State v. Steele

Citations: 2019 UT App 71; 442 P.3d 1204Docket: 20170855-CA

Court: Court of Appeals of Utah; May 2, 2019; Utah; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Loretta Rae Steele was convicted of driving under the influence and leaving the scene of an accident. During the trial, Steele requested the dismissal of her case, arguing that the State's failure to preserve a 911 call made during the incident violated her due process rights. The district court denied this motion, stating that Steele did not demonstrate any prejudice from the missing recording. On appeal, the court affirmed the conviction, concluding that Steele failed to show a reasonable probability that the 911 recording contained exculpatory evidence.

The incident occurred around 9:00 p.m. when an eyewitness heard a crash involving an SUV. The eyewitness approached the vehicle and observed the driver, who demanded help but did not indicate any need for medical assistance. While the eyewitness called 911, the SUV's passengers fled the scene, leaving the driver to attempt to start the vehicle. The eyewitness described the driver to the responding officer, who, with the assistance of a police dog, tracked Steele based on the description provided. Upon locating Steele, the officer noted signs of intoxication, and the eyewitness confirmed her identity as the driver. The passengers were not found.

Steele was charged with driving under the influence and leaving the scene of an accident involving property damage. Nearly two years later, her case proceeded to a jury trial. Defense counsel moved to dismiss the case, citing a due process violation due to the State's failure to preserve a 911 recording of an eyewitness's call. Defense counsel discovered just a week prior to trial that the recording, requested during discovery, had been destroyed according to a one-year retention policy. Two days before trial, the State provided a computer-aided dispatch report, which lacked a detailed description of the SUV's occupants.

At trial, defense counsel stipulated to Steele's intoxication and agreed not to question the eyewitness about her 911 call, with the court entering an order in limine to exclude that evidence. After the jury was empaneled, defense counsel expressed regret over the stipulation and sought to withdraw it, claiming the recording was exculpatory and potentially contained a description of the driver, which could assist Steele's defense. Citing State v. Tiedemann, defense counsel argued the State was at fault for failing to preserve the recording, which hindered Steele's ability to defend herself.

The court denied the motion to withdraw the stipulation and the motion to dismiss, emphasizing the lack of demonstrated prejudice. The court noted that even if a description was provided to the 911 operator, it was unlikely to differ significantly from what the eyewitness would later convey to the responding officer. During the trial, defense counsel proposed a theory suggesting another occupant of the SUV was the driver instead of Steele. Despite efforts to challenge the eyewitness's identification through cross-examination and expert testimony on memory, the jury convicted Steele of both charges. Steele is now appealing the denial of her motion to dismiss.

Steele argues that the district court incorrectly denied her motion to dismiss, claiming a violation of her right to a fair trial due to the State's destruction of potentially exculpatory evidence. This issue involves a mixed question of law and fact. The excerpt explains that the determination of whether the destruction of evidence violates due process is a legal question reviewed for correctness, with subsidiary factual findings evaluated under a clearly erroneous standard.

In her argument, Steele points out that a 911 recording likely contained an eyewitness's initial description of the driver, which may differ from later statements made to police. She asserts that the State's failure to preserve this recording violated her due process rights. The Utah Supreme Court's framework for evaluating such claims includes a threshold requirement where the defendant must show a reasonable probability that the lost evidence would have been exculpatory. This threshold can be met as long as the defendant's assertions about the evidence are not speculative or incredible. If met, the court would then assess the severity of the due process violation by balancing the State's culpability in the evidence's destruction against the prejudice suffered by the defendant.

The district court's decision implied that Steele could meet the threshold requirement but concluded she could not demonstrate prejudice. On appeal, the court notes it can affirm the lower court's decision on any valid basis found in the record. Ultimately, the court found that Steele did not meet the threshold requirement, so it did not need to evaluate the balance of culpability versus prejudice.

The Utah Supreme Court, in DeJesus, defined the standard for establishing a reasonable probability concerning a defendant's due process right to exculpatory evidence, stating it is greater than mere possibility but less than "more probable than not." The defendant must demonstrate a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the case's outcome. In DeJesus, the defendant was charged with assaulting a correctional officer during an altercation with another inmate, and crucial video evidence of the incident was destroyed before it could be reviewed. The defendant argued this loss constituted a due process violation, claiming the video would have shown her actions were unintentional, aimed at self-defense.

During the evidentiary hearing, the defendant's fiancée testified that the officer was unintentionally kicked while dealing with the other inmate. The court found the fiancée's testimony lacked credibility due to bias. The officer provided conflicting accounts about the other inmate's position during the incident. Ultimately, the Supreme Court ruled that the combined testimonies of the fiancée and the officer demonstrated a reasonable probability that the lost video would have been exculpatory, which satisfied the threshold for the due process claim.

In contrast, in State v. Mohamud, decided the same day, the court determined that the defendant did not meet the threshold showing regarding the destruction of video evidence related to a charge of possessing a prohibited item in a correctional facility, highlighting the differing outcomes based on the specifics of each case.

The defendant requested all video recordings related to an incident, discovering that any surveillance footage had been destroyed in accordance with a thirty-day retention policy prior to the charges being filed. He moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the video would have served as exculpatory evidence to impeach officer testimonies, although he failed to specify which testimonies could be undermined. The only evidence regarding the video’s potential contents came from an investigating officer who stated that while the cameras were generally operational, he had no confirmation of whether they recorded the incident, nor had he viewed any related footage. The district court found there was no evidence that a video existed, and thus denied the motion to dismiss. 

On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the district court’s decision, determining the defendant did not meet the threshold requirement to show a reasonable probability that the video would have contained exculpatory evidence. The court acknowledged that while video evidence could be highly probative, the defendant's claims were speculative and lacked specific details about how the footage would contradict or discredit the officers' testimonies. The court noted that to establish a reasonable probability of exculpatory evidence, the defendant could have presented testimony from other witnesses or provided his own account of what the video might have shown, without waiving his Fifth Amendment rights. Ultimately, the court concluded that mere speculation about potential impeachment was insufficient to meet the required standard.

Steele failed to meet the threshold requirement of demonstrating a reasonable probability that the 911 recording contained exculpatory evidence, as outlined in Tiedemann. She did not provide evidence that the eyewitness described the driver to dispatch during the 911 call, nor did she show that any such description would contradict the eyewitness's testimony. Her claim that the 911 recording may have details about another female passenger rests solely on an officer’s general statement about dispatch procedures, without specific evidence regarding this case. 

The dispatch notes lacked any description of the SUV's occupants apart from the gender of the adults and the presence of a child. At trial, the officer only relayed the eyewitness's description of the driver without any mention of a description from dispatch. Steele did not seek to present evidence outside the jury's presence regarding the eyewitness's potential description provided to dispatch, nor did she offer testimony from herself or other passengers that might support her argument of confusion with another occupant. 

Even assuming the eyewitness described the driver to dispatch, there is no evidence to suggest that such a description would differ from her trial testimony. The absence of actual evidence regarding the contents of the 911 call leads to mere speculation. Moreover, while lost or destroyed evidence could contain exculpatory information, Steele needed to provide more than speculation to establish a reasonable probability that the recording would benefit her case. Consequently, the court affirmed the denial of her motion to dismiss, indicating that Steele did not demonstrate a reasonable probability of exculpatory evidence in the lost recording.