Lori Drummond, Resp V. Bonaventure Of Lacey, Llc, Apps

Citation: Not availableDocket: 54273-1

Court: Court of Appeals of Washington; December 13, 2021; Washington; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Raymond Drummond, a resident of Bonaventure of Lacey, suffered insulin poisoning due to incorrectly administered medication and subsequently passed away. His estate, represented by Lori G. Drummond, filed a lawsuit against Bonaventure alleging responsibility for the medication error and included a wrongful death claim. Bonaventure sought to compel arbitration based on an arbitration agreement signed by Lori when admitting Raymond, arguing it was binding on the estate. However, the trial court denied this motion, ruling that the arbitration agreement violated RCW 70.129.105, which prohibits assisted living facilities from requiring residents to waive rights under chapter 70.129 RCW. Bonaventure appealed, contending the trial court misinterpreted the statute and denied the motion to stay the beneficiaries' claim. The appellate court determined that RCW 70.129.005 does not establish a right to a jury trial, meaning it does not prohibit the arbitration agreement. The court declined to address the stay of the beneficiaries' claim as the trial court had not ruled on it, reversing the lower court's decision and remanding for further proceedings. The background details included that Raymond was admitted in 2017, had an arbitration agreement included in the admission documents, and that glimepiride, a non-prescribed medication, was found in his system leading to his hospitalization and eventual death. The Estate’s complaint included six causes of action related to the alleged negligence resulting in wrongful death.

The Estate argued that the arbitration agreement with Bonaventure was non-binding, claiming it violated RCW 70.129.105, which prohibits long-term care facilities from requesting arbitration agreements with residents. The court sided with the Estate, concluding that the statute indeed barred the arbitration agreement, but did not resolve whether Lori had the authority to sign it or if the beneficiaries’ claims should be stayed. Bonaventure appealed, contending that the trial court's interpretation of RCW 70.129.105 was erroneous and that if it prohibited such agreements, it would be preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The Estate maintained that the agreement necessitated Raymond to waive his right to a jury trial as outlined in RCW 70.129.005, which the court found does not specifically grant a right to a jury trial.

In legal principles, statutory interpretation is reviewed de novo, focusing on the legislature's intent through the statute's plain language. RCW 70.129.005 ensures residents receive appropriate services and retain their basic rights, while RCW 70.129.105 explicitly states that no long-term care facility can require residents to waive rights or request liability waivers. Furthermore, the FAA supports the validity and enforceability of arbitration agreements, stating they can only be invalidated on legal or equitable grounds, and preempts state laws that undermine arbitration agreements. The FAA's authority was highlighted in Kindred Nursing Centers Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, where the U.S. Supreme Court rejected state-level attempts to invalidate arbitration agreements under the guise of constitutional rights.

A Washington statute, RCW 70.129.105, cannot be interpreted to prohibit arbitration agreements, as arbitration merely limits recovery avenues and does not constitute a waiver of liability or infringe upon any rights specified in chapter 70.129 RCW. The Estate argues that RCW 70.129.005 contains a right to a jury trial, thus rendering the arbitration agreement invalid. However, it is determined that RCW 70.129.005 does not explicitly grant a right to a jury trial; instead, it expresses legislative intent for residents to maintain basic civil and legal rights without detailing them. Consequently, the claim that the arbitration agreement violates RCW 70.129.105 is unpersuasive.

Furthermore, even if there were ambiguities regarding the statute, courts avoid interpretations that could raise constitutional issues, as established by preemption principles rooted in the supremacy clause. If RCW 70.129.105 were to be interpreted as preventing arbitration agreements, it would be preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which prohibits laws that undermine arbitration agreements by targeting their core characteristics. Thus, the interpretation suggested by the Estate would result in a preemption problem, violating the supremacy clause. Ultimately, the court holds that the arbitration agreement between Bonaventure and Raymond is valid, as RCW 70.129.005 does not establish a right to a jury trial, and therefore does not prohibit the agreement under RCW 70.129.105.

Bonaventure contends that if its motion to compel arbitration for the Estate is approved, then its motion to stay the beneficiaries' claim pending arbitration should also be granted. However, the court refrains from evaluating the appropriateness of such a stay since the trial court has not yet issued a decision on this matter, leaving no basis for appellate review under RAP 2.4(a). The appellate court typically does not review issues unaddressed by the trial court. Additionally, the trial court has not fully examined all aspects related to Bonaventure's arbitration enforcement motion, which may render the beneficiaries' claim stay issue irrelevant. 

In conclusion, the court determines that RCW 70.129.005 does not provide a right to a jury trial, and RCW 70.129.105 does not invalidate Bonaventure's arbitration agreement with Raymond based on the assertion of a jury trial right in RCW 70.129.005. The court chooses not to address other issues pending trial court ruling and thus reverses and remands for further proceedings. The Estate's request for a decision on issues related to the arbitration motion, including Lori's authority to sign the settlement agreement, is also declined as the trial court has not ruled on these matters.