State v. Smith

Citations: 2018 UT App 144; 427 P.3d 1251Docket: 20150736-CA

Court: Court of Appeals of Utah; July 27, 2018; Utah; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Cody C. Smith faced fourteen charges of sexual misconduct with children, including multiple counts of rape and sexual abuse. He entered a plea agreement to plead no contest to two counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a child, in exchange for the State dropping all other charges and recommending a sentence of two six-to-life terms. Prior to the plea hearing, Defendant's counsel confirmed thorough review of the plea affidavit with him, which stated that he could withdraw his plea only if he proved it was not made knowingly and voluntarily. During the plea colloquy, Defendant confirmed he was not under the influence of substances and understood the proceedings. He expressed confusion about being taken into custody immediately despite complying with requirements and requested additional time to arrange for his children. The trial court denied his subsequent motion to withdraw the plea, leading to his appeal. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision.

The State confirmed that the plea agreement required the Defendant's immediate incarceration to prevent self-harm, as he had been on bail for an extended period. During the court's colloquy, the Defendant was asked if he understood his constitutional rights as outlined in the signed document. After some hesitation, he acknowledged understanding those rights, the implications of a no-contest plea, and the consequences of pleading guilty to two first-degree felonies involving aggravated sexual abuse of a child. The court accepted the Defendant’s pleas as knowing and voluntary and informed him of his right to withdraw the plea for good cause before sentencing. Following the hearing, the Defendant was taken into custody.

Subsequently, the Defendant, with new counsel, sought to withdraw his no-contest pleas before sentencing, citing that he had not read the plea affidavit, misunderstood key aspects including immediate custody and the potential life sentence, and claimed that his initial counsel had coerced him into the plea agreement by presenting incriminating evidence shortly before trial. He argued that ineffective assistance of counsel rendered his plea involuntary.

The trial court first addressed the claim of misinformation regarding the plea withdrawal standard, stating that the transcript reflected the correct “knowing and voluntary” language and determined that the Defendant was not prejudiced by any reference to the “good cause” standard since he filed his motion timely and cited the appropriate standard. An evidentiary hearing followed, where the initial trial counsel testified about the plea negotiations, noting a strict deadline imposed by the State and the opportunity for the Defendant to speak with the Victim during those discussions.

Counsel testified that the time spent with the Victim significantly influenced the Defendant's decision to accept the State's plea offer. The Defendant's initial counsel indicated she spent considerable time discussing the plea agreement and affidavit with the Defendant just before trial, emphasizing that the State required his immediate custody post-hearing and that the agreed sentence was six-to-life. She noted her concerns about the jury's reactions, particularly a juror who requested to be excused. 

Counsel also addressed the incriminating evidence described in Defendant's motion, clarifying that she had been made aware of the photos from Defendant's phone through a police report prior to trial, having seen all but one photo, which featured a nude girl and was deemed non-critical since it did not involve the Victim or relate to child pornography charges. 

Defendant's mother and brother-in-law testified during the evidentiary hearing, with the mother stating that counsel was clear about the six-to-life sentence but described her as aggressive. The brother-in-law mentioned a miscommunication regarding the State's offer, stating it involved two six-year terms, although he was not present for the entirety of the discussions. 

Defendant himself testified that he had not read the plea affidavit before the hearing and was unaware of the immediate incarceration requirement, despite confirming his understanding of the affidavit's rights and the penalties during the plea hearing.

Following the evidentiary hearing, the court addressed the remaining issues regarding Defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea, affirming that his pleas were made knowingly and voluntarily based on the plea affidavit, plea hearing transcript, and evidentiary testimony. The court found Defendant's claims in his motion to lack credibility and emphasized the testimony from his initial trial counsel about the significance of incriminating photos. Consequently, the court concluded that Defendant did not demonstrate that his counsel's failure to seek a continuance or mistrial constituted deficient performance, thereby rejecting the ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

Subsequently, the court held a sentencing hearing and imposed two concurrent prison terms of ten years to life. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to withdraw his no-contest pleas, arguing that the trial court erred in its decision. The standard of review for such denials is an abuse of discretion, with findings of fact being disturbed only if clearly erroneous, while legal questions regarding plea compliance are reviewed for correctness.

A no-contest plea may only be withdrawn with court permission and upon showing that it was not entered knowingly and voluntarily. Defendant contended that his pleas were not made knowingly and voluntarily, raising several arguments. He claimed reversible error occurred when the court referred to an incorrect legal standard during the plea hearing, disputed the finding that he read and understood the plea affidavit, and asserted that the plea colloquy was fundamentally flawed. Each of these arguments is addressed in the order presented.

Defendant argues that it is fundamentally unfair to hold him to the "knowing and voluntary" standard for withdrawing a plea, as he was informed during the plea hearing that he could withdraw his plea for "good cause." This "good cause" standard was replaced by the current standard in 2003, which Defendant claims undermines the adversarial nature of the justice system. However, he fails to address his trial counsel's testimony during the evidentiary hearing or the trial court's ruling, leading to the rejection of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding the handling of incriminating photos and decisions not to seek a continuance or mistrial. 

Defendant's argument mirrors that of a previous case, State v. Ferretti, where the appellant also claimed misinformation about the withdrawal standard; the court found this reasoning unpersuasive due to a lack of supporting authority. Similarly, Defendant does not cite any authority, nor does he address the Ferretti case, instead asserting that the trial court's mention of the outdated good cause standard constituted a failure to comply with rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. However, the court clarifies that rule 11 does not require the court to specify the legal standard for plea withdrawal, and non-compliance regarding advising on time limits for filing such motions does not invalidate the plea. Ultimately, the court concludes that a defendant’s understanding of withdrawal procedures does not have constitutional implications affecting plea voluntariness.

Courts are no longer required to strictly comply with Rule 11 regarding guilty pleas. Prior to 1987, substantial compliance was necessary, but after the Utah Supreme Court decision in *State v. Gibbons*, strict compliance became mandatory until the rule was amended in 2005. The amendment established that failure to comply does not alone justify a collateral attack on a guilty plea; instead, compliance is evaluated by reviewing the entire record, and minor variances that do not affect substantial rights can be overlooked. 

Criminal defendants often seek to withdraw their pleas long after entering them, illustrated by the reliance on *State v. Lovell*, which applied strict compliance due to the defendant's plea date. However, the "clear break" principle prohibiting retroactive application of amended rules has since been abandoned, as noted in *State v. Guard*. In the current case, strict compliance with Rule 11 was not required.

The record indicates that the defendant did not demonstrate that the trial court's misstatement of the withdrawal standard hindered his understanding of the plea. The plea affidavit contained the correct standard, and the defendant signed it prior to the court's misstatement, suggesting no impact on his substantial rights.

The defendant argues that his pleas were not knowing and voluntary due to a lack of understanding of key aspects of the plea agreement, namely immediate custody and exposure to a life sentence. His claims are supported by his testimony and that of his brother-in-law. However, the trial court's findings of fact will only be overturned if they are clearly erroneous, as established in *State v. Beckstead*.

Defendant failed to convince the court that it clearly erred in determining he understood the plea affidavit, including its provisions for sentencing and immediate incarceration. Despite Defendant's testimony claiming he did not read or understand the affidavit, his initial trial counsel testified that she thoroughly reviewed it with him, emphasizing the State’s recommendation of two terms of six years to life in prison. Defendant’s mother corroborated this, stating that counsel was clear about the recommendation. Although Defendant's brother-in-law recalled a different statement regarding the sentencing, the court chose to credit the testimonies of the mother and initial counsel.

Defendant's argument that his inquiries during the plea hearing indicated a lack of understanding was rejected. His questions focused on the reasons for immediate incarceration rather than expressing surprise at the requirement. This suggested he had contemplated the immediate incarceration aspect prior to the plea hearing and was seeking to challenge it.

The court found no clear error in its conclusion that Defendant understood the plea affidavit before entering his pleas, affirming that his pleas were knowingly and voluntarily made. Regarding the plea colloquy, Defendant argued it was fundamentally flawed under rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, but this argument was deemed foreclosed by precedent set in State v. Alexander. While acknowledging deficiencies in the colloquy, the court noted that rule 11 is designed to ensure that pleas are made with a full understanding of rights and the nature of the offense, and compliance with this rule is crucial for establishing a record of informed consent.

Defendant argues that the trial court's colloquy under rule 11 was inadequate, specifically citing the failure to inform him of the maximum sentence associated with his pleas and not effectively incorporating the plea affidavit into the record. He asserts that simply asking if he had enough time to discuss the affidavit with his attorney was insufficient; the court should have explicitly confirmed that he had read and understood the affidavit. The trial court's findings must be supported by the record, which can include various means of acknowledgment from the defendant. Although the court's inquiry was lacking, the Utah Supreme Court's ruling in Alexander establishes that a plea may only be withdrawn if it is shown to have been made unknowingly and involuntarily, and not merely due to rule 11 violations. In this case, the court concluded that Defendant's pleas were made knowingly and voluntarily, and thus denied his motion to withdraw the plea. The decision was affirmed as the court found no reversible error, despite acknowledging shortcomings in the colloquy process. The concurring opinion also supports the finding of a knowing and voluntary plea, citing ample evidence from the record. The concurring judge further notes that while the colloquy was not exemplary, strict compliance with rule 11 is not mandatory if substantial rights are not affected.

Conducting a plea colloquy that substantially complies with Rule 11 requires significant time due to its specific requirements. A comprehensive colloquy covering all eight requirements of Rule 11 would be time-consuming, which is challenging for trial judges managing busy criminal calendars. To improve efficiency, written plea agreement forms have been created that encapsulate the necessary information, as permitted by Rule 11. If a defendant adequately understands the plea agreement—either by reading it or having it explained—judges can streamline the colloquy process, focusing primarily on the defendant's mental state and understanding of the agreement.

The effectiveness of this system relies on two conditions: the written plea agreement must include all required information, and the defendant must genuinely understand its contents. Courts must conduct an inquiry to confirm the defendant's understanding before incorporating the plea agreement into the record. In the current case, the defendant did not contest the written plea agreement's terms but claimed his plea was not knowing and voluntary due to a lack of understanding. This necessitated a three-hour evidentiary hearing with multiple witnesses to resolve the issue. While the court's resolution of the matter was affirmed, there was concern over the need for such a hearing, attributed to shortcomings in the abbreviated plea colloquy. Additionally, special considerations are necessary for defendants who may face language barriers or literacy issues when engaging with the plea agreement.

The trial court's plea colloquy was found to be deficient, primarily due to its failure to ask the defendant if he had read and understood the plea agreement form. This omission is critical, especially since the colloquy relied heavily on the written form to expedite the process. Although the court asked if the defendant was thinking clearly and aware of the constitutional rights he was waiving, these questions did not sufficiently demonstrate his understanding of the plea agreement. 

In legal contexts, having access to review a document may bind a party to its contents; however, in plea agreements, mere availability is inadequate without confirming the defendant's comprehension. The court's failure to ask about the understanding of the plea led to the necessity of a separate evidentiary hearing to assess the validity of the plea withdrawal motion, which could have been avoided with a more thorough initial inquiry. The trial court ultimately reached the correct conclusion, but the process was inefficient and could have been streamlined with a more focused colloquy that ensured the defendant's understanding of the plea agreement, as required by Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e).