged the mistake as an editing error, and although Steffen accepted this explanation, he moved for dismissal or a mistrial based on cumulative due process violations, referencing the prior issues that had led to the mistrial.

Playing the cutting statement to the jury was argued to have prejudiced Steffen, impacting his right to a fair trial. The court rejected motions to dismiss the case or declare a mistrial but permitted Steffen to introduce previously excluded evidence of prior abuse to counter the claim that A.Z. cut herself due to Steffen's assault. Despite this allowance, Steffen did not present the evidence, claiming the ruling came too late to prepare necessary witnesses. At trial's end, the jury acquitted him on ten counts but convicted him on five, including lewdness and aggravated sexual abuse of a child. 

On appeal, Steffen raises several issues: he asserts the district court exceeded its discretion in excluding the prior abuse evidence, which is generally reviewed for abuse of discretion but involves legal standards assessed for correctness. He also claims two erroneous discovery rulings under Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, with legal interpretation reviewed for correctness. Lastly, he contests the denial of his motion for mistrial, which is also reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Steffen contends the court abused its discretion by excluding the prior abuse evidence under Rule 412, which generally prohibits evidence regarding a victim’s past sexual behavior or abuse. However, there are exceptions allowing such evidence if it meets specific criteria, including proving someone else's involvement or if its exclusion violates the defendant's constitutional rights.

Steffen has not specified which exception to rule 412 he believes applies in his case, leading to the assumption that he argues the exclusion of prior abuse evidence violated his constitutional rights, specifically his Sixth Amendment right to present a defense. The court clarifies that the right to present a defense is not absolute; the exclusion of evidence under rule 412 only violates this right if it is arbitrary or disproportionate to the rule's intended purposes. A defendant must show that the exclusion significantly undermines fundamental elements of their defense, requiring proof that the evidence is essential.

Steffen criticizes the district court for not applying a previously adopted two-part balancing test, which weighs the defendant's interests against those of the State. However, the court notes that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Nevada v. Jackson clarified that such balancing is not constitutionally required. The Utah Supreme Court's adoption of rule 412 indicates a policy decision favoring the exclusion of a victim’s sexual history unless specific exceptions are met.

Steffen argues that the prior abuse evidence was relevant to counter the inference of A.Z.'s sexual innocence. Although the district court acknowledged this relevance due to A.Z.'s age, the court concluded that relevance does not equate to essentiality for the defense's presentation. Thus, Steffen has not met the necessary standard to demonstrate that rule 412's exclusion of evidence significantly undermined his defense.

The district court determined that prior abuse evidence was relevant for rebutting the sexual innocence inference but lacked significant probative value in this case. The evidence indicated that A.Z.'s grandfather had committed multiple abusive acts against her, similar to the allegations against Steffen, which included inappropriate touching. However, Steffen faced accusations of more severe misconduct, including digital penetration and vaginal rape.

The court concluded that admitting the prior abuse evidence was not essential to Steffen's defense based on three key points: (1) the State did not rely on the sexual innocence inference during the trial; (2) Steffen had alternative evidence available to counter such an inference if the jury made one; and (3) the probative value of the prior abuse evidence was limited due to A.Z.'s age and the differences between those acts and the charges against Steffen.

The issue of A.Z.'s sexual knowledge was not central to the trial, and Steffen did not demonstrate that the State relied on the sexual innocence inference. Moreover, Steffen was able to present other explanations for A.Z.'s sexual knowledge, citing her grandfather's past abuse of her cousin, conversations with peers, and exposure to social media. Therefore, even without the prior abuse evidence, Steffen effectively argued against the implications of sexual innocence, demonstrating that A.Z.'s knowledge could have come from various sources.

The excerpt addresses the relevance of prior abuse evidence in the context of rebutting the sexual innocence inference concerning A.Z., a child victim. It emphasizes that the probative value of such evidence hinges on the child's age at the time of the described abuse and the nature of the allegations. The district court must evaluate whether prior abuse is similar to the current allegations to assess its admissibility. 

Steffen contends that A.Z.'s prior abuse is highly relevant to her capability to fabricate allegations against him, claiming similarities between her past abuse by her grandfather and the accusations against him. However, the court notes that while there are some similarities, the nature of Steffen's alleged actions is far more severe, making it unclear how prior, less egregious abuse would inform A.Z.'s ability to fabricate more serious claims. 

Moreover, the evidence did not clarify how A.Z. acquired knowledge of sexual acts that would typically be beyond the understanding of a child her age (11-12 years old). The court suggests that a jury would not expect a child to possess detailed knowledge about such acts, thus indicating that the prior abuse evidence fails to provide an alternative explanation for A.Z.'s sexual knowledge. Ultimately, the ruling on the admissibility of prior abuse evidence must be made based on the information available at the time of trial, independent of the eventual acquittal of Steffen on many charges.

Prior abuse evidence concerning A.Z. is seen as having minimal probative value in establishing her allegations against Steffen, as it suggests she could fabricate claims of inappropriate touching without requiring advanced sexual knowledge beyond her age. Citing *Commonwealth v. Rathburn*, the document notes that the use of basic anatomical terms by a young victim does not indicate exceptional sexual awareness. Consequently, the court determined that the evidence of prior abuse was not essential for Steffen’s defense, leading to the conclusion that the constitutional exception to rule 412 is inapplicable, and the exclusion of this evidence was within the district court's discretion.

In terms of discovery rulings, Steffen challenges two decisions made by the district court under rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. First, he contends that the State waived its work-product privilege regarding witness-interview notes, and thus, the court wrongly denied his motion to compel full disclosure of those notes. Second, he argues that the court erred in requiring the defense to disclose privileged work product when granting the State's motion to compel. Rule 16 mandates that prosecutors disclose certain evidence upon request to ensure a fair defense, although they may resist discovery to protect work product. During Steffen's initial trial, it was revealed that A.Z.'s mother had coerced her regarding an incident involving Steffen, which should have been disclosed to the defense. The court mandated the State to provide all relevant investigator notes but ruled out the disclosure of the prosecutor’s notes under the work-product doctrine. The State subsequently shared factual portions of its paralegal’s notes from the mother’s interview, waiving work-product privilege only for those portions. Steffen argues that this waiver extends to all related notes, but the court disagrees.

The State's disclosure of factual notes from a paralegal's interview with the mother was a compliance with a district court order, which allowed for the sharing of factual information while protecting privileged work product. This action did not waive the privilege associated with core opinion work product, which includes an attorney's mental impressions and legal theories, as clarified in Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Automated Geographic Reference Center. The waiver of work product privilege is limited to factual or non-opinion work product related to the same subject matter as any disclosed materials, unlike the broader attorney-client privilege. The State's compliance with the court's order did not create additional discovery obligations, as the disclosure was involuntary.

In response to Steffen's argument that the district court erred in granting the State's motion to compel access to the defense’s core opinion work product, Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure requires the defense to disclose evidence to the prosecution if the court finds good cause. The district court determined the State had shown good cause for Steffen to disclose various investigative materials, ruling that the privilege would be waived if he intended to use protected notes to impeach witnesses. The court mandated Steffen to disclose notes containing prior inconsistent statements of prosecution witnesses during cross-examination and to share relevant portions of notes from interviews with defense witnesses.

On appeal, Steffen did not contest the waiver of work-product privilege but challenged the scope of the court's order, asserting it unjustly allowed prosecutors access to the mental impressions and observations of the defense team. The court acknowledged that the language in its order could be interpreted too broadly, potentially infringing on the defense's protected information.

The district court mandated Steffen to disclose only factual work product concerning notes from interviews with defense witnesses, while the order for prosecution witness notes lacked such limitations, requiring disclosure of any prior inconsistent statements made by those witnesses. Work product waivers should be narrowly interpreted to apply only to factual, not opinion, work product. Although the court's order for disclosure was potentially overbroad, Steffen did not demonstrate harmful error since he did not use the notes during cross-examination, thus they were not disclosed. Steffen contended that the order forced him to choose between using investigator materials and disclosing core opinion work product or forgoing the materials entirely. The court acknowledged the risk of a chilling effect on presenting exculpatory evidence but noted that no record was made by Steffen to indicate how he would have utilized the notes. Errors are deemed harmless unless a party can show a reasonable likelihood of affecting the outcome, and the court has historically refused to presume prejudice without an adequate record. Steffen argued for presumed prejudice due to the need for protected work product disclosure; however, the court indicated he could have presented only factual portions of the notes or outlined questions he would have posed to witnesses without disclosing privileged information.

The record does not indicate that the notes contained any favorable evidence that could have influenced the case's outcome, thus Steffen has not shown reversible error. Regarding Steffen's claim of abuse of discretion in the denial of his mistrial motion after an accidental statement was played for the jury, the court found no abuse of discretion. The improper statement was not intentionally elicited; it was a two-word phrase, "I cut," played inadvertently due to a mistake with the State’s editing software, which the court accepted without challenge from Steffen. The statement was made in passing during a video and was not elaborated upon, making it relatively innocuous given the graphic nature of the testimony presented during the six-day trial. The court concluded it was unlikely the jury would perceive the statement as significant. Furthermore, to mitigate any potential prejudice from the statement, the court allowed Steffen to introduce evidence of prior abuse, although he chose not to do so. Steffen also appealed the denial of his alternative motion to dismiss charges, but since he could not demonstrate an abuse of discretion in denying the mistrial, he could not justify the extreme remedy of dismissal. The court addressed and remedied the instances of alleged cumulative due process violations raised by Steffen.

The court granted a continuance and subsequently a mistrial due to the State's failure to disclose evidence and witness testimony to the defense. In response to a prejudicial statement, the court allowed Steffen to use prior abuse evidence to counter any negative implications arising from that statement. Dismissal of criminal charges is considered a severe measure, and the court did not abuse its discretion in denying such a motion given that it had already provided adequate remedies based on the specific circumstances. The precedent set in *United States v. Koubriti* requires a showing of significant and ongoing prosecutorial misconduct along with substantial prejudice, which cannot be established if prior misconduct has been adequately addressed. The district court acted within its discretion by excluding prior abuse evidence, and Steffen failed to prove entitlement to further disclosure of the State’s interview notes or that the order compelling disclosure of the defense notes was detrimental. Additionally, the denial of Steffen's mistrial motion was also within the district court's discretion. Consequently, the court upheld Steffen's convictions.