Evans v. Utah Department of Transp.

Citations: 2018 UT App 207; 437 P.3d 561Docket: 20160994-CA

Court: Court of Appeals of Utah; November 1, 2018; Utah; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Jamie Evans and Evans Billboards LLC appealed a district court decision that upheld the Utah Department of Transportation's (UDOT) denial of two outdoor advertising applications. The applications were originally submitted in 2008 for signs near Exit 257 on Interstate 15, which were denied due to their proximity to the interchange, violating the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act. Despite the denial, Evans erected the signs, leading to a court order for their removal, which was upheld by this court in a prior case.

In 2012, after UDOT reconfigured Exit 257, Evans applied again for sign permits at similar locations. UDOT denied these applications, citing that the signs remained within the prohibited 500-foot zone from the interchange. The district court affirmed this denial, stating the signs violated the Act designed to protect areas around interchanges from advertising.

Evans's primary argument on appeal was that the district court misinterpreted the term "intersecting highway" within the context of "pavement widening" under the Act. The Utah Outdoor Advertising Act aims to regulate outdoor advertising, balancing public safety with the preservation of scenic beauty along highways. The court noted that the safety concern arises particularly when drivers are navigating interchanges, as distractions from billboards could compromise their focus. The analysis of the regulations, while complex, emphasizes their primary objective of ensuring safety for drivers.

Under the Act, signs are prohibited within 500 feet of an interchange, which is defined as the area where traffic enters or exits an interstate route. The 500-foot measurement is taken along the interstate from the sign to the nearest point of pavement widening at the interchange's entrance or exit. Pavement widening occurs either at the point of the gore (the triangular area formed by two solid white lines) or where the intersecting lane begins to parallel the traffic lanes. Both parties in this case agree that pavement widening occurs at the gore for Exit 257. 

Evans claims that one of the exit lanes is a deceleration lane, while the court's prior decision indicated that pavement widening is determined by lane configuration—if there is no acceleration lane, it occurs at the gore; if there is an acceleration lane, it occurs where the lane begins to parallel. Under the Utah Administrative Code, acceleration and deceleration lanes are defined similarly, as speed change lanes for merging in or out of traffic.

In this case, one exit lane is classified as an off-ramp, diverging from I-15 without merging, confirming that pavement widening occurs at the gore. UDOT acknowledges that no intersecting highway exists within 2,640 feet of the gore but argues that allowing Evans's signs would violate the Act and the Utah-Federal Agreement. The district court ruled that the bridge crossing I-15 is an intersecting highway and that Evans's signs are within the prohibited 500 feet from the interchange. On appeal, Evans contests the classification of the bridge as an intersecting highway, asserting that since no intersecting highway is within the specified distance, the signs should be permissible.

UDOT maintains that the lack of a limit on pavement widening distance in the Utah-Federal Agreement is problematic, as it complicates enforcement of the 500-foot prohibition. However, the legislature clearly intended to impose such a limit, and the court's role is to interpret the statutes as written, rather than aligning with UDOT's enforcement perspective.

Evans argues that exit lanes qualify as deceleration lanes, which would permit billboards near them due to the Act's exclusion of deceleration lanes from the definition of “interchange.” However, the court's reversal of the district court’s interpretation of 'intersecting highway' means it does not need to determine the nature of exit lanes. The Act lacks a definition for 'intersecting highway,' leading to differing interpretations from the parties. UDOT claims the Bridge qualifies as an intersecting highway under Title 72 of the Utah Code, defining 'highway' broadly to include public structures like bridges. This interpretation supports the district court’s view that the interchange intersects with I-15 for statutory purposes, despite I-15 and US-6 not intersecting directly.

Conversely, Evans posits that the term 'intersecting highway' should refer to an 'other route' as defined by the interchange's traffic flow. However, neither interpretation is substantiated by the Act. The court emphasizes the importance of discerning legislative intent through the plain language of statutes, ensuring all words are given effect and avoiding interpretations that would render parts of the statute superfluous. UDOT's analysis fails to consider that the Bridge, being an off-ramp, is part of the interchange, and thus defining 'intersecting highway' to include the interchange itself would negate the necessity of a 2,640-foot measurement limit from the highway's centerline.

The statute specifies that measurements should be taken from the pavement widening to the centerline of the 'intersecting highway,' indicating that it should refer to a distinct route rather than components of the interchange. Additionally, the Act differentiates between 'highway' and 'streets or roads,' indicating a narrower interpretation for 'intersecting highway.' Evans' interpretation, suggesting that 'intersecting highway' means 'other route' based on the definitions of 'interchange' and 'pavement widening,' lacks statutory support.

The term "intersecting highway" lacks a specific definition in the Act, prompting an examination of its plain and ordinary meaning. "Intersect" denotes a meeting or crossing at a point, while "highway" refers to a main road linking towns or cities. The analysis establishes that an "intersecting highway" is a principal public road that meets or crosses another road, not an expansive term including all streets. The Act distinguishes "intersection" from "interchange," and the definition of "intersecting highway" aligns with the statutory context, requiring consistency with the Utah-Federal Agreement. This agreement mandates Utah to regulate outdoor advertising adjacent to interstate and primary systems, stating that only roads directly entering the main-traveled way of a primary highway qualify as intersecting highways. An interchange does not fit this definition as it lacks components like deceleration and acceleration lanes, which are characteristic of a main-traveled way. Consequently, since the 2,640-foot measurement of the distance to the center line applies only to a primary highway, an interchange cannot be classified as an intersecting highway.

For the Act and the Agreement to align, an interchange must connect directly to the main-traveled way of a primary highway, defined as an ‘intersecting highway.’ An 'intersecting highway' must be a 'primary highway,' which is not explicitly defined in the Act but is clarified through the Utah-Federal Agreement and federal statutes. A 'primary highway' is identified as part of the federal-aid primary system as outlined in 23 U.S.C. 131(a). 

As of 1991, the federal-aid highway system included the interstate, primary, secondary, and urban systems, which were later restructured into the National Highway System (NHS). The NHS comprises major routes crucial for population centers and commerce, receiving federal funding to meet 21st-century transportation demands. 

The district court’s interpretation that I-15 qualifies as an 'intersecting highway' is flawed, as interstates do not meet the definition of primary highways. This is due to the nature of interchanges and statutory distinctions between interstate and primary systems. An 'intersecting highway' must be a primary highway on the federal-aid primary system as of June 1, 1991, or part of the NHS, aligning with legislative intent to adhere to the Agreement's specifications.

Additionally, while US-6 is classified as a federal-aid primary highway and SR-156 is part of the NHS, neither intersects the interchange within the required 2,640 feet from the pavement widening at Exit 257. UDOT’s method of calculating distances from the gore point to intersections with I-15 is deemed incorrect; measurements should originate from the center line of the primary highway at the interchange. Ultimately, neither US-6 nor SR-156 meets the necessary criteria for intersection within the specified distance.

US-6 begins at the Moark Connection Interchange of Route 15 and extends easterly through Spanish Fork Canyon, located over four miles from the I-15 interchange. The Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT) determined that the legislative definition of US-6 does not include the southbound ramps of the I-15 mainline in this area. Additionally, State Route 156 (SR-156) intersects I-15 more than 4,400 feet from the gore point, meaning this intersection is over 2,640 feet from the pavement widening. 

Due to the absence of an "intersecting highway" within 2,640 feet of the gore point at Exit 257, there is no applicable 500-foot prohibition around the interchange. Consequently, the district court incorrectly concluded that Evans’s signs were prohibited. The court determined that an "intersecting highway" under the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act must be a primary highway directly intersecting the relevant interstate interchange. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's decision, instructed UDOT to grant Evans's applications, and remanded the case for further action.